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Abstract
Until recently, studies of metaphor and metonymy within cognitive linguistics 
have tended to rely on data collected on a fairly ad hoc basis from speakers’ 
intuition, resulting in a largely theory-based method of analysis. In this thesis I 
present an analysis of the concept INTELLIGENCE, based on HTE data. By 
examining the etymologies of individual words and their roots I have 
identified a number of source concepts for INTELLIGENCE, and I consider 
the motivations that underlie these mappings. I hope to illustrate that the 
mechanisms of different mappings vary substantially; my evidence suggests 
that no one theory of metaphor is sufficient to aceount for all the mappings 
that charaeterise a single target concept, and that the crucial role of culture, as 
well as cognition, must be recognised.
I have analysed a total of 1075 nouns and adjectives meaning a clever/stupid 
person, and clever/stupid. Although my study is not intended to be 
quantitative, I have used quantity as a very basie indieation of the souree fields 
that are particularly productive and therefore characterise our 
conceptualisation of intelligence. In the main part of the thesis, the source 
concepts the SENSES, ANIMALS and DENSITY are analysed in detail. 
These exhibit major differences in motivation, and each one raises particular 
theoretical issues.
By taking a data-centred approach to a whole semantic area, and by looking 
from a historical as well as a cognitive perspective, I give an overview of a 
whole target concept. I hope that my analysis will challenge and illuminate 
both understanding of the way INTELLIGENCE is conceptualised, and beliefs 
about the motivations and meehanisms of figurative language. Above all, I 
wish to demonstrate the relevanee and importance of diaehronic language 
study in any consideration of metaphor.
iii
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been completed without the support of a 
number of individuals, who have made my time as a graduate happy and 
rewarding.
I am very grateful to everyone at the Department of English Language 
at the University of Glasgow for their help, and for the friendly and positive 
atmosphere which I have enjoyed throughout my studies. In particular, I 
would like to thank the many staff involved with HTE during the past three 
years for their encouragement and patienee (and for all the tea and eake); I am 
indebted to Flora Edmonds, HTE Database Manager, for many hours of 
practical advice and assistance.
Various scholars have made helpful comments and suggestions 
throughout my research, and drawn my attention to useful information. I 
would like to give special thanks to Carole Biggam, Isabel de la Cruz 
Cabanillas, Philip Durkin, Kurt Feyaerts, Sakis Kyratzis, Jim MeGonigal and 
George Lakoff for their valued contributions. Equally importantly, I could not 
have finished my thesis without support of various kinds from friends and 
family, and for this I am especially grateful to Irene and Graham 
Wotherspoon, and again to Philip Durkin.
Thanks are also due to the Student Awards Agency for Scotland and 
the Arts and Humanities Research Board for research grants that have enabled 
me to concentrate on my studies full time.
Above all, I must express my gratitude to my supervisor, Christian 
Kay; without her enthusiasm, confidence and humour, my experience as a 
PhD student would have been very different.
iv
Contents
Abstract.................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements................................................................................................ ill
Table of contents.................................................................................................... iv
1 introduction.................................................................................... 1
1.1 Brief outline of metaphor study_ ...................._......................................... 4
1.2 Methodology................................................................................................... 13
1. 2 .1 Historical Thesaurus of English.................................................................13
1. 2.2 The INTELLIGENCE eorpus.....................................................................13
1.2.3 Guide to the database................................................................................... 14
1.2.4 Discrepancies between HTE and the INTELLIGENCE corpus...............16
1.2.5 Dating of entries........................................................................................... 17
1.2.6 Data analysis................................................................................................. 18
1.3 The ddta - s ome preliminaay c omments................................................ 22
1.3.1 STUPID vs CLEVER..................................................................................22
1.3.2 The core eoncept groups..............................................................................24
1.3.3 The ‘hierarchy’ of core concepts................................................................ 28
1.3.4 Associations between core concepts.......................................................... 29
1.3.5 MIND, HEAD and BRAIN.........................................................................30
1.3.6 Focus of this thesis.......................................................................................36
2 SENSES..........................................................................................38
2.1 introduction...................................................................................................38
2.2 Data..................................................................................................... _..........39
2.2.1 VISION........................................................................................................ 40
2.2.1.1 LIGHT....................................................................................................... 43
2.2.2 TOUCH.........................................................................................................43
2.2.3 TASTE................ .........................................................................._____.........45
2.2.4 HEARING.................................................................................................... 45
2.3Motivation...................................................................................................... 46
2.3.1 VISION.......................................................................................................47
2.3.1.1 LIGHT 48
V2.3.2 TOUCH............. _____...................................... ............................................ 50
2.3.3 TASTE.......................................................................................................... 53
2.3.4 HEARING.................................................................................................... 54
2.4 Proto-Indo-European.................................................................................55
2.5 Primary metaphor and conflation theory................................................ 59
2.6 Evidence in non-Indo-European languages ____.....    64
2.7 Ontogeny and phylogeny.............................................................................68
2.8 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 69
2.9 Evidence from Austronesian and Afroasiatic.......................................... 72
2.9 .1 VISION........................................................................................................ 72
2.9.2 TOUCH........................................................................................................ 76
2.9.3 TASTE.......................................................................................................... 77
2.9.4 HEARING.................................................................................................... 78
2.10 Data tables.................................................................................................... 81
2.10.1 SENSE- VISION........................................................................................ 82
2.10.1.1 SENSE-VISION-LIGHT........................................................................88
2.10.2 SENSE-TOUCH........................................................................................90
2.10.3 SENSE-TASTE..........................................................................................92
2.10.4 SENSE-HEARING....................................................................................93
3 ANIMALS.................................................................................... 94
3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................... 94
3.2 Data.......................................................................     94
3.2.1 MAMMALS............................................................................................... 95
3.2.2 BIRDS......................................................................................................... 96
3.2.3 INSECTS.................................................................................................... 97
3.2.4 FISH............................................................................................................ 97
3.3 Motivvtion............   98
3.3.1 Nature and nurture, the brain, and cognitive fluidity.............................. 98
3.3.2 Cultural influences: the medieval tradition and beyond.......................... 100
3.3.3 Dating issues - a problem?........................................................................105
3.3.4 Derogatory terms and the Great Chain metaphor................................... 110
3.3.5 An analysis of animal metaphorization....................................................113
3.3.6 Similarity theory........................................................................................ 115
vi
3.4 Particular animals found .................................. ............ .........................118
3.4.1 MAMMALS............................................................................................... 119
3.4.1.1 DONKEYS/MULES...............................................................................122
3.4.1.2 SHEEP..................................................................................................... 125
3.4.1.3 BOVINES......................................................... ..................................... 129
3.4.1.4 Other animals.......................................................................................... 132
3.4.2 BIRDS......................................................................................................... 135
3.4.3 INSECTS.................................................................................................... 141
3.4.4 FISH............................................................................................................ 146
3.5 Conclusion.................................................................................................... 148
3.6 Data tables..... ...............................................................................................150
3.6.1 ANIMAL-MAMMAL............................................................................... 151
3.6.1.1 ANIMAL-MAMMAL-DONKEY/MULE............................................151
3.6.1.2 ANIMAL-MAMMAL-SHEEP..............................................................152
3.6.1.3 ANIMAL-MAMMAL-BOVINE...........................................................153
3.6.1.4 ANIMAL-MAMMAL-Other animals...................................................154
3.6.2 ANIMAL-BIRD.......................................................................... _____...... 155
3.6.3 ANIMAL-INSECT.................................................................................... 157
3.6.4 ANIMAL-FISH.......................................................................................... 158
3.6.5 ANIMAL-general.......................................................................................159
4 DENSITY................................................................................. 160
4.1 Introduction....................................................................................  160
4.2 Data............................................................................................................ 162
4.2.1 General terms............................................................................................. 163
4.2.2 WOOD.........................................................................................................164
4.2.3 EARTH....................................................................................................... 165
4.2.4 FOOD ....................................... ............................. .................................... 165
4.2.5 Miscellaneous............................................................................................. 165
4.3 Dates.............................................................................................................. 166
4.4 Motivation.................................................................................................... 167
4.4.1 Blending theory.......................................................................................... 172
4.4.2 General terms vs. specific substances................. ........._..........................174
4.4.3 WOOD  175
au
4.4.4 EARTH....................................................................................................... 180
4.4.5 FOOD.......................................................................................................... 182
4.4.6 Miscellaneous............................................................................................. 185
4.5 Semantic pathways..................................................................................... 185
4.6 Specificity and lack of other substances................................................. 187
4.7 Conceptual links and limits on reference............................................... 188
4.8 Conclusion.................................................................................................... 195
4.9 Data tables.................................................................................................... 197
4.9.1 DENSITY-GENERAL.............................................................................. 198
4.9.2 DENSITY-WOOD..................................................................................... 199
4.9.3 DENSITY-EARTH....................................................................................201
4.9.4 DENSITY-FOOD...................................................................................... 202
4.9.5 DENSITY-MISC........................................................................................203
5 Conclusion.................................................................................. 204
5.1 A corpus-based approach..........................................................................205
5.1.1 Incongruity in conceptualisations of intelligence...................................205
5.2 A diachronic approach..........................................................  207
5.3 An interdisciplinary approach..................................................................209
5.4 Future research............................................................................................210
6 Postscript^^r-Whorf, PC language
and the influence of metaphor.................................................212
7 Appendix: Additional data tables..........................................215
7.1 AGE................................................................................................................216
7.2 ALIVE/ANIMATE.......................................................................................217
7.3 BEAUTY....................................................................................................... 218
7.4 BIRTH/CREATION.....................................................................................219
7.5 BRAIN........................................................................................................... 220
7.6 BODY PART-SEXUAL..........................................................  222
7.7 COLOUR____________ ____ _________________ _______ _________ 223
7.8 COMPLETION............................................................................................. 224
7.9 CONTAINER .......................................................................................... 226
VU1
7.9.1 CONTTANR-EMPTY/FULL OFNOTHING....  .......... .....................227
7.10 FAT.............................................................................................................. 228
7.11 FRLIT/VEG................................................................................................229
7.12 GOOD/HATTY...........................................................................................230
7.13 HARD/SOFT.... ..............      231
7.14 HEAD.......................................................................................................... 232
7.15 HEALTH-THYSICAL/MENTAL.............................................................239
7.16 HIT/STUNNED...........................................................................................240
7.17 HUMAN...................................................................................................... 241
7.18 HUMBLE/ORDINARY.............................................................................242
7.19 INTELLIGENCE........................................................................................243
7.20 LIQUID/SEMI-LIQUID............................................................................245
7.21 LOOSE TEXTURE............... ............. ......................„...................... .........246
7.22 LUMP.......................................................................................................... 249
7.23 MIND........................................................................................................... 250
7.24 OBJECT...................................................................................................... 255
7.25 TURE/CLEAN............................................................................................256
7.26 SENSE/FEELING...................................................................................... 257
7.27 SHAPE.........................................  258
7.28 SHART/TIERCING.......................... _........................................................259
7.29 SIZE............................................................................................................. 262
7.30 SOUND........................................................................................................ 263
7.31 STEECH....................................          264
7.32 STEED......................................................................................................... 265
7.33 STRENGTH/WEAKNESS........................................................................266
7.34 VALUE........................................................................................................ 267
7.35 WEALTH/TROSTERITY..........................................................................268
7.36 WEIGHT...................................................................................................... 269
Bibliography.................................................................................. 270
 1 Introduction
Metaphor studies have long been challenged by questions about the 
nature of metaphor, and even after many centuries of study there is 
surprisingly little consensus about what actually constitutes metaphor. 
Dictionary definitions of the term vary, and many would be disputed by 
cognitive linguists. The Oxford English Dictionary (in a revised 3rd edition 
entry) defines metaphor as “A figure of speech in which a name or descriptive 
word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but 
analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable”; the American Heritage
Dictionary offers “A figure of speech in which a word or phrase that 
ordinarily designates one thing is used to designate another, thus making an 
implicit comparison”. Definitions like these rightly reflect widely-held popular 
beliefs about metaphor, but this is not the way that the term is used within 
cognitive linguistics. Many of the traditional ideas about metaphor like those 
given in these definitions have been disputed and discredited within the 
discipline by recent research. Metaphor is no longer regarded as a figure of 
speech only and has been shown to be common and pervasive, and theories 
that metaphorical mappings are based on similarity or comparison have been 
rejected as inadequate or simply mistaken. However, it seems to me that there 
is not yet any widely agreed definition of the term within cognitive linguistics 
itself, and this is problematic. Recently, with the increasing interest in 
electronic corpora and artificial intelligence, there have been renewed efforts 
to find some reliable procedure for identifying metaphor, and at the heart of 
this must be a generally acceptable definition of metaphor.
A further complication in the debate is the existence of metaphors 
regarded by many as conventionalized to the extent that they ‘die’ or cease to 
be metaphorical. Work in cognitive linguistics, concentrated on system-wide 
“metaphors we live by” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), has diverted much attention 
away from this issue by shifting focus to the cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie metaphorical mappings, but there is still some uneasiness about the 
difference between more and less ‘active’ metaphors.
2By taking a diachronic approach to metaphor, I would contend that it is 
possible to side-step these issues and adopt a pragmatic, data-centred stance. 
My analysis is focused on the target concept INTELLIGENCE, and starts 
from an examination of the etymological development of a group of lexical 
items from Old to Present Day English, in order to identify earliest meanings 
and stages in semantic change; these are nouns and adjectives signifying either 
CLEVERNESS and STUPIDITY which can be applied to people. I then go on 
to look at three of the most productive source concepts in more detail; these 
are the SENSES, ANIMALS and DENSITY. Each group raises particular 
questions about the way in which metaphor can be motivated, and how 
mappings between concepts develop, and in the main part of the thesis I 
present detailed individual case studies centred on the linguistic data for these 
concepts.
The approach I have adopted, which is influenced by the work of 
scholars including Sweetser (1990) and Kay (2000), renders it unnecessary to 
draw up any strict guidelines for metaphor until these can be based on 
evidence. I hope that this will preclude a situation in which one begins with a 
rule that proves to be prohibitively theoretical and narrow, and which has to be 
supplemented to deal with ‘anomalous’ real examples. Issues of metaphoricity 
and conventionality in particular mappings also become largely irrelevant, 
since the important point for my study is the metaphorical basis of meaning 
change and the processes on which this change depends.
The findings of my study suggest that the most important thing to 
recognise in studying metaphor is that there is no single-strand theory that can 
deal with all the complexities that can be involved in various different 
examples of metaphor. The theories that are most promising in this respect are 
ones that can integrate elements from a range of disciplines in a flexible and 
adaptable manner, such as Fauconnier & Turner’s blending theory (1998, 
2002); whilst I am not qualified to critically evaluate this from a neural 
perspective, it seems to be able to take account of all sorts of factors, both 
those concerned with culture and with cognition. The aspect of this theory that
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has been most criticised is its open-ended nature and this has led to criticisms 
that it is so general as to be meaningless. However, this seems to me to be its 
strength, and I think that Gibbs’ observation about the usefulness of the theory 
to psychology is useful here:
...it is...miportent to realise that blending theory is not a single theory that can be
studied and potentially falsified within a single experimental test. Instead, blending
theory is a broad framework that suggests a variety of localized hypotheses... (Gibbs
2000:349).
Crucially, Fauconnier & Turner have stressed the importance of an inter­
disciplinary approach, suggesting that “Research on meaning...requires 
analysis of extensive ranges of data, which must be connected theoretically 
across fields and disciplines by general cognitive principles” (Fauconnier & 
Turner 1998:136). Totentially, blending theory sits comfortably alongside 
established theories from semantics, and I believe that this is particularly 
important because semantics as a discipline has been overlooked in much of 
the recent research within cognitive linguistics.
The data presented in the main part of the thesis, chapters 2-4, draws 
attention to a number of motivating factors that can be involved in 
metaphorical mappings, and the range of traditions and influences that can 
affect these mappings. No aspect of my analysis of each of these metaphors is 
in any way comprehensive, nor is it intended to be. The basic thing I hope to 
achieve in this study is to highlight the diversity that characterises metaphor in 
the broadest sense. I propose that the most helpful and practical way to 
approach metaphor is to recognise that, as Max Black contends, “Metaphor is 
a loose word, at best, and we must beware of attributing to it stricter rules of 
usage than are actually found in practice” (Black 1962:28-29).
 4
1.1 Brief outline of metaphor study1
Historically, metaphor and metaphorical expression has attracted a 
general lack of enthusiasm from linguists. This is not to say it has been 
ignored: as far back as Aristotle, who is thought to have begun the tradition of 
studying figurative speech, widespread interest in metaphor stretched into 
various disciplines, notably literary criticism and philosophy. But as modem 
linguistics emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, a growing determination 
that it be given the status of a science followed. Preoccupation with data that 
could be recorded precisely (phonetics received a great deal of attention) left 
little room for semantics, let alone figurative language that could not be 
accommodated easily in a typical grammar. Metaphor was considered to be “a 
species of figurative language which needs explaining, or explaining away... a 
kind of anomaly of language” (Schon 1993:137). Leonard Bloomfield’s 
Language was typical of this period: in over five hundred pages, there are only 
nineteen that deal with any form of semantics (Bloomfield 1933).
This left metaphor study to philosophy and literary criticism, and this 
is where almost all interest in the subject was rooted, going back as far as 
Aristotle. In most early work, metaphor was seen by many scholars as “a kind 
of decorative addition to ordinary plain language; a rhetorical device to be 
used at certain times to gain certain effects” (Saeed 1999:303). Metaphor was 
most often discussed within guides to skill in rhetoric, and was rarely 
considered as its own justification. The writings of Henry Home (Lord Karnes) 
in the eighteenth century are indicative of the work published in this era: in 
Elements of criticism, first published in 1762, metaphor is considered along 
with other kinds of figurative language in a section entitled ‘Figures’ (Home 
1993:275f1). Occasionally scholars did discuss the role of metaphor in 
language, but this comment by Shelley is very much in line with this idea of 
metaphor as a device used best by those with expertise in ‘the art of rhetoric’.
' The following is a brief summary of metaphor study, which is intended only to provide a 
background for the present study.
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Their language [that of poets] is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before
unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension, until words,
which represent them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of thought
instead of pictures of integral thoughts; and then, if no new poets should arise to
create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized, language will be
dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse (Shelley 1891:4-5).
His words demonstrate the view that metaphor is something ‘special’ or 
‘extraordinary’ - although he talks about language being “vitally 
metaphorical” he asserts that poets have an integral role in the creation of 
metaphor. He echoes Aristotle’s famous phrase (in the Poetics) “The greatest 
thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted 
to another: it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye 
for resemblances” (quoted in Richards 1936:89).
Naturally, therefore, ‘literary’ metaphor was deemed the most 
interesting and worthy of notice. As well as this, there was a prevailing 
attitude that metaphor was potentially a misleading and deceptive linguistic 
tool, and this idea can still be found. Max Black went as far as to say that 
“Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, on the principle that whereof one 
can speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all... No 
doubt metaphors are dangerous...” (Black 1962:25,47). Around the same time, 
a similar view was expressed by Colin Turbayne:
I try to explode the metaphysics of mechanism. ..by exposing mechanism as a case of
being victimized by metaphor. Descartes and Newton I choose as excellent examples
of metaphysicians of mechanism malgre eux, that is to say, as unconscious victims of
the metaphor of the great machine... All this is so in spite of the meager opposition
offered by the theologians, a few poets, and fewer philosophers, who, in general,
have been victimized by their own metaphors to the same degree of their rivals
(hurbayne 1962:5).
Though the majority of linguists would distance themselves from using 
terminology like ‘dangerous’ and ‘misleading’ of metaphor, the idea that 
choice of metaphor can frame situations or people in different ways and 
influence the attitudes of others has certainly been taken on. It is also 
beginning to exert practical influential in a wider context. Currently, in the US 
particularly, political and media organisations are beginning to employ
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linguists (including Lakoff) to advise them of the best ways to ‘market’ 
themselves and their policies.
It was not until the early twentieth century, notably with I A Richards 
(whose interest lay mainly in literary criticism), that any detailed account of 
the workings of figurative language was attempted. In retrospect Richards’ 
work on metaphor was groundbreaking, and the impact of his new 
perspectives was far-reaching. He was one of the first to recognise that 
metaphor was not the unusual, extraordinary phenomenon that it had been 
widely regarded to be, describing it as the “omnipresent principle of 
language”, which “we cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid 
discourse without” (Richards 1936:92). He went on to say that this was also 
the case in scientific discourse and technical language. Terhaps his greatest 
contribution to the discipline, over forty years before Lakoff & Johnson 
published Metaphors We Live By, was his assertion that metaphor was more 
significant than a mere rhetorical flourish:
The traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and limited its
application of the term metaphor to a few of them only. And thereby it made
metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas
fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction
between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the
metaphors of language derive therefrom. To improve the theory of metaphor we must
remember this (Richards 1936:94).
By bringing in the labels ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ to distinguish between the two 
‘halves’ of a metaphor (ie the concept being referred to and the concept being 
used metaphorically to refer to it), Richards created a useful terminology for 
future scholars. By simply attempting to look at the complexity of 
metaphorical expression, he cleared the way for more precise, more analytical 
investigation of metaphor.
The work of the philosopher Max Black in the sixties has also been 
influential, and continues to be used a great deal by current scholars. Within 
the context of philosophy, Black was interested in the limitations of traditional 
theories in accounting for the way metaphor works, presenting a critique of the 
widely held substitution view (his terminology), and the closely related
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comparison view (Black 1962:31-39). The substitution view holds that 
metaphorical expression is used as a substitute for some equivalent literal 
expression that the reader/hearer must ‘decipher’: Black’s example is using 
‘Richard is a lion’ to mean ‘Richard is brave’. This is a standard definition for 
metaphor, found for example in the OED entry “The figure of speech in which 
a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but 
analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable; an instance of this, a 
metaphorical expression”. The comparison view is a slightly more 
sophisticated version of the substitution view, holding that metaphorical 
expression is simply condensed simile and can therefore be replaced by a 
literal comparison: to use Black’s example again, ‘Richard is a lion’ stands for 
‘Richard is like a lion (in being brave)’. In his criticism of substitution view, 
he claims that metaphor is reduced either to a convenient source of 
catachresis, existing to compensate for inadequacy in the lexicon, or to a mere 
decoration of language. Both of these are problematic:
There are, however, many metaphors where the virtues ascribed to catachresis cannot
apply, because there is, or there is supposed to be, some readily available and equally
compendious literal equivalent... Except in cases where a metaphor is a catachresis
that remedies some temporary imperfection of literal language, the purpose of
metaphor is to entertain and divert. its use, on this view, always constitutes a
deviation from the “plain and strictly appropriate style (Whately). So, if philosophers
have something more important to do than give serious pleasure to their readers,
metaphor can have no serious place in philosophical discussion (ibid:33-34).
He is equally unconvinced by the comparison view, stating that “it suffers 
from a vagueness that borders upon vacuity” (Black ibid:37). In other words, 
there are no rules to guide a reader in which characteristics are theoretically 
being compared, and often it is hard to find objectively recognisable, ‘literal’ 
resemblances. Building on Richards’ suggestion that the ideas in metaphor 
“co-operate in an inclusive meaning” (Richards 1936:119), Black suggests that 
the alternative interaction view is a more realistic theory of the way metaphors 
function.
...in the given context the focal word...ob tains a new meaning, which is not quite its
meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning which any literal substitute would
have. The new context...imposes extension of meaning upon the focal word. And i
take Richards to be saying that for the metaphor to work the reader must remain
 8
aware of the extension of meaning - must attend to both the old and the new 
meanings together (Black 1962:38-39).
In my opinion, the strength of this theory lies in its defined yet flexible nature: 
it applies (perhaps more or less obviously) to all types of metaphoric 
expression without requiring any amendment. Previous theories had all been 
demonstrated to be inapplicable or irrelevant in certain cases; at last here was 
a simple yet convincing alternative. The interaction view of metaphor has 
gained the general approval of many subsequent scholars, and has informed 
much of the later work in the field. Several current theories are compatible 
with this idea that metaphorical meaning is mediated by the target, and 
‘imports’ only selected elements of the source in the mapping whilst also 
retaining elements of the target.
After Black and during the sixties and seventies, semantics gradually 
began to be accepted as a viable part of linguistics, and linguists at last began 
to turn their attention towards figurative language as a valid and justifiable 
topic for study. The Bloomfieldian view that linguistics should be ‘scientific’ 
was still very much in evidence in much of the work done around this time 
(and continues to be important), but semantics was increasingly being taken 
more seriously, and this bred early attempts in what would now be termed 
‘cognitive linguistics’. In turn, this laid the foundations for later, more realistic 
examinations of what the term ‘metaphor’ constitutes and how it works. An 
increase of interest in meaning (bolstered by the work being done with 
componential analysis and prototype theory), and the resulting acceptance of 
metaphor as central in the development of polysemy, were factors that lent 
credibility to its study. The work of RA Waldron is indicative of this: in Sense
and Sense Development he examines 'metaphoric transfer' in the context of 
diachronic meaning change (Waldron 1979:162-185).
It is in the last twenty years that metaphor has been recognised as a 
central element of linguistics, and perhaps the most significant influence on 
the field has been that of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Much of their 
work, both individually and collaboratively, has been important, but it is 
Metaphors We Live By that has had the greatest impact on study in linguistics,
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and has stimulated a wave of fresh interest in metaphor. Lakoff & Johnson 
looked beyond the role of metaphor in language and focused instead on its 
relationship to thought; the result is a coherent and convincing account of the 
way that metaphor underlies the fundamental structuring of concepts.
.. .metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words
rather than thought or action... We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is
pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our
ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature... Our concepts structure what we perceive,
how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual
system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in
suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think,
what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980:3).
This assertion is followed up with the presentation of a number of the 
metaphors that Lakoff & Johnson believe can be found in the structure of 
certain concepts, alongside linguistic evidence for these.
The ideas that are presented in Metaphors We Live By are not all new. 
The previous year, Michael Reddy had produced the same type of data on the 
“conduit metaphor” (Reddy 1979), and as I have already mentioned, the basic 
notion of metaphor in thought can be traced back as far as Richards. But the 
achievement of this book was the way it developed and substantiated these 
theories. By picking up strands of research that had hitherto been largely 
overlooked, and by adopting a fundamentally different outlook at the outset, 
Lakoff & Johnson shifted the emphasis of metaphor study and opened up new 
areas of inquiry. These included a new interpretation of the terms ‘live’ and 
‘dead’ when applied to metaphor. Traditionally, the dominant view was that 
when a metaphor has become so familiar that it is no longer striking to a 
reader/hearer it has ‘died’ and passed into literal language (see for example 
Searle 1993:122). Exactly at what point this can be considered to have 
happened is debated. Brown suggests that it is “When the word becomes as 
familiar in its new context as it was in its old” (Brown 1958:142). MacCormac 
is more specific in his contention that “when metaphors become so 
commonplace that one or more of the referents adds a lexical entry in a
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dictionary, then we can be sure that the metaphor has completely died and is 
now literal rather than metaphorical” (MacCormac 1985:77). A few scholars, 
before Lakoff & Johnson, registered their unease about this issue - notably 
Richards, who talked about the possibility of what might be termed 
‘remetaphorization’.
...however stone dead such metaphors seem, we can easily wake them up... This
favourite old distinction between dead and living metaphors (itself a two-fold
metaphor) is, indeed, a device which is very often a hindrance to the play of sagacity
and discernment throughout the subject. For serious purposes it needs a drastic re­
examination (Richards 1936:101).
Lakoff & Johnson argued that ‘dead’ or conventionalised metaphors were 
actually the most important and interesting, since they could provide linguistic 
evidence for the concepts that are used to structure speakers’ views of the 
world, and their understanding of situations and experiences.
Each of the metaphorical expressions we have talked about so far (e.g., the time will
come; we constmct a theory, attack an idea) is used within a whole system of
metaphorical concepts - concepts that we constantly use in living and thinking.
These expressions, like all other words and phrasal lexical items in the language, are
fixed by convention. In addition to these cases, which are parts of whole
metaphorical systems, there are idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand
alone and are not used systematically in our language or thought. These are well-
known expressions like the foot of the mountain, a head of cabbage, the leg of a
table, etc... They do not interact with other metaphors, play no particularly
interesting role in our conceptual system, and hence are not metaphors that we live
by... If any metaphorical expressions deserve to be called “dead,” it is these...the
systematic metaphorical expressions we have been discussing...are “alive” in the
most fundamental sense: they are metaphors we live by. The fact that they are
conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive (Lakoff
& Johnson 1980:54-55).
The idea that conventionalised metaphors can be examined from a 
cognitive perspective, as a source of insight into the way concepts are 
structured, is now widely accepted within cognitive linguistics, and has been 
taken up by many other scholars to become the focus of much of the current 
metaphor research within the discipline. It is this assumption that underlies 
this analysis of INTELLIGENCE metaphors, which is informed by the work 
of Lakoff & Johnson alongside subsequent research in the field. Several
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theories that are key to this research have been proposed since Metaphors We
Live By\ two of these are outlined below, and these (as well as some others) 
will be discussed more fully in relation to the INTELLIGENCE data in the 
main part of this thesis.
Grady’s theory of primary metaphor (1997) was a direct product of 
Lakoff & Johnson’s work2, and was formulated to account for the parallels 
that can be observed across mappings, and the way in which targets only 
selectively import features of the sources that are mapped to them. Grady 
observed that many of the mappings that had been identified and discussed in 
the literature could be broken down further, and could be logically interpreted 
as complex, ‘secondary’ metaphors that combined more basic, ‘primary’ 
mappings. For example, he analyses THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS and 
observes that this can be explained as a combination of ORGANIZATION IS 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS. Furthermore, 
he proposes that these basic primary metaphors link particular kinds of sources 
and targets. As the motivations for these mappings, sources are simple 
experiences that are directly linked to the way in which humans physically 
interact with their surroundings, eg having a body that operates as a container, 
or experiencing different temperatures; Grady describes primary target 
concepts as “the most fundamental aspects of our cognitive machinery” 
(1997:134) such as abstract concepts relating to relations, degree, time etc, eg 
quantity or similarity, as well as others relating to consciousness and the 
emotions, eg thought or anger. Since Grady first posited this theory, primary 
metaphors have been shown to underlie a huge number of secondary 
mappings, both conventionalised and novel, and a number of the primary 
metaphors that he lists are relevant to the core concept groups identified in the 
INTELLIGENCE data.
Another theory that is particularly important for this thesis is blending 
theory, developed by Fauconnier & Turner (1998, 2002). This came out of a
2 Lakoff & Johnson subsequently ‘borrowed’ both the theory of primary metaphor and 
blending theory (summarised below) as parts of their integrated theory of primary metaphor
(Lakoff & Johnson 1999:46ff). This is discussed further in chapter 2.
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recognition that, while much of the recent research on metaphor focuses on 
relatively straightforward examples involving one or two source concepts, in 
reality mappings can be far more complex and can involve input from a 
potentially unlimited number of sources, not all of them metaphorical in 
nature, interacting in a number of ways. Fauconnier & Turner propose that 
elements of all of these sources are integrated in a specially designed mental 
‘space’ to produce a new blend of meaning; this may become fixed, just as a 
metaphor can become conventionalised, but the process is flexible and can 
account for the ‘online’ processing of novel, creative language (as well as 
other media). As I have already pointed out in section 1, it is this flexibility 
that makes blending theory particularly appropriate to the consideration of the 
INTELLIGENCE data.
Amongst the most recent body of research emerging from metaphor 
studies, there is a recognition that much of the theoretical content of past work 
has lacked empirical evidence, and that there is potential for much more 
investigation of real usage. An increasing number of studies in various 
branches of linguistics employ a corpus-based approach. In Steen’s volume on 
metaphor in literature, he comments that “although philosophical and 
theoretical speculation have been rife across the centuries, attributing a crucial 
function to metaphor for the way we make sense of all sorts of phenomena, 
such ideas have only recently been put to the test in empirical research on the 
actual usage of metaphor by people” (Steen 1994:ix). Later he goes on to 
criticise the non-empirical approach of Lakoff & Johnson, saying that:
.. .although the analysis of language structure is highly useful, it cannot serve as the
whole basis for the study of actual language use. Language analysis may serve a
function to derive all sorts of expectations and speculations about processing, but that
is quite another matter, namely theory formation. Theories have to be tested, and the
analysis of further language data cannot count as a serious test of predictions about
individual metaphor use (ibid:9).
Some work combining a corpus-based approach with historical data has also 
been undertaken, notably by Geeraerts et al (eg 1995), and I believe that this 
sort of work has already yielded valuable insights into the way metaphor 
works and develops, and will continue to do so in the future. Geeraerts &
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Grondelaers, in their study of the cultural traditions associated with anger, 
make the following statement:
in the case of purely lexical research, the emphasis on the mechanisms of semantic
flexibility that underlie the stmcture of polysemy (such as metaphor and metonymy)
naturally entails a renewed interest in diachronic semantics...: to a large extent, the
synchronic polysemy of lexical items is a reflection of their diachronic development
(Geeraerts & Grondelaers 1995:177).
It is on this premise that the present work is based.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 T he Historical Thesaurus of English
This thesis is based on data from the Historical Thesaurus of English
(HTIE , an ongoing project based in the department of English Language at 
the University of Glasgow, to compile a thesaurus similar in structure to 
Roget's Thesaurus. The finished volume will contain lexical items from OE to 
PDE, classified by semantic field and presented chronologically with first and 
(if no longer current) last recorded dates of usage. These dates, as well as 
stylistic information such as dialectal or specialised usage, is taken from the 
OED (2"2 edition) and the Thesaurus of Old English {TOE}4.
1.2.2 The INTELLIGENCE corpus
The items in this corpus are taken from two sections of HTE,
WISDOM and FOOLISHNESS. In line with Roget’s Thesaurus, these are 
presented in two separate subsections, collected together under the heading 
INTELLECT, rather than in a single group. I have chosen to take them all 
together in this way because the focus of my thesis is the way in which 
INTELLIGENCE as a whole target concept is conceptualised, and this 
includes both CLEVERNESS and STUPIDITY. My corpus is made up of
2 Detailed information about HTE is available at
httnti/www.arts.gla.ac.uk/SEStiti/F.ngtiang/lhiesai.ir/ti.irther.htm.
Publications based on HTE data are listed at
http://www.arts .gla.ac .uk/SESLL/EngLang/thesaur/publicat.htm.
14
1075 Thesaurus entries, made up of 464 nouns and 611 adjectives. Just over 
11% of the total data dates as far back as OE; including expressions in 
specialised usage, such as those that are found in scientific language or are 
archaic, around 40% of the entries are labelled current.
A general point to be made about the data is that there is an imbalance 
between STUPIDITY and CLEVERNESS entries. Of the total of 1075 entries 
that constitute the data, 648 (around 60%) signify STUPIDITY, whilst 427 
signify CLEVERNESS. There is an even more marked difference if the OE 
only data is removed from the calculation. There are 99 entries that are dated 
to the OE period without any subsequent evidence of use, leaving 976 entries 
dated after this time; of these 976, 624 (almost two thirds) are associated with 
STUPIDITY, leaving 352 CLEVERNESS entries. Possible reasons for this are 
discussed in section 1.3.1.
1.2.3 Guide to the database
The data is stored in a very simple Access database, which allows 
users to search by various criteria, and for this reason the complete corpus is 
presented alongside the thesis on CD. The following section details the fields I 
have used, the information to which each one refers, and where appropriate, 
notes on why this has been included.
The first field in the database gives record number; in this thesis, I 
have cited all terms with part of speech and dates rather than using this ID, but 
this may prove useful for others using the data. Field two contains meaning, ie 
either clever (with one or more subcategory, eg clever-common sense) or 
stupid. Field three is for core concept, and I have used various symbols in 
this field to indicate different relationships between concepts. For compound 
words, where each element relates to a different core concept, these are 
separated by and; where two or more core concepts seem equally relevant to a 
source, I have used &, and where two or more are equally possible and likely I 
have used or. If an item has changed semantically before coming to be
4 See http://www.artS■gla■ac.uk/SESLL/En»Lan&'l'thesauI7'toni .htm for details.
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associated with INTELLIGENCE and this seems relevant, different core 
concepts to which it has been related are listed with the earliest first, separated 
by > . If a core concept group is part of a larger, superordinate category, both 
are recorded with the superordinate category listed first, and separated by -, 
and where the core category group is uncertain this is preeeded by ?. The 
INTELLIGENCE terms themselves are in the fourth field, followed in the fifth 
by a part of speech label (either n for noun or aj for adjective).
Entries are presented in chronological order from earliest to latest, 
according to the date of the first and last record of usage. Where there are two 
entries with the same starting date, the one with the earliest final date will 
come first (ie, entries with the same starting date marked current are listed 
last). As in HTE, dates up to 1150 are not preserved, but are simply labelled 
OE; entries with final dates after 1870 are marked current wherever possible, 
and all entries with final dates in the twentieth century are marked current. 
There are eleven fields in the database dedicated to dating, which allow entries 
to be labelled as OE and a possible three other dates. With the exception of the 
OE field, the date fields can all be preceded with ante or circa, and this is 
recorded in a separate field (again, for ease of searching by date). Dates are 
separated by - to show continued currency, and by + if there is a period of 
around 150 years or more between recorded use or in cases where one date is 
labelled to show specialised usage. Entries considered to be in current use are 
marked > in the final date field.
There are two further fields. Field seventeen contains labels referring 
to specialised usage, such as slang, dialect etc; if these apply to particular 
dates, these will also be given in this field. Field eighteen is for derivation,
and is included to enable database users to collect together all the terms with 
shared etymology by giving the roots from which terms are derived (this is 
discussed further below). It should be pointed out that because of the difficulty 
of using symbols in Access, <Q> is represented by <£> in the database, and
superscript characters are represented by normal characters (both of these are 
found only in reconstructed TIE forms).
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In this thesis, data items are underlined and given with part of speeeh 
label and dates of usage, eg in the form craftv<craftig ai OE-1791+1876>.
1.2.4 Discrepancies between HTE and the INTELLIGENCE 
corpus
At the time I collected my data, between October 2000 and January 
2001, HTE had not been completed, and the sections I worked with had only 
been pre-classified (they would go on to be classified more finely and edited, 
checked, and then passed to Professor Samuels for a final proof). Although I 
have edited the material to be included in the thesis using HTE guidelines, this 
may not correspond in all cases to the finished version of HTE, and there may 
be minor discrepancies of date or form. As well as this, I have not retained the 
classification into subsections with specific headings, since attending to these 
seemed in general to be unnecessary for my own investigation of the semantic 
field. However, I have used the broadest pre-classifications from the 
CLEVERNESS data, which give an indication of the type of intelligence 
connoted by each term (eg SHARPNESS or SHREWDNESS as opposed to 
COMMON SENSE or GENIUS). These are not discussed in detail in this 
thesis, but they are included in the consideration of some groups where I have 
judged them to be relevant. There was nothing comparable to this set of 
divisions in the STUPIDITY data.
The main difficulty I encountered in using data from unfinished 
sections of HTE was the apparent lack of some terms that seemed to me to 
belong in these groups, and in several cases I intended to add these terms to 
my own data. However, I have not done this, since I believe that time did not 
allow me to review all the data that might be missing in any ordered or 
comprehensive way. It seemed preferable, and more theoretically justifiable, 
to work with the data as it existed at a particular stage of HTE whilst 
acknowledging that this may be incomplete. This is especially the case given 
the current revision of the OED, which will in turn affect HTE data and may 
lead to a number of insertions and changes in later editions; one of the areas
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that this may affect most is the inclusion of recent words. In the future I would 
hope to revise my own data in line with these changes if it is to be used more 
widely. However, I do not believe that these omissions and discrepancies 
affect the observations made in this thesis, even though they may necessitate 
an adjustment in some percentages and statistics. As I have already stated, this 
study is not intended to be quantitative, and the figures I have included are 
only intended to give some impression of the balance between particular 
groups of data. This might serve to identify concepts that appear to be 
important diachronically or particularly productive at certain points in time, 
but it is certainly not an end in itself.
1.2.5 Dating entries
Like all the information in the database, the dates that are attached to 
the individual entries are the dates given in HTE, with a few exceptions 
accounted for by the above explanation. These are based on written sources 
that are dated as precisely as possible, but this does not mean that they can be 
taken to be definitive. The dates given in any historical dictionary are always 
open to improvement2, and because of its unusual size and detail, the way in 
which it was compiled, and above all its age, the OED can be particularly 
problematic. The first edition was completed in 1928, and although the second 
edition was published relatively recently (in 1989), this was essentially the 
same work with the supplement integrated into it, and incorporated very little 
revision. This means that the huge body of research conducted since the first 
edition, spanning 75 years, has not been consulted, and some of this contains 
information that can improve the accuracy of OED dates. The OED is 
currently undergoing its first total revision, to create a new edition, and the 
datings of a considerable number of entries have been affected by new 
evidence. A comparison of a sample of 0ED2 and 0ED3 entries condueted by 
Durkin suggests that the dates given in 0ED2 should be treated with care, 
since revisions affect a high proportion of items:
2 Definitive dates could only ever be given in a historical dictionary if it were based on a 
completely closed corpus comprising of all the surviving texts from a period or area; even in
this case the evidence used would only be relevant to written, recorded language.
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Of the 245 0ED2 items with sixteenth-century first dates, 142 (58%) have the first
date unchanged in OED3, while the remaining 42% have changed first dates, 61
(25% of the total) as a result of antedating, 41 (17%) as a result of redating of the
existing first quotation, and one as a result of the existing first quotation being
rejected... I hope to have demonstrated some of the possible pitfalls in making
uncritical use of dictionary data, especially where complex data such as that provided
by the OED is to be used for statistical purposes... Caution is therefore advisable
when making use of such data for statistical purposes... (Durkin 2002:68-75).
While not all of the redatings discussed here involve long periods, a 
significant number do, and for one entry the first date has been adjusted by 
almost 350 years (although this is certainly exceptional). This is an important 
point in relation to the data used in this thesis, and any observations about the 
datings of individual items can only be speculative, based on the best evidence 
that is available. In this thesis I have made only limited reference to the dates 
attached to particular items and groups, which are not discussed at length or in 
great depth, but there is some consideration of what particular date ranges 
might imply: in chapters 3 and 4 I have looked at the date ranges of the 
complete groups of data, and made various suggestions to account for these. 
Chapter 2 is the only one in which my argument is built on dating evidence, 
but this is well sourced and relates to the OE period rather than to any specific 
decade or even century.
1.2.6 Data anaaysis
My starting point in analysing the HTE data was to look closely at 
etymological information supplied in the OED. This was done for every entry 
in the data, as it seemed particularly important to avoid preconceived ideas 
about what constituted metaphor from the outset. From this initial analysis, 
some groups emerged in the data. A large number of items shared elements 
and roots, either because these were variant forms of one another or 
compounds: for example, simple and silly had several variant forms; there is a 
large group of entries that derive from TIE *weid- (discussed in chapter 2); 
and there are 175 entries that are compounds formed from head. Beyond this, 
particular concepts were repeated in the data, and entries relating to these 
could be collected together. For example, the ANIMAL entries quickly 
emerged as a group, as did the VISION entries, and there were several other
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smaller clusters of entries like those relating to AGE and 
STRENGTH/WEAKNESS.
To label these recurring concepts, which I have taken to relate to 
motivation in the entries that are metaphorical (in a wide sense), I have used 
the label core concept. This is a purposely general term, since it is appropriate 
to describe sources involving conceptual mappings but also concepts that 
might be regarded as being more ‘literal’ in nature, such as elements like 
BRAIN that are found in compounds. These core concept labels are not 
mutually exclusive, and a large proportion of entries have been assigned to 
more than one core category. This might be the case if there has been a 
significant shift in meaning: for example, words derived from the Latin root 
capere, such as perceived ai 1400. are labelled both as SENSE-TOUCH, 
which seems to have been the core meaning of this root, and as SENSE- 
VISION, reflecting the semantic shift that affected many English derivatives 
of this root. Equally, entries might have multiple labels if they are compounds 
of two elements, or if it seems unhelpful to distinguish only a single core 
concept when a second might equally apply. In cases where there seems to be 
one motivating factor reflected in the core concept that is the most salient, but 
where another (or several other) factors might also be significant in the 
mapping, this is noted and discussed.
Obviously, there are a large number of entries that presented problems 
in this kind of classification. The etymological information presented in any 
dictionary will be incomplete, as there is often insufficient or problematic 
evidence from which to build up a picture of the roots of a lexical item, and 
the OED is no exception. For entries where no etymology is suggested, or 
where the etymology is doubtful, this has been indicated in the core concept 
field in the database.
It should be pointed out that, in most cases, I have split compound 
words into their parts and examined each one separately. This seems to be the 
most appropriate method of analysis in most cases, since the meaning of the 
majority of compounded entries seems to be a sum of their parts (for example.
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this is clearly the case for almost all of the HEAD and BRAIN entries/. It also 
enables users of the database to run queries that pull out all the entries relating 
to a particular core concept, and the derivation field offers the opportunity of 
searching by particular lexical root, since these are given in a standardised 
form to link expressions with common derivation. The forms that I have used 
for these roots are the earliest forms from the source language where relevant, 
for example if there are several different derivatives from a single root as there 
are in the VISION group (with PIE *weid- in common). In this and similar 
cases, I have also supplied the more immediate root to enable searches that 
will recover only the most closely related forms (ie an entry in this field might 
read videre<*weid-. or wit<*weid-T In all cases I have used a PDE form 
unless this is misleading (eg wise rather than wisan), since this seems more 
useful to potential database users, who may not be familiar with these other 
forms. For the same reason, etymological information has not been given in 
this field if it does not seem relevant, and again in these cases I have supplied 
the most obvious form (in my judgement). At all times I have tried to supply 
all the information that will enable the most comprehensive list to be 
recovered when queries are run.
As described above, I have based my classification on etymology 
supplied by the OED. If there are two possible root senses, the one favoured 
by the OED is given; if there is no bias shovm I have filed either in a general 
category which would accommodate both (if the senses are closely related) or 
under categories corresponding to each sense. In a few cases I have used the 
evidence of the other INTELLIGENCE data and my own judgement to decide 
which source meaning, or which aspect of the source meaning, is more likely 
to be relevant, and for any entries that are discussed this is noted. If there are a 
number of root senses etymologically but only one has an OE reflex, or one is 
attested significantly earlier than the others in OE, I have used that sense. If 
this is not the case, but several of the senses are possible sources for the slip 
sense, the entry will be labelled ‘etymology/category uncertain’ (and where
2 There are a few entries where the INTELLIGENCE meaning results specifically from the 
compounded form, and where this is the case I have categorised the entry accordingly and
commented on the entry if the group to which it belongs is discussed.
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appropriate, further comment will be made). I have tried not to make 
assumptions that are not evidenced - if a word appears with two senses from 
around the same time I have not presumed that one is earlier even if this would 
seem to be a natural conclusion. In some cases where the OED is unclear or 
uncertain about an etymology I have consulted the Oxford Dictionary of
English Etymology (ODEEff if this provides any clarification I have used it as 
further evidence and classified accordingly. If not, I have filed under 
‘etymology unknown’. Where there is no evidence of transfer from an earlier 
meaning, I have labelled entries INTELLIGENCE*. In many cases, it may be 
that additional information about etymology that might affect this 
classification is available in sources I have not consulted for every entry in the 
group, such as Holthausen’s Altenglisches Etymologisches Worterbuch.
However, had I conducted more detailed research on all the items in the data 
(including those that are not discussed at any length or may not be mentioned 
in the main section of the thesis), this would have necessitated also the 
evaluation of competing etymologies, and hence entailed primary 
etymological work, which is not the focus of this thesis. This does means that 
a small number of the etymologies may be disputed elsewhere, or that a small 
number of items may have been excluded from the core category groups to 
which reference is made, but in general I am confident that this is unlikely to 
invalidate the main arguments presented here.
If a word has a recognisable root but its slip meaning clearly emerges 
from its use in a specific context (eg light-weight n 1885>) I have filed it 
according to its sense in this context (more or less specifically). Similarly, if a 
sense emerges centuries after its root sense with no continuation of use but has 
clearly been influenced by some other usage/context, I have tried to consider 
this.
7 It should be stated that Onions’ research in ODEE is not independent of the OED, but in 
some cases it provides more detailed supplementary evidence. This is especially the case for
lexical items starting with letters early in the alphabet, since these were published earliest by
the OED, and further evidence on their etymological history was available by the time
Onions’ work was completed.
8 As with all of the other core category groups, this label may be used alongside others, eg for 
compound words, where there has been significant semantic change etc.
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For OE words, if a later descendant is listed in the OED, I have used 
the etymological information supplied by the OED. If not, I have used 
Bosworth & Toller’s Anglo-Saxon Dictionary9 to check for other meanings. If 
the word appears to have a concrete and abstract meaning, I have not assumed 
that the concrete meaning is the earliest, unless there seems to be evidence of 
this (eg gebeorglic ai OE. appears to come from the noun beorg which has the 
concrete sense mountain but no corresponding abstract sense). If I cannot go 
any further back than OE, I have put the word in a general core category group 
(eg INTELLIGENCE or MIND); if it is in the OED and there is an OE sense 
but the etymology is listed as obscure, unknown or uncertain, I have used this 
information in my categorisation. I have not marked vowel-length in any OE 
words in the thesis or database, partly because, as far as possible, I have tried 
to avoid using symbols in the database for simplicity of use.
1.3 The data - some preliminary comments
1.3.1 STUPID vs CI.EVER
As discussed in the previous section, there is a significantly higher 
number of items that signify STUPIDITY than CLEVERNESS in the data. 
This is in line with the general observations made by a number of linguists 
about derogatory vocabulary. Ullmann comments that “Pejorative
developments are so common in language that some early semanticists 
regarded them as a fundamental tendency, a symptom of a ‘pessimistic streak’ 
in the human mind” (Ullmann 1962:231); he goes on to say that whilst the 
opposite kind of semantic change can also be observed, “‘‘ameliorative’
developments... on the whole... seem to be less frequent” (ibid:233). Waldron 
specifically discusses this trend in relation to the vocabulary of 
INTELLIGENCE, and suggests that this is a semantic area that is particularly 
prone to pejoration.
9 By this I mean Bosworth & Toller’s 1898 edition, together with Toller’s 1921 supplement 
and Campbell’s 1972 addenda and corrigenda.
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The group of epithets denoting human cleverness, a quality which may easily be
mistrusted by those who are exploited by it, shows a continuous trend towards
pejoration. Crafty meant ‘strong, powerful, mighty’ in OE but this sense became
obsolete after the fourteenth century. There is a secondary sense in OE ‘skilful,
dexterous, clever, ingenious’, which persists until the nineteenth century. The
negative ‘wily, cunnmg’ appears in LME and co-exists with the favourable meaning,
until in PresE it remains as the dominant sense... [The] earliest adjectival sense [of
cunning] in ME is ‘learned, skilful’, a meaning which is still recognized, if only as an
archaism...; the current bad sense is first recorded in 1599. Again and again we find
the same story: artful means ‘learned, wise’ in the seventeenth century; later this
meaning narrows chiefly to ‘skilful in practical ways’, which gradually passes over
into ‘deceitful, cunning’... Sly, which is from Scandinavian...is yet another example
of the same type of development (Waldron 1979:158-9).
These observations are mirrored by my own findings, and there are 56 entries 
in the INTELLIGENCE data, relating to various kinds of CLEVERNESS, that 
are marked ‘derog’.
Aside from this, some of the variation in forms that can be found in the 
STUPIDITY entries, which can account for the fact that some roots are 
productive and yield a number of entries, may also be associated with the fact 
that many of these terms are slang. Intuitively, it would seem that these are 
more likely to be used flexibly^. Having said that, in practice there is more 
variation in forms in the CLEVERNESS entries, and in fact the root that 
exhibits the greatest number of variant forms is PIE *weid-, discussed in 
chapter 2.
The balance in the OE data, which is the opposite to that of the rest of 
the group, may be explained by considering the nature of OE texts. Obviously, 
it was extremely expensive to produce any texts in OE, and to a certain extent 
this constrained the types of materials that were copied. Most tended to deal 
with religious material, either the bible itself or devotional or instructional 
texts. By nature, and because of the relatively formal register in which they 
tend to be written, these are unlikely to contain much in the way of colourful 
or creative terminology to describe stupid people; rather, they focus to a great
10 Eg ‘wido’ for ‘wide boy’ and similar cases.
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extent on wisdom, either the wisdom possessed by divinities and saints, or that 
which humans should strive for in discipleship to God, and for this reason 
CLEVERNESS expressions are well represented in this body of texts. The 
HTE pre-classification that divides the entries into specific types of cleverness 
indicates that these entries are associated predominantly with particular kinds 
of intelligence: 68 entries are labelled CLEVER-WISE11, and there are no 
entries at all relating to COMMON SENSE.
1.3.2 The core concept groups
This thesis is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of all the 
core concepts involved in the conceptualisation of INTELLIGENCE; 
assuming this were possible, it would be an enormous undertaking, and would 
involve extensive and meticulous research in numerous disciplines, including 
etymology, history and psychology. My intention in surveying the 
INTELLIGENCE data is to give an overview of the issues involved, and to try 
to gain insights into the workings of metaphor by the observation of empirical 
data. I will not examine all of the data, or discuss each of the core concept 
groups I have identified in detail (although I will refer to many of these within 
other sections).
Below is a list of all the labels I have used in the core concept field of 
the database. A number of these, which are not mentioned in this thesis, 
require further examination, and are best thought of as useful working labels 
rather than as suggested core concept groups. All of the groups to which 
reference is made are emboldened; full tables of these are given in alphabetical 
order by core concept in appendices at the end of the thesis. The core concepts 
that are dealt with in detail in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the SENSES, ANIMALS 
and DENSITY respectively. More detail about each of these is given in 
section 1.3.6.
' 1 One of these expressions was in two subgroups of the HTE classification, and is therefore 
labelled both WISE and INTELLIGENT in my database.
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AGE
ALIVE/ANIMATE
ANIMAL
ANIMtAL--BIRD
ANIMAL -- BIRD - BUZZARD
ANIMAL -- BIRD - COCK
ANIMAL -- BIRD - CUCKOO
ANIMAL -- BIRD - DAW
ANIMAL -- BIRD - DOTTEREL
ANIMAL -- BIRD - DOVE
ANIMAL -- BIRD - EAGLE
ANIMAL -- BIRD - GOOSE
ANIMAL -- BIRD - LOON
ANIMAL -- BIRD - SPARROW
ANIMAL -- BIRD - WIDGEON
ANIMAL -- FISH
ANIMAL -- FISH - COD
ANIMAL -- FISH - LOACH
ANIMAL -- FISH - MULLET
ANIMAL -- FISH - SMELT
ANIMAL -INSECT
ANIMAL -- INSECT - BEETLE
ANIMAL -- INSECT - NIT
ANIMAL -- INSECT - SNAIL
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - APE
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - BOVINE
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - DONKEY
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - PUPPY
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - SHEEP
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - SHREW
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - SQUIRREL
ANIMAL -- MAMMAL - VERMIN
BEAUTY
26
BIRTH/CREATION
BRAIN
BRAVERY
BODY PART
BODY PART - SEXUAL
CARE/CONSIDERATION
CLOTHING/FOOTWEAR
COHERENCE
COLOUR
COMPLETION
CONTACT
CONTAINER
CONTAINER - EMPTY/FULL OF NOTHING
COUNT/RECKON
COURAGE
DECEIVE/CONFUSE
DENSITY
DENSITY - EARTH/TURF
DENSITY - FOOD
DENSITY - FOOD - GRAIN
DENSITY - FOOD - MEAT
DENSITY - FOOD - GENERAL
DENSITY - FOOD - MISC
DENSITY- WOOD
DILIGENCE
DIVIDE/SEPARATE
DIVINE/SUPERNATURAL
DRUNK
EASINESS
EXPERTISE
FACIAL EXPRESSION/FEATURE
FAT
FIERCE/CRUEL
FLEXIBLE/YIELDING
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FRUIT/VEG
GENTLE/MILD
GOOD/HAPPY
HARD/SOFT
HEAD
HEALTH - PHYSICAL/MENTAL
HIT/STUNNED
HUMAN
HUMBLE/ORDINARY
HURT/INJURE
IDLE/WEARY
INFERIOR/SUPERIOR
INTELLIGENCE
JUDGEMENT
KNOWLEDGE
LIQUID/SEMI-LIQUID 
LOOSE TEXTURE 
LUMP
MIND
MISCELLANEOUS
MOVEMENT
MUDDLE
NATIVE/INHABITANT
OBJECT
OCCUTATION
OTEN
TERSONAL NAME
TICK UT/CHOOSE/GATHER 
TLEASING/AGREEABLE 
TOWER/ABILITY 
TROVIDED
PURE/CLEAN
QUALITY
QUANTITY
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READY/PREPARED
RIGHT/LEFT
SENSE - GRASP (TOUCH)
SENSE - HEARING
SENSE - SMELL
SENSE - TASTE
SENSE-VISION
SENSE - VISION - LIGHT/CLEARNESS
SENSE/FEELING
SHAPE
SHARP/PIERCING
SIZE
SKILL
SLEEP
SMOOTH/LEVEL
SOLID/STEADY
SOUND
SPACE/DISTANCE
SPEECH
SPEED
STRENGTH/WEAKNESS
SUITABLE/APPROPRIATE
TEACHING/ADVICE
THOUGHT
UP/DOWN
USELESS/INVALID
VALUE
WEALTH/PROSPERITY
WEARY/FATIGUED
WEIGHT
WORLD
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1.3.3 The ‘hierarchy’ of core concepts
The core concept groups that I have identified to classify the data vary 
in nature and generality. Some are closely aligned to very basic metaphorical 
sources like SIZE or CONTAINER, and these correlate with a large number of 
other core categories in the data as well as constituting a core concept in 
themselves. Others, like the DENSITY group, are much more restricted and 
may rely to a greater extent on culture-specific influences (and perhaps 
understandably, these tend to have been recognised and researched less). 
Correspondingly, these sources vary in their implications for the way 
intelligence is conceptualised. Some core concepts, whilst providing the 
motivation for a group of items in their own right, seem to be involved in the 
motivation for other groups as well; others are more narrow in their influence, 
and do not seem closely aligned with any other groups. This reflects Lakoffs 
observations about the inheritance hierarchies into which mappings fall. 
Lakoff suggests that the sources of metaphorical mappings can be organised 
into a hierarchy according to the extent to which they can combine with other 
sources and influence other mappings. The most basic and general mappings, 
like the SENSES group, are situated at ‘higher’ positions at the top of the 
hierarchy, while more specific, highly elaborate mappings which tend to be 
more culturally informed, like the DENSITY group, are placed in ‘lower’ 
positions. Correspondingly, mappings at the top of the hierarchy feed into 
those nearer the bottom, which “inherit the structures of the ‘higher’ 
mappings” (Lakoff 1993:222). Primary metaphors, as classified by Grady 
(1997; discussed in section 1.1), fit into this classification at the top level, 
whilst the complex metaphors that can be broken down into several ‘elements’ 
operate at lower levels.
1.3.4 Associations between core concepts
As described in section 1.2, the term core concept is used because in 
many (and probably most) cases, expressions are motivated by more than one 
source concept, and examples of this are explored in the following three 
chapters. For several groups, this results from the nature of the sources 
themselves, rather than from the targets. Some concepts are bound up with one
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or more others, so that referring to a single concept these others are 
‘automatically’ implied, and in this way a network of associations can be 
drawn upon very economically (though this is not to say that this is purposely 
or consciously effected). For example, one concept that is very important in 
the way INTELLIGENCE is conceptualised is SPEED12. In fact, there are few 
entries amongst the data that relate to this directly - only fifteen entries in my 
classification - but the concept underlies a high number of expressions by 
being necessarily bound up with many other core concept groups. One of these 
is WEIGHT, which contains some entries derived from objects that are large 
and unwieldy, and one aspect of the burdensome nature of these objects is that 
they cannot be manoeuvred quickly. As this implies, for these entries large 
SIZE is also bound up with these other concepts. Aside from this, within 
ANIMAL there are several entries including those in the subcategories 
BOVINE and SNAIL (discussed in chapter 3) that are from animals 
recognised to be slow moving, and this naturally results from the direct 
relationship between speed and motion.
1.3.5 MIND, HEAD and BIRAIN
The three groups that are the main focus of this thesis have been 
chosen because they represent particularly productive source concepts for 
INTELLIGENCE terms and are very different sorts of mappings (as I have 
described above). However, there are other core concepts to which a 
significant number of the entries in the database are related, and in fact these 
account for more entries than either ANIMALS or DENSITY. These are the 
MIND, and the HEAD and BRAIN13.
12 The table of entries relating to SPEED as a core concept is included in the appendix at the 
end of this thesis. As the relevant column indicates, several of the entries, including all those
derived from quick, do not have SPEED as their original motivation, but have been
categorised in this group because of semantic shifts. AHD also suggests a semantic connection
between the concept speed and smart. I have classified expressions derived from this item in
SHARP, since this is the earliest sense suggested by the OED and indicated that smart follows
the same kind of semantic path as sharp. AHD also draws attention to this and then goes on to
make a link with SPEED: “Smart is a word that has diverged considerably from its original
meaning of “stinging, sharp,” as in a smart blow. The standard meaning of “clever,
intelligent,” probably picks up on the original semantic element of vigor or quick movement”.
13 These have been labelled separately in the database so that they can be referenced 
individually, although they are very close conceptually.
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The first of these, which underlies a large group of entries, is the 
concept that I have labelled MIND. This is a problematic group in that 
changing beliefs about the self have meant that the mental faculty is a 
particularly fuzzy concept, and terms used to refer to this have had varying 
denotations and connotations at different times in history. In modem popular 
consciousness, there is a dichotomy between the emotions and the intellect, 
which are held to be separate and often irreconcilable; in practice the 
distinction is not always sustainable, but it nonetheless exists as a powerful 
model. A person’s emotional side is metonymized by the heart, and 
characterised as being illogical and unconnected to sense or reason. This 
contrasts with their mind or intellectual side, metonymized by the head or 
brain, which is logical and ruled by reason. However, this has not always been 
the popular view, and traditionally there was a far more integrated concept of 
the intellect that did not divide the two aspects of the self. The range of OED
definitions for mind (and other terms in the same semantic field such as soul
and will) reflects this, and gives some indication of the broadness of the term 
at different times and the difficulty of attaching any clear limits corresponding 
to modem ideas to its earlier uses14. For example, in OE one sense of mind 
was closely connected with memory; the OED also lists the meaning “The 
action or state of thinking about something; the thought of (an object)” with an 
earliest quotation dating to 971. A slightly later definition, with supporting 
quotations from cl 340 to the present, gives a related but distinct meaning for 
the term:
The seat of a person's consciousness, thoughts, volitions, and feelings; the system of
cognitive and emotional phenomena and powers that constitutes the subjective being
of a person; also, the incorporeal subject of the psychical faculties, the spiritual part
of a human heing; the soul as distinguished from the body.
The somewhat blurred boundaries that terms in this semantic field can have 
are mirrored in languages other than English: Buck noted the difficulty of
14 The term intellect fits in with a more clearly divided idea of the self, and correspondingly 
seems to surface much later than these others. The first supporting OED quotation is from
Chaucer, dated to cl386, and this is given under the main definition, “That faculty, or sum of
faculties, of the mind or soul by which one knows and reasons (excluding sensation, and
sometimes imagination; distinguished from feeling and will), power of thought;
understanding. Rarely in reference to the lower animals”.
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distinguishing between the concepts referenced by a number of terms in a 
range of Indo-European languages. In his Dictionary of Selected Indo­
European Synonyms he includes two separate categories, MIND (section 
17.11) and SOUL/SPIRIT (section 16.11), but comments that there is not an 
entirely clear distinetion between these:
‘Mind’ is intended here as the seat of intelligence, parallel to ‘soul, spirit’ (16.11) as
the seat of emotions. But, as already remarked in 16.11, the two groups overlap.
Several of the words there listed may cover also the ‘mind’, and conversely many of
those in this list cover mental states in the widest sense, that is, may be used with
reference to feelings as well as thoughts, as Lat. m&is, Skt. manas-, Grk. vovs
(rarely), OE mod, NE mind, etc. (Buck 1949:1198).
Many of the OE terms that are found in the data, and their reflexes in 
ME and/or PDE, reflect this kind of general meaning. Because of this, in order 
to avoid any false distinctions, I have placed all of these in a single core 
concept group labelled MIND, which contains a sizeable proportion of the 
data, 116 entries (over 10% of the total INTELLIGENCE corpus). Within the 
group, there is a high level of repetition of roots, and this is partly due to the 
proportion of OE data. 36 entries appear in OE only, and many of these are 
compounds of the same roots, combined in a variety of ways. For example, the 
data contains both gleawferhb ai OE and ferhbgleaw ai OE. as well as both 
gleawmod ai OE and modgleaw ai OE: many of the entries have parallel 
formations with a different first or second element, including hvgefest ai OE 
and hohfast ai OE. and wiswvlle ai OE and wishvcgende ai OE. More than 
half of the total entries, 57, are from forms related to wit; these are also 
included in the SENSE-VISION group, since they are ultimately descended 
from PIE *weid-. Other particularly productive roots are mind (including the 
OE form (ge)mynd)., which yields thirteen entries, sense (from Latin sens and 
ultimately PIE *sent-), which yields eleven entries, and OE hyge (and variant 
form hycge).
Most of the entries in MIND are compounds with modifying elements 
that relate to a second core concept, as in the PDE noun form x-mind and 
adjective form x-minded. I would suggest that the simplest reason for the 
formation of linguistic items with a MIND element, and the predominance of
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these rather than non-compounded forms (especially in the later data), is to 
make the meaning of these expressions more explicit. Many of the specific 
entities that are sources in different core concept groups are found in more 
than one metaphorical mapping, and by referring metonymically to the respect 
in which the source is being mapped to the target a particular expression can 
be disambiguated. In the case of the INTELLIGENCE metaphors, the target is 
ultimately a person, so by using this kind of modified compound it is clear that 
mental abilities are being referred to, rather than any other aspect of the person 
such as appearance (for example). In most cases, metaphorical sources tend to 
become conventionally associated with particular targets over a period of time, 
but this may not always be the case. If an expression is coined that reflects a 
novel mapping, or if its source is a specific example of a more generic group 
(as is the case with the DENSITY items), it may not have become 
conventionalised, and the second element may clarify the meaning. However, 
it should be pointed out that the x-mind form?5 is itself a conventionalised 
formula, and is found even with sources that are very strongly associated with 
INTELLIGENCE and also occur in expressions without a second element. 
Apart from this type of compound, the MIND group also contains entries that 
are composed simply of an expression for the mind, which can be affixed 
positively (eg with -ful or -y, as in andgietful ai OE or wittv<fge)wittig ai OE- 
1784+1886) or negatively (eg with un- or -less, as in unwita n OE or heartless 
ai 1382-1611). A few entries have more than one affix, such as unandgitfull ai 
OE. In all of these entries, terms associated with the mind will automatically 
imply cleverness rather than stupidity unless modified negatively.
The same is true of entries that are formed with a HEAD or BRAIN 
element. The mapping of the abstract entity mind to a physical organ or body 
part represents one of the most basic elements of the way intelligence is 
conceptualised in English, as well as in many other languages. This is a 
metonymy in which the physical organ related to thought, the brain, or the 
body part in which the brain is enclosed, the head, is used to stand for the less 15
15 The OE entries have more flexible composition, but essentially most of these are similar in 
the way that they are formed from a MIND element with a modifying element (either
preceding or following) that relates to another concept, as in the examples above.
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concrete concept of the mind or intelligence. The use of the physical in 
metaphorizing the mental can be seen in most of the core concept categories I 
have identified, though exactly what is mapped to the physical varies. For 
example, for the SENSES group, ideas themselves are mapped to physical 
objects; CONTAINER, and related groups including DENSITY, additionally 
map the mind itself to a physical object.
Again, the majority of items in this group, which has a combined total 
of 203 entries, are of the noun form x-head/-brain or the derived adjective 
form x-headed/-brained (obviously head or brain can be substituted with a 
different expression for the same entity). The modifying first elements in these 
items appear to be able to come from any other core concept group. Only nine 
entries in the HEAD and BRAIN group do not conform to this same pattern, 
and these are motivated by this core category without any other source. Five of 
these are simple expressions for the head or the brain’; the remaining four are 
suffixed, one (the only noun) with -ist, one with -y, and two with the negative 
-less. The latter, brainless ai cl470> and headless ai 1526>. both signify 
stupidity, while all the others bar one signify cleverness. This can be explained 
by the relationship between the head or brain and the mental: because these 
parts of the body are the most closely associated with thought and knowledge, 
they can be used to stand for the mind and intelligence in general, and in this 
capacity they will naturally have a positive meaning if unmodified, just as is 
the case with the MIND entries’s. The one exception to this rule is noli n 
1399+1566. The core meaning of noil is given in the OED as “The top or 
crown of the head; the head generally”. Despite having this neutral meaning 
on its own, all of the phrases and compounds in which noil is found, including 
those within my data, are negative - for example, it is commonly collocated 
with the epithet drunken. The meaning ‘a stupid person’ seems to result from 
this frequent association with negative qualities, and in particular with 
expressions signifying stupidity.
16 One of these is a plural form, the brains n 1925>.
17 Cf. Glucksberg & Keysar’s (1993) observations about “most salient part”, also discussed in 
chapter 3.
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Although one might expect that the more direct relationship between 
the brain and cognition than between the head and cognition might be 
reflected in the data, in fact the opposite is true. There is a far greater number 
of HEAD entries than BRAIN entries: 174 compared to only 29, ie more than 
six times as many. As well as this, the earliest entry in the BRAIN group is 
brainless ai cl470>. One possible explanation for this is a lack of awareness of 
the role of the brain historically among non-experts, though evidence suggests 
that the majority of ordinary English-speaking people have probably known 
about the existence of the brain and its integral role in mental processes for 
several centuries’*. However, this does not mean that it had acquired the level 
of familiarity that seems to be desirable in metaphorical mappings. As well as 
this, it seems to me that it is natural to think of the head as a reference point in 
assessing or commenting on a person’s intelligence. Obviously the head 
contains the brain, but as well as this it is physically visible, and all our key 
impressions about a person’s intelligence are gained from the face, from 
expressions and in particular the eyes. All of the senses apart from touch are 
related to organs located visibly on the head, and again the eyes must be 
particularly significant given the strong conceptual link between vision and 
perception, discussed in chapter 2. The linguistic data in this thesis, for the 
most part, reflects ordinary and widespread usage rather than technical 
language, and therefore it should represent the way in which intelligence is 
regarded in general rather than by specialists. Perhaps in this context, and for 
the above reasons, the head is conceptually more salient than the brain.
18 Evidence suggests that the brain was recognised to have a key role in thought processes at 
least as early as 450BC, when research was conducted by a Greek physician, Alcmaeon, but it
is not until much later that this was generally acknowledged to be scientific fact. A number of
other theories have been posited at various times. These include (in 335BC) Aristotle’s theory
that the brain merely assisted the main organ of thought, which he believed was the heart;
three entries in the data, heartless ai 1382-1611. hearty ai 1382 and simple-hearted ai cl400-
1711. relate to this idea, though not necessarily to Aristotle’s views on the subject. In 170BC,
Galen proposed that the brain was a glandular organ designed to control the bodily humors,
and this theory was particularly influential in medieval thinking. However, even if its
workings were not accurately understood, the brain seems to have been widely acknowledged
as the seat of intelligence by the middle ages; at this time a ban on human dissection and the
study of anatomy precluded much further study in Europe, although some primitive surgery
was still conducted. (The summary given here is based on information about the history of
neurology from htm://www.pbs.org/wnet/bram/historv/.)
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1.3.6 Focus of the thesis
The main section of the thesis focuses on three groups of data, each 
related to a core category: these are the SENSES, ANIMALS and DENSITY. I 
have chosen these for two main reasons. Firstly, they are all quantitatively 
important in the INTELLIGENCE data, and make up the three largest core 
concept groups (with the exception of MIND and HEAD, discussed below). 
As I have already stated, my research is not intended to be quantitative in 
itself, but I have used quantity as a useful indicator of the importance of 
particular concept as sources for the metaphorization of INTELLIGENCE. 
However, perhaps more importantly than this, these groups are evidence of 
three very different mappings, and between them give some sense of both the 
diversity and the complexity that metaphor can exhibit and the range of factors 
that can influence mappings.
Chapter 2 deals with a group of mappings that are recognised to be key 
to the way intelligence is understood in a number of languages, and these are 
related to the SENSES. These mappings are recognised to be primary 
metaphors because of their experiential basis; their very basic nature means 
that they can combine with others to result in more complex, compound 
metaphors. For example, the core category group GRASP seems to 
incorporate the idea of the CONTAINER metaphor as well as TOUCH, and in 
the ANIMAL group there are several bird entries that are influenced by the 
idea of lack of VISION.
The ANIMAL group, discussed in the chapter 3, is the product of a 
different kind of mapping. The items in this group exemplify a general 
tendency to link humans and animals (and even more generally, animate 
beings) through personification and zoomorphism. Unlike the SENSES 
entries, which display the systematic link that is made between physical and 
mental perception, ANIMAL metaphors are found in a wide (and potentially 
unlimited) range of semantic fields that relate to humans. Because of this, 
particular ANIMAL metaphors will always have an additional motivation
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relating to another concept. In every case it is some characteristic associated 
with the animal is mapped, rather than animality in itself, but at the same time 
the mapping is grounded in a tradition of human-animal thought that appears 
to be a common and perhaps inevitable by-product of the way the brain is 
designed.
The final group that is examined in detail, in chapter 4, is DENSITY; 
this is a different kind of metaphor again. As a core concept, DENSITY seems 
to be strongly culturally informed, in that the specific entities that are found as 
sources for particular terms tend to be selected for familiarity and depending 
on other shared associations within a society. As well as this, the mapping 
between DENSITY and INTELLIGENCE can be broken down into elements 
shared with other metaphors. In other words, it is informed by other mappings, 
but in itself it seems more specific and narrow in its influence on other 
metaphors and on language in general: for example, it does not generate verb 
expressions in the way that the SENSES group does.
Other issues related to the data will be considered within the following 
three chapters, in the context of these groups.
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2 SENSES
2.1 Introduction
Despite the recent surge of interest in conceptual metaphor and a 
growing body of interdisciplinary work, approaches marrying cognitive and 
historical semantics have been rare. This is not to say that this has been 
ignored entirely; Eve Sweetser, notably, has examined etymological data 
whilst taking account of current theories and findings. By and large, though, 
this is exceptional, and conceptual metaphor theory and historical linguistics 
have had little influence on each other.
Within the body of work of this kind that has been attempted, one of 
the best-known and most thorough studies is Sweetser’s analysis of the 
metaphorical link between intellection and the senses (Sweetser 1984, 1990), 
which focuses most sharply on the pervasive connection of vision and 
intellection/perception. This has subsequently become one of the best- 
documented conceptual metaphors, and studies have been conducted into a 
variety of languages, though rarely if ever with the same attention to 
etymology. Sweetser claims in her thesis that the mapping is ancient, and can 
be traced back through the roots of language. In her examination of some of 
the most common polysemous words she uses comparative techniques in 
considering Proto-Indo-European roots and their descendants in other 
languages.
Such large-scale conceptual metaphors are of the highest importance for synchronic
and diachronic semantic analysis. Through a historical analysis of “routes” of
semantic change, it is possible to elucidate synchronic semantic connections between
lexical domains; similarly, synchronic connections may help clarify reasons for shifts
of meaning in past linguistic history (Sweetser 1990:45-6).
It is this type of methodology that I believe is required in understanding 
conceptual metaphor, but I would contend that the etymological evidence 
should be reassessed in light of recent theories about metaphor acquisition. In 
this chapter I will attempt to reconsider the senses as source concepts, and I 
will argue that new findings (especially Christopher Johnson’s theory of
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conflation) have implications for the way in which we discuss the mechanisms 
of particular metaphorical relationships.
2.2 Data
The senses have long been recognised as pervasive contributors to our 
perception of mental perception itself - vision and touch, particularly, are 
integral in our vocabulary about knowing and understanding, and this in part 
accounts for the amount of research into the connection between them that has 
been, and is still being, undertaken within a variety of disciplines. This is 
reflected in my own data: nearly a fifth of the words included in my database 
have connections with the senses (204 words -18.98%)’. Of these, around 70% 
(141 words) are used to signify cleverness; to use the notation of 
Componential Analysis, most of the vocabulary here is [+ intelligence], ie 
focusing on the senses as conduits of knowledge rather than on a lack of the 
senses as an impediment to cognition.
It should be noted again here that, where there has been significant 
meaning shift through time, a word may be included in the database in more 
than one category. In this particular section this only affects two entries: 
perceived ai cl400 and perceiving ai c 1410-1645 are both derived from PIE 
*kap-, meaning ‘grip’, which developed to be used simultaneously of vision
1 As discussed in the previous chapter, I have classified the data by ‘core concept’: this is a
purposely general term, since it includes metaphorical sources but also concepts such as those
represented by one element in a compound word that might be regarded as more ‘literal’ in
motivation, for example ‘brain’. Included in the core concept SENSES is LIGHT, which I
regard as a special extension of VISION (this is discussed below). I have also identified a
further group of data, the core concept of which I have termed SENSE/FEELING, but this has
not been included here. Since words within this particular group are not related to particular
physical senses (eg VISION or TOUCH), it is difficult to determine whether they can
correctly be associated with the physical senses or are more sensibly identified with some kind
of abstract ‘mental’ sense (or, as seems most likely, whether they carry a generalised meaning
with elements of both).
It should also be pointed out again that some words have been classified with more than one
core concept. For example, words derived from the Latin root capere, such as perceived ai
cl400. appear both in SENSE-TOUCH, following the meaning of this root, and in SENSE-
VISION, reflecting a semantic shift.
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and general intellection in the 14” century. One further entry, nimble-witted 
ai 1613/6>. is found in two categories, in this case because it is a compound of 
nimble, from PGmc *nem- meaning ‘assign, allot, take’, and wit, from PIE 
*weid-, which will be discussed below.
2.2.1 VISION
Quantitatively, vision is by far the most important sense, accounting 
for 157 entries, around 77% of the SENSES data, and just under 15% of the 
total data. The striking feature of this group is the very limited number of root 
forms from which the entries are derived. The most productive of these roots 
is the reconstructed PIE root *weid-; including compounds, 106 words can be 
traced back to this root, through various later forms. The OED suggests that 
five of these have come through French from Latin videre, and that the 
remainder are from OE witan and related forms {(ge)wit, wis, wissan etc.; it is 
often difficult to be clear about exactly which form is the direct source of a 
particular item, but roughly half are from a -t- form and half from an -s- form). 
58 of the entries are current.
There are two other root forms that are particularly important in the 
VISION group. The first is OE gleaw (from PIE *ghel-), which has twelve 
related entries, only one of which survives beyond the OE period. The other is 
OE seon (from PIE *sekw-), from which see and sight are derived, and this is 
responsible for eleven entries dating from al425 onwards; seven of these are 
current. There is further repetition of sources in the remaining 28 entries, but 
not to the same extent: four are from OE blind (from PIE *bhlendh-); two are 
from OE dwas; two are from OE sceawian (from which PDE show is derived; 
can be traced back to PIE *(s)keu-); two are derived from Latin illuminare,
from lumen, and one from the related Latin lucere (both ultimately from PIE 
*leuk-); two are derived from Latin perspicere (from PIE *spek-); two are 
compounds of eye (from PIE *okw-); two are from Latin capere (from PIE 
*kap-; the sense progression of these items is discussed above); two appear to 
be forms of PDE gowk; two forms are from opaque (from Latin opacus); three
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are compounds of clear2 3 4. Two entries are from understand, which has been 
shown convincingly to be connected with light by Hough. There are two 
entries with no repetition of sources, hlutor ai QE. and dim ai 1892>. and 
bright appears in the data as a complete entry twice tbright ai 1741> and 
bright ai 1824+1885>1 because it carries 2 distinct senses representing 
different types of intelligence?.
It is difficult to comment at length on the implications of this level of 
lexical production from a few sources, but I am convinced that it must be 
significant. To a certain extent, it must merely be the result of natural 
processes of language change. Some variation in forms is due to the variety of 
routes through which individual words, or individual morphemes, have 
entered English, and this accounts for the orthographical difference, and in 
part for the semantic difference, between wit and vision' the fact that they have 
the same root in PIE *weid- is academic in this respect. The huge number of 
very similar forms varying only in affixes, many of which have very limited 
periods of usage (cf. witful ai cl 205-1614. witty ai 1340-1611. witted ai 1528­
1606. wittiful ai 15901 may occur simply because the language was not 
completely fixed and therefore variation in forms was more common, 
especially in the Late Middle and Early New English periods. And as well as 
this, there are a huge number of compounds in this group which share an 
element: for example, there are 23 entries that are modified compounds of 
witted alone?.
2 This includes clear-eyedai 1530> which has already been mentioned as a compound of eye.
3 This has been a major source of controversy in recent years. Despite the fact that understand 
is one of the most central terms connected with the mental, there does not seem to be any
comparable expression with a similar source relating to position or posture. This is home out
by the INTELLIGENCE data, in which there are no items that can be obviously grouped
alongside these entries. However, Hough (forthcoming 2004) argues that understand is a
LIGHT metaphor that has become conventionalised by making reference to other OE
compounds of stand that mean ‘shine’.
4 The duplication is a result of the classification in HTE, in which different types of 
‘cleverness’ are placed in different subsections. I have preserved it here because there are
different citation dates for each sense, and I feel that it is misleading to merge the entries, even
though I recognise that this is a somewhat clumsy solution.
2 One of these is the entry witted twith prec. modifier! 1377>; this represents a general 
tendency to make compounds from this element, including some nonce words mentioned in
the OED but not included in this data such as two-third-witted.
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Despite these considerations, there would still seem to be an unusually 
large number of single-root derivations, and the number of words derived from 
PIE *weid- seems fairly exceptional. In my opinion, it is certainly possible 
that this reflects the centrality of vision in the conceptualisation of 
intelligence. New words are coined from an ' established root form either 
because a need arises - perhaps because there is no available vocabulary for 
the particular part of speech required - or because a writer or speaker chooses 
not to utilise lexical items that are already available to him/her. This could be 
for a number of reasons: for example, established forms may have picked up 
connotations that the writer wishes to avoid, whilst still selecting the concept 
that the root expresses, or he/she simply wishes to lend a word a particular 
tone or register and feels that by changing the morphological ‘make up’ a 
more appropriate (or grander) effect is created. Whether it is the case that the 
coining occurs as a matter of necessity or choice, it still demonstrates the 
perceived ‘aptness’ of the root to express a particular concept, and in turn this 
must mirror the import of this concept. In this case, this must offer some 
indication of the way in which vision is key to human understanding of 
intelligence.
In its turn, this cumulation of single root vocabulary must lead to a 
snowball effect - the very fact that this root is frequently exploited must 
attract further exploitation. This applies to the compound words as well, since 
the initial use of a word or element in a compound very often lays a 
foundation for the appearance of more, similar compounds.
A further aspect of the data that should perhaps be commented on is 
the balance between CLEVER and STUPID words in this group of data. As I 
have already commented, in the data as a whole there are far more STUPID 
than CLEVER words, but this is not reflected in the OE data, which is made 
up of 41 CLEVER words and only ten STUPID words. A large proportion of
The same sort of effect is evident in other areas of my data; see especially the group with
core concept DENSITY, where a very few specific substances are found in a relatively large
number of vocabulary items and come to be conventionally associated with intelligence.
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the OE words come from the *weid- root, 33 in total, and of these 27 signify 
CLEVERNESS. This is certainly a result of the nature of sources surviving 
from this period: most of these are biblical or related texts, many on the theme 
of wisdom (as discussed in chapter 1, section 1.2).
Overall in the VISION group, there are more words denoting 
cleverness than stupidity - out of the total 157 entries, 110 are linked with 
cleverness, and 47 with stupidity. As I commented above, this is consistent 
with the focus on the senses as conduits of intelligence. Predictably, because 
vision and blindness are clear opposites, there is clear symmetry in the data in 
that vision is always associated with cleverness and lack of vision with 
stupidity.
2.2.1.1 LIGHT
Within the VISION group, 34 entries are more specifically connected 
with light, although in many cases it is difficult to make a clear distinction 
between vision and light as a source; for example, clear is from Latin clarus,
which the OED defines as “bright, clear, manifest, plain, brilliant, illustrious, 
famous, etc.”. Of the entries, 16 occur in OE, and twelve of these are 
compounds derived from PIE *ghel- (of which only one survives beyond the 
OE period, glew<gleaw ai OE-cl290). The rest are from a variety of sources. 
Three derive from PIE *leuk-, three from dim (<0E dim), and three from clear
(<Latin clarus) two each are from dwws, clear, bright and opaque, and the 
final entry is hlutor ai OE. The data is symmetrical in that bright always equals 
clever and dim/dark stupid, and although there are more entries signifying 
cleverness (a total of 21) there are still a number associated with stupidity 
(13); this is a similar bias to that found in the VISION data as a whole.
The particular motivation for the LIGHT group, as a subgroup of 
VISION, is discussed below.
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2.2.2 TOUCH
In this section there are 32 items, making this the second largest group 
within the sense data (accounting for 15.69% of the SENSE data and just 
under 3% of the total data). Again, there is some duplication of roots, though 
not on the scale of the VISION group. The most productive of these is PIE 
*kap- (>Latin capere) which accounts for eleven entries, dating as early as 
cl300 but mainly from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards, and four 
of these are current with this particular meanings. A further six entries are 
from clevee* 7 8 (from PIE *gleubh-), one dating from 1716 and the rest from the 
mid-nineteenth century, and all but one in current use; five entries are from 
OE numol (from PGmc *nem-), with reflex nimble9', five are from Latin 
prehendere (pre + PIE *ghend-). The five remaining entries are compounds, 
phrases or derivatives of feel, fetch, reach, take and tact. All but eight entries 
signify cleverness, and of these, six are compounds with the negative prefix 
un-.
I have labelled this core concept GRASP(TOUCH), because in all 
cases the words here are more specifically connected with grasping. I would 
contend that this is a special case of touching which incorporates the concept 
of possession or enclosure. This is discussed at more length below.
7 Two of the words in this group sit somewhat uncomfortably with the rest of the data, and 
may not be best included in this core concept group, heavy ai cl300> and heavv-headed aj
1590> clearly relate better to some kind of concept of weight and perhaps slowness; this
development of meaning, (which fits in with the idea of the mind as a container, i.e. ‘holding’
weighty contents), is shown in the core concept field of the database. Despite this, I have
included them here as well since it is interesting that they share a root with this group.
7 The etymology of clever is doubtful, but the OED and other sources tentatively attribute it to 
ME cliver, which is found only once before the sixteenth century in English but has cognates
in Old Frisian and material found in Jutland. The explanation given for its semantics is as
follows: “The early example suggests relation to ME. clivers ‘claws, talons, clutches’, in the
sense ‘nimble of claws, sharp to seize’, and the 16-17th century examples (also of cleverly)
show it connected with the use of the hands, a notion which still remains in the general sense
of adroit, dexterous, having ‘the brain in the hand’.”
7 Nimble occurs twice in the database, once in the entry nimble<numol ai OE-1483 and again
in the entry nimble ai 1604>. As with bright, discussed earlier, this is because in each case a
slightly different type of cleverness (as distinguished by the OED) is represented. It is HTE
policy to preserve the distinctions made by the OED wherever possible; the splitting of the
senses is further justifiable because of the gap between the end and begirming of the date
ranges.
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2.2.3 TASTE
There are twelve entries in this seetion10. Ten of these have a common 
IE root, *sap-; this level of productivity can be partly accounted for by the fact 
that they have come into English by different routes. According to the OED,
sapientipotent ai 1656 and sapientipotent n 1675. and insipid ai al700-al834. 
come directly from Latin (although insipid ai al700-1834 does have a French 
cognate earlier than the English form); sapient ai 1471-1868 and sapient n 
1549-1600+1827 come either directly from Latin sapientem or via OFrench 
sapient, sage ai 1297-1872 and sage n al 400-1862. and the later compound 
sage-like ai 1879. come through French and Common Romanic from Latin; 
and savvey/saww ai 1905> comes through French much later. This variation 
in direct source forms, and the range of cognates available in other languages, 
show that the intelligence sense of the root was very well established before 
any forms had appeared in English, and this perhaps makes it less theoretically 
sound to suggest TASTE as a core concept for this group. Having said that, 
this thesis is concerned with the ultimate sources of intelligence vocabulary 
and the motivation behind their processes of change, so I do not believe that 
this invalidates the categorisation I have adopted. As well as this, the fact that 
there are entries in this section related in concept but not in root, and more 
generally that taste (and other vocabulary in the same semantic field) has other 
current senses related to mental processes, makes it more plausible to make 
the connection.
2.2.4 HEARING
This is noticeably the smallest group in the SENSES data, with only 
six entries, all of which express stupidity and two of which have questionable 
etymology. The most central current adjective to express lack of ability to 
hear, deaf, is listed in the OED with a limited period of use with this particular 
meaning, ie deaf ai c 1440-1482. although intuitively I suspect that there are 
shades of this in the phrase “Are you deaf?”. However, from comparative 
evidence, an older connection with the mental does seem plausible, and it may
10 There in one entry in this section that is duplicated: sage (n) appears with two slightly 
different senses, wise and wise derog, and different date ranges, following the OEDs
classification.
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even be possible that the physical meaning is not the earliest (or at least no 
earlier that the mental meaning). The OED suggests the following etymology:
A Common Teutonic adj.: OE. deaf= OFris. <ii/(WFris. doaf), OS. dof(MDu.
., Du.j MLG. doof (v), LG. dof), OHG. toup (b), (MHG. toup, Ger. taub), ON.
daufr (Sw. dof. Da. dov), Goth, daufs (6) :-OTeut. *daub-oz, from an ablaut st
em deub-, daub-, dub, pre-Teut. dheubh-, to be dull or obtuse of perception: cf
. Goth, afdaubnan to grow dull or obtuse, also Gr. r-vjAos (:-0v^-") blind.
The important point is that the earliest reconstructed meaning appears to be 
more generally related to lack of perception/intelligence than the more specific 
PDE deaf. This is in line with the reconstructed semantics of several of the 
other main sense-perception verbs, discussed below.
There is also some data on lack of ability to speak, within a group I 
have labelled SPEECH, and although this seems to me to be a separate 
concept it may be worth noting here. Although there is not a great deal of 
cross-over between the two groups within the data - only one entry, surd aj 
1601 -al676. is from Latin surdus which can mean deaf or dumb and is 
therefore classified into both groups - the two concepts do seem to fall 
together occasionally, presumably because they are often linked. There are 28 
entries in the SPEECH group; the most important root for these is dumb,
discussed below, from which ten entries are derived (two of these date back to 
the mid-sixteenth century, and the rest from around the beginning of the 
nineteenth century).
2.3 Motivation
The senses have long been recognised as central to our perception of 
perception itself, and the motivation for the mapping between physical and 
mental in this case is well-documented and seems relatively straightforward. It 
is a textbook case for cognitive metaphor theory (perhaps even a cornerstone 
example), since it demonstrates the way in which our physical being cannot be 
separated from the way we conceptualise, and consequently affects language. 
From very early experience, humans have access to knowledge and
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understanding through the physical senses, and as a result the process (gaining 
knowledge/understanding) and the end result (being knowledgeable/having 
understanding) are inextricably linked, to the extent that one affects the way 
the other is perceived. Put simply, the way in which we are able to access 
knowledge affects our perception of what it is to be intelligent.
As I have already outlined, there is a huge difference in the quantity of 
data relating to each of the senses, and this can be understood better if one 
considers these individually.
2.3.1 VISION
This is without doubt the most recognised and studied source field 
within the senses group, and has been variously expressed as KNOWING or 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. The bias towards vision in the data is 
explained by Sweetser in terms of human reliance on available, apparently 
‘shared’ input.
...vision is connected with intellection because it is our primary source of objective
data about the world. Child language studies (e.g. Clark 1976) have shown that visual
features are among the most marked in children’s early discrimination of one
category from another; and, as mentioned earlier, cross-linguistic studies of
evidentiaas show that direct visual evidence is considered the strongest and most
reliable source of data. This is reasonable, since vast numbers of objects in daily life
do not give forth auditory stimuli, and it would be impossible for the child to
constantly taste, smell, or touch every object to be encountered. As the child matures,
social understanding of appropriate distance also develops; it may not merely be
dangerous to touch or taste, it may be socially inappropriate to get that close. Vision
gives us data from a distance... Vision is also identical for different people — that is
to say, two people who stand in the same place are generally understood to see the
same thing (Sweetser 1990:39).
Vision also appears to be the most ‘general purpose’ of the senses. Viberg 
comments on the way in which the verb see can “extend its meaning to cover 
the other sense modalities” in English (Viberg 1983:140), and he compares 
this to verbs in other languages with a prototypical meaning ‘see’ that can 
extend to mean other ways of perceiving. This is discussed at more length 
below.
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Apart from the experiential reasons for the status of vision, it is crucial 
to be aware of its cultural significance. Western society assigns vision such a 
privileged status that it has been described as ‘oculareentrie’ (Jay 1993:4), and 
this is evident in all sorts of ways historically: preoccupation with signs and 
symbols, belief in the authority of the written word and, in modem times, 
dependence on visual media such as TV and film. It must be that, as well as 
reflecting it, this perpetuates and intensifies the way we value and tmst the 
visual over, for example, the auditory. Of course, this is almost impossible to 
measure in any meaningful way.
2.3.1.1 LIGHT
LIGHT is generally aceepted to be elosely connected to VISION, and 
is very often included within this group - for example, Sweetser lists light 
alongside the eyes and facial movement as an example of “The physical nature 
of sight” as a source concept (Sweetser 1990:32), and Lakoff & Johnson 
present metaphors of light and vision together under the heading 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING; IDEAS ARE LIGHT-SOURCES; 
DISCOURSE IS A LIGHT-MEDIUM (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:49). I regard it 
here as a special case of VISION, with a sort of extended version of the same 
motivation. If it is preferable for one to be able to see in order to gain 
information, then light is preferable to darkness since it facilitates vision. If 
one is bright then presumably this will enable one to see, in order to have 
access to knowledge or understanding, and perhaps it may also enable others 
to do the same.
It is also important to note that this metaphorical connection fits into a 
network of correspondences or oppositions between qualities perceived as 
positive and negative, which are often associated with one another more or 
less consciously. Lakoff & Johnson refer to this “system of overall external 
systematicity” in discussing spatial metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:18); 
similar links are also proposed by Hertz, though perhaps more philosophically, 
within his study of the dichotomy between left and right.
All the oppositions presented by nature exhibit this fundamental dualism. Light and 
dark, day and night, east and south in opposition to west and north, represent in
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49
imagery and localise in space the two contrary classes of supernatural powers: on one
side life shines forth and rises, on the other it descends and is extinguished. The same
with the contrast between high and low, sky and earth... The same contrast appears if
we consider the meaning of the words ‘right’ and ‘left’. The former is used to express
ideas of physical strength and ‘dexterity’, of intellectual ‘rectitu<^^’ and good
judgement, of ‘uprightness’ and moral integrity, of good fortune and beauty, of
juridical norm; while the word ‘left’ evokes most of the ideas contrary to these (Hertz
1960:96-99).
In his discussion of morality metaphors, Lakoff suggests that the states 
and qualities equated with morality as opposed to immorality are grounded in 
physical experience, and can be understood if one considers the corollaries of 
bodily well-being. He identifies a number of these states, which are all 
connected with the generally positive as well as with the moral.
In the basic physical sense, “well-being” is constrained as follows: Other things 
being equal, you are better off if you are 
healthy rather than sick,
rich rather than poor,
strong rather than weak,
safe rather than in danger,
cared for rather than uncared for,
cared about rather than ignored,
happy rather than sad, disgusted or in pain,
whole rather than lacking,
beautiful rather than ugly,
if you are experiencing beauty rather than ugliness,
if you are functioning in the light rather than the dark, and
if you can stand upright so that you don’t fall down.
These are among our basic experiential forms of well-being. Their opposites are
forms of harm. Immoral action is action that causes harm, that is, action that deprives
someone of one or more of these - of health, wealth, happiness, strength, freedom,
safety, beauty, and so on (Lakoff 1996:250).
A number of the core concept groups in the INTELLIGENCE data 
appear in this list, and in fact, this perhaps offers some form of explanation for 
a number of apparently ‘miscellaneous’ entries which are either isolated or in 
very small core category groups. BEAUTY is found only in beautiful-minded 
ai 1865: PURE/CLEAN has two entries, clean ai cl400> and cleanlv ai cl 540-
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1712: there are five entries relating to WEALTH/PROSPERITY. A further 13 
entries are connected with either physical or mental HEALTH; 14 can be 
grouped under STRENGTH/WEAKNESS; 23 relate in various ways to 
COMPLETION (similar to wholeness); as I have discussed already, 33 are 
connected with LIGHT. There are other core categories I would place 
alongside these which appear to have similar justifications: 
ALIVE/ANIMATE (12 entries) is an obvious addition; VISION (158 entries) 
certainly belongs, since light is primarily related to well-being because it 
enables vision; and arguably the BIRTH/CREATION group (17 entries) can 
be included since it is connected with life. Including all of these categories, 
264 entries - well over a fifth of the total data - can be associated with this 
very general, positive ‘experiential well-being’ motivation.
There is an exception to this general pattern, which can be accounted 
for by examining the meaning development of the lexical root. There are 6 
entries (one of these uncertain), all meaning STUPID, derived from silly,
which can be traced back to OE gescelig. This is clearly a positive term that
one would expect to mean clever - it is listed in TOE in the sections 
08.01.01.03 Good feeling, joy, happiness and several of its subsections, 
15.01.05 Possession of wealth, and 16.02.01.10.02.01 A Blessing, invocation 
of divine favour, and so fits in with the other ‘experiential well-being’ data. 
However, its history has several stages, partially similar to the development of 
innocent, very roughly,
happy/blessed > innocent > eelrleis/pitiful/weak/unsoreiiticated > foolish/it.urid
(based on Samuels 1972:66, which analyses the semantic development of this 
term in a more detailed diagram; this is given in full in chapter 4, section 4.7). 
This accounts for its use as an adjective expressing non-intelligence.
2.3.2 TOUCH
The desire to touch things seems to be to be one of the most basic of 
human responses to the external world. Even before babies can recognise it, 
touching and holding on to things is a reflex, and as they mature this becomes 
more conscious.
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As I mentioned briefly earlier, most of the items within this group are 
related, not only to touch, but specifically to grasping or physically 
holding/taking. In fact, this metaphorical link tends to be most commonly 
discussed in these terms; for example, Lakoff & Johnson discuss 
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:124-125), and 
Grady (1997:297) lists this as a primary metaphor. However, in the light of the 
other senses data and because this mapping does not seem to be irreducible 
(Grady’s criteria for identifying primary metaphor), I am not sure that this is 
the most helpful way to describe the link, which can be broken into simpler 
constituent ‘parts’. At its most general level, it is an ontological metaphor, 
exemplifying the human tendency to objectify abstract concepts, since ability 
to have hold of an idea implies that this is a bounded physical entity. 11 In this 
sense it represents a very typical concrete/abstract relationship between source 
and target, perhaps itself the most basic of all metaphorical mappings.
It also seems to me to be consistent with, if not closely related to, some 
kind of container or enclosure metaphor, since there is an element of 
encircling something completely with the hands rather than only having 
contact with it (having it in one’s grasp). This may be linked to the idea of 
control: if one is holding a physical object one can manipulate it, and similarly 
if one really understands an idea one can make use of it intellectually.
It is noted above that almost all of the entries in this group signify 
cleverness rather than stupidity, and that of the STUPID words there are only 
two entries that are not negated compounds (as with the entries derived from 
ges&lig discussed above, this can be explained by semantic development). 
This seems to me to be a consequence of the source concept: the opposite of 
vision is blindness, and the opposite of hearing is deafness, but there is no 
central opposite concept of touch or grasp, and correspondingly no basic
" See Bamden 1997, http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~jab/ATT-Meta/Databank/Metaphor-
Descriptions/ideasANDemotions-AS-physlcai-objects.html for a discussion of this
metaphor. It is also expressed more specifically as the primary metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS
PHYSICAL CONTENTS OF THE HEAD by Grady (1997:298).
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lexical term to express this. Having said that, there are perhaps echoes of the 
idea to be found in words or phrases expressing stupidity that do not appear in 
the thesaurus data: for example, handless in Modem Scots originally denoted a 
lack of ability to work with the hands but has developed to mean stupid, since 
the most basic function that this part of the body performs is holding/grasping; 
the example I’m all thumbs at algebra (Lakoff 1994) further supports this.
Most of the words in this group connote understanding rather than 
knowledge or intellectual prowess. Clever is a notable exception, which could 
be because it is not a prototypical member of this group. Despite the centrality 
of the term, its etymology is somewhat obscure, and there is general 
uncertainty about its origins, although most etymologists mention ME clivers,
‘claws’. Both OED and MED cite the same single quotation of diver (aj) from 
ME and give similar tentative meanings (MED: “?Expert in seizing”), and 
OED says the following:
Early history obscure: app. in local and colloquial use long before it became a
general literary word. A single example of cliver is known in ME., but the word has
not been found again till the 16th c., and it appears not to have been in general use till
the close of the 17th, since Sir Thos. Browne specially mentions it as East Anglian,
and Ray explains it among his dialect words. Outside Eng., Koolman gives EFris.
clufer (from difer), clever, skilful, alert, ready, nimble, and klover, klever is used in
same sense at Ribe Stift in Jutland (Molbech). The early example suggests relation to
ME. divers ‘claws, talons, clutches’, in the sense ‘nimble of claws, sharp to seize’,
and the 16-17th c. examples (also of cleverly) show it connected with the use of the
hands, a notion which still remains in the general sense of adroit, dexterous, having
‘the brain in the hand’. Cf. also CLEVERUS. Clever appears to have come into
general use about the time that deliver, formerly used in the sense ‘expert’, became
obsolete, but there is no trace of any influence of the one upon the other. The sense-
development has analogies with that of nimble, adroit, handy, handsome, nice, neat,
clean.
Sweetser comments on the close association of touch with emotional 
perception, and suggests that this is a corollary of the fact that “there is not a 
simple and tidy way to divide physical perception from emotion” (Sweetser 
1990:44). My own difficulty in classifying a group that I have labelled 
SENSE/FEELING testifies to this. These have been separated from the rest of
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the physical sense data, as particular words have such general meanings that it 
is impossible to say whether they should be presented as having earlier 
physical meanings; nevertheless, they should perhaps be considered alongside 
this group.
2.3.3 TASTE
Although there is little data in this section and almost all of this is from 
a single root, the link between TASTE and mental states or processes can be 
found in other parts of speech and phrases. For example, one can have good or 
bad taste' something can leave a bad taste in one’s mouth, one can taste
freedom or victory. Having said that, TASTE is a far less pervasive source of 
any kind of intellection vocabulary, and far less central to conceptualisation. 
The main reason for this must surely be its lack of suitability as a source of 
information, which Sweetser refers to in her discussion of VISION (Sweetser 
1990:39, quoted above). It is clearly impossible, and might even be dangerous, 
to taste everything, aside from the fact that this is likely to be unproductive 
and inappropriate. As well as this, it is the most personal of the senses, since 
one has a high level of control in what one chooses to taste, and nobody apart 
from the taster can be involved in the process of tasting. The prevalent abstract 
meaning of taste, as in personal preference or discernment, reflects this.
An interesting feature of the data is that no entries are modified 
compounds except for one, insipid n ai7QQ^l-834. and in all cases the 
presence of taste (either the ability to taste or the presence of flavour) is 
equated with intelligence. In other words, taste is itself a positive, rather than a 
neutral, term, in the same way that to have taste implies ‘good taste’. Viberg 
notes that this is the case in various languages, and that the opposite can be 
observed in SMELL vocabulary.
When taste and smell appear as copulative expressions, an evaluative element is
often present. In one of the languages in the sample, namely Oromo (=Galla), there
are no neutral verbs for taste and smell, as shown in Table 23. You must always
choose between two verbs: mi’aau ‘taste = good'lhadaau ‘taste = bad’ and urgaau
‘smell - good’ / ajaau ‘smell = bad’... In English, the verbs taste and smell are freely
combined with good and bad... Parallel examples are found in Swedish. But in
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absolute constructions where no modifier is used, the verbs are not completely
neutral. Lukta ‘smell’ implies ‘bad’ (as in English) and smaka ‘taste’ implies ‘good’
(unlike English)... (In English, the adjectives smelly and tasty differ in the same
way.) This seems to reflect a very general tendency. For smell, I examined what
happens if you use the verb in an absolute construction in most of the languages in
the sample. And it turned out that a bad smell was implied (Viberg 1983:152-5).
2.3.4 HEARING
As indicated above, there is very little data on HEARING compared 
with the other senses. In the literature, this metaphorical link is most often 
described as UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING or something similar, with an 
emphasis on comprehension rather than, for example, academic learning. 
Although all the words in this section express stupidity, there are certainly 
other verbs and phrases in current usage that fit in with this mapping and can 
be more ‘positive’. To ‘hear’ someone, for example in the phrases “I hear 
you” or “Do you hear what I’m saying?”, is to understand them; to ‘listen’ to 
someone is to try to understand them and to be receptive to their ideas. 
Sweetser discusses the way in which “physical auditory reception...[is] linked 
with heedfulness and internal “receptivity”...and hence also to obedience” 
(Sweetser 1990:41).
The same distinction between hear and listen is mirrored in the 
vocabulary of vision - there is a difference in attention between looking and 
seeing - but there still seems to be a discrepancy in the extent to which vision 
and hearing are trusted as sources and conductors of knowledge. Like smell 
and taste, the usefulness of hearing is limited by the fact that not everything 
has a sound, but this does not seem a convincing argument on its own since it 
would be difficult to compare the number of entities that cannot be heard with 
those that cannot be seen. As I have already mentioned, Sweetser points out 
that “Vision is also identical for different people — that is to say, two people 
who stand in the same place are generally understood to see the same thing” 
(ibid:39). The same does not seem to be believed of hearing, or at least not to 
the same extent; intuitively people seem to trust auditory data less (attested by 
the lack of a hearing-related term equivalent to eye-witness, for example). On
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the one hand this seems quite illogical: hearing capability can certainly vary 
enormously from individual to individual, but then so can vision. In terms of 
any interpretative element, the same is true: one’s impressions when listening 
to music, for example, are personal and subjective, but this is also the case 
when it comes to appreciating visual art. On the other hand, it is true that one 
has more control over vision than over hearing. Although one can ‘tune in’ to 
a stimulus either visually or aurally, vision involves particular physical factors, 
since in order to look at something the body must be oriented in a certain way 
and the eyes must be opened and directed at the stimulus, whereas hearing 
does not have any similar restrictions, but is “mainly a mental activity” 
(ibid:41). Conversely, one can be reasonably confident that another person 
sees something if these physical ‘conditions’ are being met so that they are 
apparently looking at the stimulus, but it is more difficult to assess whether or 
not someone is listening and therefore hearing, since no change of position or 
expression are required.
This may go some way to explaining why, in general, hearing tends to 
be associated with a much narrower field of mental experience than vision, 
and therefore is not linked with intelligence to the same extent.
2.4 Proto-Indo-European
At a basic level, the mapping between INTELLIGENCE and the 
SENSES appears to be one of the simplest and easiest to account for, and this 
appears to be the underlying assumption in most of the literature, where it is 
presented as fairly typical and unproblematic. Each of the senses provides a 
source concept that maps onto the target, KNOWING or 
UNDERSTANDING, thus resulting in a ‘classic’ link between a ‘concrete’ 
physical ability and a more ‘abstract’ mental process.
However, this seems to me to be something of an assumption, and one 
that is not home out by the evidence. Sweetser’s assertion that “There is a set
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of basic IE roots which seem to have referred to vision as far back as their 
history can be traced” (Sweetser 1990:33) seems to me to be accurate, but 
misses an important point: as far as they can be reconstructed with any 
certainty at all, most of these roots seem to have referred to mental processes 
as well. It may be the case that “Vision verbs commonly develop abstract 
senses of mental activity” (ibid:33), and this is certainly what one would 
assume intuitively, but it does not appear to be evidenced by the etymologies 
of some root words in the data.
In her study, Sweetser considers the roots of perception verbs 
connected with vision only, and within this group she does not include all of 
the most central English verbs - for two of the PIE items, all the reflex verbs 
listed are from other languages. As a starting point, I have examined the five 
most quantitatively important PIE roots in the corpus, each of which yields 
more than ten entries. In order of productiveness, these are:
PIE *weid- (> PDE wtt, vision)
PIE *ghel- (> OE gleaw > EME glew )
PIE *sekw- (> OE seon > PDE see , sigh, etc )
PIE *kap- ( > L capeee > PDE perceive, conceive )
PIE *sap- ( > L sapeee > PDE aage , sapien,)
*ghel- is unusual in this group in that none of its reflexes survive into PDE, 
and only one survives past the OE era until 1290, glew<gleaw ai OE-cl290. 
Of the others, *weid- (discussed above) is the root of 106 entries, the greatest 
number by far, accounting for one tenth of the INTELLIGENCE data. Of the 
other roots, *ghel- yields 12 entries, *sekw- and *kap- each yield 11, and *sap- 
is the root of 10. In total then, these five roots have 151 derived entries, almost 
three quarters of the SENSES data (204 entries).
Both Sweetser and the AHD give the meaning of *weid- as ‘to see’. 
Pokomy’s entry for this root does give a physical vision meaning first, but lists 
the mental meaning alongside this:
2. u(e)di- ,erblicken, sehen‘ (ursprungl. Aorist), Zustandsverbum u(e)idfi)-, nasaliert
ui-n-d-, Perf. uoid-a- ,habe gesehen, weifi‘, woher die Bedeutung ,wissen‘ auch auf
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andere Formen iibertragen wurde; aus der Bedeutung ,erblicken‘ stammt ,finden‘;
uid-to-s ,gesehen‘, uid-ti-, uid-tu- ,das Wissen‘, uidd, uidiom, uid- ,Wissen‘, ueidos-
n. ,das Sehen‘; Partiz. Perf. ueid-uOt-s, f. uidus-T ,wssend‘ (Pokomy 1959:1125).
From the comparative evidence following this, it seems more reasonable to 
posit a mental meaning alongside the physical meaning of the PIE root; in 
almost all the languages listed there are reflexes of this kind, including some 
that Pokomy overlooks: both Latin video and Greek oiSa can be used with a 
mental sense (see Lewis & Short 1996 and Glare 1982; Liddell & Scott 1996).
Sweetser also makes a brief reference to PIE *sekw-, asserting that 
“*sekw- is the ancestor of Hittite sakk- /sekk- “know,”12 as well as of Eng. see 
(Sweetser 1990:33). However, these do not seem to be the only reflexes that 
indicate a conflated sense of mental and physical. The AHD gives the 
definition “see, perceive”; Pokomy (identifying the root as sek~-) is more
general, listing various possible meanings, and drawing attention to the fact 
that this root shares a source with the preceding entry, which has the basic 
meaning ‘ follow’.
,bemerken, sehen; zeigen‘, urspriingl. ,wittem, spiiren' und (jiinger) ,sagen‘; identisch
mit 1. sek?- (Pokomy 1959:897).
For *ghel- and *kap-, I have not been able to find evidence to support a mental 
meaning as central as the physical meaning. *kap- has the Latin reflex capax,
which can mean ‘mentally perceptive’, and percipere derives from this. *sap- 
(Watkins uses *sep-\ by contrast, is recognised by both AHD and Pokomy as 
meaning ‘taste’ and ‘perceive’, and has reflexes in Latin, Oscan, Middle High 
German and Old Icelandic relating to the mental sense.
There are other roots which have reflexes in the data that are 
comparable in etymology. *ghend- (>Latin prehendere) has a few reflexes 
with the meaning ‘mentally grasp’, but several more with related mental
12 There is some disagreement about this root in modem literature, and it may be that some of 
the items that have been traditionally linked to this are not actually related. Lehmarm draws
attention to various possibilities suggested by different scholars, but says “Hitt sakuwa n pi
eyes is probably related, and also sakuwai- observe.. .though.. .not to Hitt sak(k)~ know"
(Lehmann 1986:291).
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meanings such as ‘guess’, ‘suspect’ and ‘presume’ (Pokomy 1959:437-8), and 
similarly PGme *nem- (>PDE nimble) has various senses connected with 
counting, reckoning and checking, which seem to go beyond the purely 
physical (ibid:763-4). *(s)keu- (>PDE hear, show) is listed as
I. keu-, skeu- dehnstufig kai- ,worauf achten (beobachten, schauen)', dann ,horen, 
fihlen, merken‘... (ibid:587).
This clearly incorporates a mental meaning, and I believe that it is important to 
bear in mind when considering Sweetser’s observations about the direction of 
possible semantic change. If the earliest senses of any basic hearing verbs do 
not separate the physical and the mental, this indicates that there is a perceived 
connection between hearing and intellection in general. If this is the case, the 
type of change she observes is less surprising at the very least.
An interesting feature of the hear-heed semantic change is that the opposite direction
also seems to be possible: words meaning mental attention or understanding can
come to mean physical hearing. Thus, Lat. intendere “stretch out, direct one’s
attention to,” comes to mean “take heed of, understand” in later Romance languages
- OFr. entendere, Sp. entender, and It. intendere all mean “understand.” But in
French the semantic development did not stop there, and entendre in Modem French
has the primary meaning “hear” (ousting OFr. ouir, the legitimate heir of Lat.
audire). Something similar may be going on in the domain of vision: in at least one
case, a verb seems to have shifted from the realm of intellection to a possible (if not
completely) physical meaning, namely recognize, which derives from the Latin root
gno- “know.” Thus, although the pattems of semantic change which I am describing
do seem to be primarily one-way (concrete — abstract, or physical — mental),
nonetheless some verbs may shift in the opposite direction along these same axes
(Sweetser 1990:35).
The probable meaning of *keu- also shows the cross-over between physical 
senses that can be found in the semantic development of a number of roots, 
including *sekw- (above). Interestingly, this is also evident in other lexical 
items that are not found in the data but are semantically related, the most 
striking of which is perhaps the Latin root of taste (according to the OED):
ME. tasten, a. OF. tast-er to touch, feel (12th c.), in 13-14th c. also to taste, mod.F.
tater to feel, touch, try, taste, = Pr., OSp. tastar, It. tastare to feel, handle, touch,
grope for, try (Florio):-Com. Romanic or late pop.L. *tastare, app. from *taxtcire.-
*taxitare, freq. of taxare to touch, feel, handle (Gellius, etc.): see tax v.]
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Additional etymologies in the same semantic area back up the idea that 
the traditional idea of a concrete source to abstract target may not always be 
accurate. The OED gives information for dumb a (n) which points to 
metaphorical extension in the opposite direction:
A Com. Teut. adj.: OE. dumb = OS. dumb (MDu. domp, dom, Du. dom, LG. dum),
OHG. tumb, tump (MHG. tump, tum, early mod.G. thumb, mod.G. dumm), ON.
dumbr (Sw. dumb), Goth, dumbs. In Gothic, Old Norse, and OE. only in sense ‘mute,
speechless’; in OHG. it shared this sense with those of ‘stupid’ and ‘deaf; in the
other langs. and periods, generally in sense ‘stupid’, though early mod.Ger. had also
that of ‘deaf: see Grimm. These diverse applications suggest as the original sense
some such notion as ‘stupid’, ‘not understanding’, which might pass naturally either
into ‘deaf or ‘dumb’.
It seems plausible that deaf followed a similar etymological path:
A Common Teutonic adj.: OE. deaf= OFris. f/(WFris. Coo/), OS. Jo/(MDu., Du.,
MLG. doof (v), LG. Co/), OHG. toup (b), (MHG. toup, Ger. taub), ON. daufr (Sw.
dof Da. dov), Goth, daufs (b) :-OTeut. *daub-oz, from an ablaut stem deub-, daub-,
dub, pre-Teut. dheubh-, to be dull or obtuse of perception: cf. Goth, afdaubnan to
grow dull or obtuse, also Gr. tv/Xos (:-V«/>-) blind.
In general, it is not possible to be certain that sense-intellection 
vocabulary is the result of a clear, physical to mental, source to target 
metaphorical mapping. At best this seems simplistic, and at worst, inaccurate; 
although it is intuitively satisfying it does not appear to reflect subtleties in the 
etymological data.
2.5 Primary metaphor and conflation theory
Above, I discussed the motivation for this group of metaphors. At the 
core of this is the idea that experiences from very early childhood are 
significant to the extent that, perceptively, they become inseparable from 
intellectual processes. This is consistent with two complementary theories that 
have been proposed recently: the first of these is about metaphor at its 
simplest, most irreducible level, and the second concerns the way in which 
concepts are initially acquired. Both theories form part of the Integrated
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Theory of Primary Metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:46ft), which pulls 
together the work of Joe Grady, Chris Johnson, Srini Narayanan and Giles 
Fauconnier and Mark Turner. The first part is Grady’s theory that there are a 
number of very simple, irreducible metaphors, ‘primary metaphors’, which are 
motivated by various kinds of early experience. 
KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is one of these (Grady 
1999:296). Other examples are NOW IS HERE, for which the motivation is 
“The correlation between our awareness of a particular world-state and our 
own surroundings” (ibid:288), and AFFECTION IS WARMTH, coming from 
“The correlation between affection and body warmth, produced by physical 
proximity” (ibid:293). All primary metaphors have the simplest and most 
generic experiences as sources, and the links between source and target appear 
to be natural to the extent that they are made involuntarily.
Primary metaphors...appear not to fit a typical characterisation of conceptual
metaphors as tools for constructing, grasping, and communicating about difficult,
abstract concepts. Instead the target concepts of these mappings refer to experiences
which appear, based again on several types of observations, to be fundamental
aspects of cognitive function.. .it seems likely that metaphorical associations between
source and target concepts are inevitable...it seems impossible for there not to be
significant interactions between concepts that are tightly correlated within recurrent
experience-types. Metaphor, on this account, would be a fundamental and necessary
by-product of the interaction between cognitive structures and experience in the
world (ibid: 173).
Grady’s assertion is that primary metaphors can combine to form more 
complex metaphors, and therefore lie behind a huge number of other 
conventional and non-conventional metaphors, some of these being the most 
common conceptual metaphors. For example, he suggests that THEORIES 
ARE BUILDINGS (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:106-110) is actually a composite 
of two primary metaphors that exist independently, ORGANIZATION IS 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS (Grady 
1997:46). By describing the metaphorical link in this way, the “poverty” of the 
mapping - ie the fact that certain elements of buildings, such as windows, are 
not mapped over to corresponding elements of theories - can be accounted for.
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A second theory, proposed by Chris Johnson, follows on from this: 
Johnson suggests that in early language learning children acquire certain 
lexical meanings, reflecting mental concepts, that do not correspond exactly to 
those that adults would identify. Rather than extending the sense of a word 
metaphorically in the way that the Metaphorical Acquisition Hypothesis 
suggests, i.e. by learning one (probably concrete) meaning first and 
subsequently transferring this to another (probably abstract) context, some 
lexical items appear to be learned with a more general meaning. This is only 
separated into the different senses traditionally identified as the source and 
target of the metaphor later in the child’s development.
Polysemous verbs conventionally exhibit a number of different but closely related
senses or conventional usages in the input to the child. While there might be a good
reason to distinguish these in adult language, the evidence for distinctions between
them might be scarce or non-existent in the input that is meaningful and useful to
very young children. In cases of metaphorical polysemy...the task is further
complicated by the experiential correlations that can motivate metaphors. If these
correlations are properties of children’s earliest learning experiences with the forms,
then the assumption that source domain meanings are earliest becomes potentially
problematic, given the delimitation problem. Children may initially fail to distinguish
different senses because their properties may overlap, resulting in conflation. The
different senses might become differentiated from one another only later in the
acquisition process (Johnson 1999a: 128).
Having examined a corpus of data made up of seven children’s usage 
of see in context, he identifies vision verbs as exemplifying this phenomenon, 
and suggests that there is a stage during which the physical sense and the 
mental sense are combined or conflated for the child. At this stage the visual 
and mental senses are assimilated into “a single inclusive meaning that 
involves vision as well as the states and changes of awareness that naturally 
accompany it” (ibid: 183); it does not appear that the child has any practical 
need to separate these any more finely, and from analysing the way adults use 
see in interaction with children, it appears that they may not even have the 
evidence to do this. All of the seven children recorded for the corpus use see
with a conflated sense for a significant period of time before more clearly 
‘metaphorical’ usages can be identified. Johnson gives the following examples 
of “overlap” utterances where both a visual and mental element contribute to
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the meaning: “/ don' see where this one goes, See what else fell down
Mommy?, I see what happens, See what I can make...” (ibid: 183).
The significance of Johnson’s theory for the link between vision and 
intellection seems to reach far beyond the particular verb he investigates, see.
He suggests that the centrality of this verb in the semantic field means that its 
usage is like a ‘blueprint’ for the way in which other vision vocabulary can be 
used13.
Since see is one of the two earliest vision verbs to be learned by children (look being
the other), there is a sense in which the constructional grounding of mental see in
visual see in fact grounds the whole KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor as a linguistic
convention for children. That is, because the pattern of see + WH-complement
directly encodes the kind of correlation between mental and visual experience that
motivates the metaphor, it sets a developmental precedent for visual vocabulary to be
applied to the mental domain (ibid: 126).
Most importantly, conflation theory has consequences for the way 
adults use vision vocabulary. Even though the physical and mental senses are 
conventionally separated into literal and metaphorical, early experience sets an 
important precedent for later usage, and the way in which vision as a concept 
is understood initially must affect one’s understanding thereafter, even if 
intuitively or subconsciously. Lakoff & Johnson discuss this in relation to their 
‘Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor’, and suggest that there is a 
physiological reason: neurological research (in particular, Narayanan 1997) 
suggests that concepts and semantic fields are represented in specific areas of 
the brain, and during the conflation period, neural links are made between 
these areas. In other words, the way adults conceptualise is underpinned by the 
physical architecture of the brain.
The result of these theories combined is that the VISION group (and I 
would argue the SENSES data as a whole) is motivated by innate early
13 Similarly, the evidence of the ANIMAL and DENSITY groups suggests that when a link 
has been made between two concepts that is cognitively ‘convincing’ and therefore successful,
this can attract other lexical items to follow the same metaphorical pathway.
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experiences, to the extent that it may even be an unavoidable by-product of 
physical existence. In other words, to go back to Lakoff & Johnson,
We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously
simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in the everyday world from our
earliest years. We have no choice in this. Because of the way neural connections are
formed during the period of conflation, we all naturally think using hundreds of
primary metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:47).
An important question is whether there are other concepts apart from 
vision that initially have some kind of conflated sense. This seems more 
difficult to prove, but it does seem plausible, especially as regards the other 
senses; presumably, as alternative methods of accessing information these 
work in a similar way. Having said that, I believe that the sense hierarchy set 
out by Viberg is relevant here, and may reflect the level to which each of the 
senses is bound up with intellection or any other mental function. Viberg 
(1983) investigated perception verbs in a number of languages from several 
different families, and found patterns in the way in which these eould be 
extended semantieally over the languages he studied. Basically, particular 
verbs of certain senses could be used in a fairly general way to cover other 
sense modalities but others were restricted in possible meanings, and this 
could be expressed in a hierarchy where verbs could extend their meaning 
downwards but not upwards:
sight > hearing > touch > f smell t taste (Viberg 1983:147)
Vision is unique in this hierarchy, since it is the only sense that can extend to 
cover all the others; this may be connected with its status as the most ‘used’ of 
the senses in terms of cognizing’4, since it is the most ‘general purpose’ tool of 
perception by this measure. Landau and Gleitman make a similar point in their 
study of the way blind and sighted children use vision verbs, in which they 
conclude that “to a young child, look means ‘explore with the dominant 14
141 do not mean by this that vision is actually used more than other senses, or even that 
individuals are more aware of visual perception that of other types of perception (though this
may be true). I am referring to its distinct role as what Sweetser calls “our primary source of
objective data about the world” (Sweetser 1984:40), which is discussed in section 2.3.
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modality used for apprehending objects,’ distinct from such terms as touch
that refer merely to manual contact” (Landau & Gleitman 1985:69). 
Consequently, it may be the case that since the other senses are not bound up 
with cognizing to the same extent that vision is, they may not be learned as 
conflated concepts in the same way. It is impossible to make any final 
statement about this until further work in child language acquisition is 
undertaken.
2.6 Evidence in non-Indo-European languages
If one accepts the experiential basis for the sense metaphors that has 
been suggested by Lakoff et al, and if one further accepts Conflation Theory, 
it would seem to be a logical progression to look for evidence of the same 
conceptual link in languages completely unrelated to English, ie those with 
non-Indo-European roots. In other words, if it is true that we conceptualise 
intelligence in terms of our primary means of access to knowledge about the 
world, the senses, and if in practice the physical and mental processes 
involved are inseparable, then it follows that one would expect to find the 
same link in other languages since all humans have the same physical make­
up. Of course, this is in part an over-simplification, since it would be naive not 
to take into account the role of culture and tradition, which must affect 
language in complex and often unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, one would 
hope to find significant parallels.
Comparison of language families, in any comprehensive way, is an 
extremely difficult and problematic task, especially when dealing with 
semantics. However, the emergence of several cross-linguistic resources in the 
last few years affords much easier and more thorough comparison of this 
aspect of language than was previously possible, especially for the non­
comparative linguist. Two of the most ambitious of these are Ehret’s 1995 
work on Proto-Afroasiatic, and Tryon’s 1995 Comparative Austronesian 
dictionary (organised in a similar way to a thesaurus), both similar in layout
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and methodology to Pokomy, my primary source for Proto-Indo-European. 
This makes them particularly suitable for my purposes.
There are still major difficulties in using comparative evidence in this 
way. The best, most comprehensive sources deal with a range of lexical 
features, and this can mean that none of these are dealt with at length. For 
example, both Ehret and Tryon present evidence for proto-roots, but neither is 
explicit about the criteria they have used to arrive at a meaning for any of 
these roots, nor do they offer any discussion of cases where this has been 
particularly uncertain (although obviously there is a considerable element of 
doubt in all cases). It is also unclear whether any distinction between literal 
and metaphorical has been made; it is possible that certain meanings have 
been omitted because they are not regarded as established or conventional 
usage, or because they are found only in particular contexts. However, it 
seems more likely that this might render the evidence presented here 
incomplete rather than inaccurate.
For each of the senses, I have attempted to look at all relevant lexical 
items and list any comparative evidence that supports a link between this sense 
and intellection or cognition (see section 2.9). In order to limit quantity, I have 
listed only relevant entries or parts of entries^; obviously in the resources 
themselves, much more information is given. For Proto-Afroasiatic, Ehret lists 
the evidence from Semitic, Egyptian, Cushitic, Chadic and Omotic, though not 
for every root; for Austronesian, Tryon includes information from 40 
languages, again selectively.
The evidence that can be found in both families is very patchy. There 
are few roots that have reflexes supporting the mental-physical link in more 
than a few languages, but the number of roots for which there is indication of a 
link is high. As well as this, it does seem to be system-wide: in section 2.9 I 
have included vocabulary that does not correspond exactly to that found in my
151 have changed the formatting of these entries for presentation here; some underlining and 
emboldening have been added to compensate for loss of visual clarity.
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own data, because this appears to demonstrate the presence of the concept of 
physical vision, or of some conflated sense of physical-mental vision, within a 
wider semantic field. In the VISION section this can be seen clearly. For 
Afroasiatic root 729, a direct link between see and know is indicated, but roots 
219 and 730 also seem significant since they suggest a conflated physical- 
mental sense of perceiving (awareness and attentiveness generally involve 
both types). Similarly, sections 15.510, 17.130, 17.140, 17.190 and 17.210 all 
seem to indicate a direct correlation, but the other sections listed here are also 
important: 15.550 SHOW includes Madurese pa-tau ‘cause to know’, which
again suggests conflation, whilst 17.340 and 17.350 (within section 17 MIND, 
THOUGHT) indicate that vocabulary for clearness and visibility has the same 
polysemous nature as in English. 17.380 EXPLAIN contains vocabulary 
associated with visibility and also with openness, which presumably relates to 
making things visible.
HEARING is also fairly well represented in both families, at least with 
a more general mental meaning, and again, there are several examples of 
conflated or closely semantically related vocabulary which support a system­
wide connection. Amongst the Afroasiatic languages, the hear-heed 
connection that Sweetser draws attention to is represented, and this seems 
similar in nature to the conflated sense of see: for example, attentiveness is a 
combination of hearing/listening and understanding, since it implies intent to 
understand through physical hearing, and this conflated sense is associated 
with hearing in roots 219, 728 and 1015. In Austronesian, hearing and 
believing are connected (section 17.150), and the same link between deafness 
and dumbness also appears to be made, as in section 4.960. Lack of ability to 
speak is also found in relation to stupidity, in section 17.220, though only in 
Spanish (ie as a result of contact).
TOUCH seems less well attested; from the evidence I have found, 
there is not as strong a connection as in IE, but this could be affected by the 
difficulty of determining whether feel is being used to mean physical touching 
or not in the sources. In Afroasiatic, root 145 produces reflexes meaning both
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touch and experience, but only one of each; in Austronesian the link between 
physical and mental is better (and more convincingly) attested in section 
15.720 FEEL.
Just as in Indo-European, there appear to be less central links between 
intellection and the remaining senses TASTE and SMELL if these do exist. In 
Egyptian (Afroasiatic root 145) there is a word that can mean both taste and 
experience, whilst in several Austronesian languages there are items 
polysemous for smell and perceive.
It should also be pointed out that there are a few examples of cross­
over between the senses, fitting in with the idea of more general sense- 
perception, and perhaps relevant to Viberg’s hierarchy. In section 15.720 
(Afroasiatic), touching, feeling (presumably physically, since this is with other 
sense verbs) and hearing are alongside one another; 15.310 appears to show a 
link between touching and tasting although it is less clear here whether “feel” 
is meant physically or mentally, and similarly it is difficult to tell whether 
11.160 is related to physical grasping and shows cross-over between touching 
and vision. 15.310 demonstrates the general way vision can be linked with 
other senses as a general mode of perception as it can in English and other 
languages (Viberg 1983:140-1), in Port Sandwich ‘eat look-s.th.’.
Although I have carried out only a relatively cursory investigation of 
non-IE languages, and make these suggestions about sense-intellection 
vocabulary cautiously, my observations do correspond to comments made by 
Viberg. This is especially noteworthy because some of the languages included 
in his study were from language families other than the ones on which I have 
focused.
Related to the meanings considered by Kryk are several cognitive meanings that are
assumed by the perceptual verbs in English: understand (‘I see’), experience (‘taste
freedom’), suspect (‘smell treason’, ‘smell a rat’). Actually, it seems to be fairly
common that the closest equivalent to some of the cognitive verbs in English such as
know, understand, or think is covered by a verb of perception through semantic
extension. Especially see and know seem to be covered by one word in a number of
languages (e.g. several Polynesian and Australian languages, Kobon) (ibid: 157).
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2.7 Ontogeny and phylogeny
From the evidence I have considered, there appears to be an interesting 
parallel between the ontogenic and the phylogenie development of the 
meaning of certain VISION roots. Recently the connection between ontogeny 
and phylogeny in linguistic development (and the idea that one may 
recapitulate the other) has been lent credibility by studies into the evolution of 
language, but none of these have considered semantic development, 
concentrating instead on mechanical and performative aspects of phonology 
(see for example MacNeilage & Davis 2000; Lieberman 1998). This is entirely 
understandable, given that there is some concrete evidence about physical 
features of the vocal tract (albeit evidence that may be interpretable in a 
variety of ways). Semantics, on the other hand, is very much more difficult 
even to conjecture about, especially because all the early historical ‘evidence’ 
that is available is based on guesswork, no matter how well informed. From 
recent data, it is clear that linguistic change may not be random or impossible 
to account for, but it is still not readily predictable; correspondingly, when one 
is dealing with very ancient data, it is not possible to be sure that nothing in 
the development of a particular root has been overlooked, or even that a major 
piece of evidence is no longer available (such as material from a language that 
is no longer in existence, or any record of a particular item of vocabulary).
As well as this, and perhaps more significantly for this study, semantic 
reconstruction tends not to take account of the influence of culture on 
language. The ‘ocularcentricity’ of western society is doubtless the product of 
the close conceptual connection between vision and intellection, resting on the 
motivation that I have discussed, and this may be universal in human 
experience. However, it is probable that this cultural emphasis on the visual
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has, in turn, affected the strength of this link in people’s perception, even if 
only subconsciously16.
Despite these difficulties, the idea that ontogeny may recapitulate 
phylogeny in this case may be worth serious consideration. This has been 
suggested in a previous study, but with the assumption that the ‘literal’ 
meanings of sense vocabulary come first historically; Sweetser (1990:18) 
suggests that this is mirrored in the way children learn physical meanings of 
words first. It is further discussed, and refuted, in the light of new research 
about child language acquisition (Johnson 1999b: 157-8), but with the same 
assumption about historical semantic extension. From the data I have 
examined, precisely the opposite of Sweetser’s proposition appears to be true: 
rather than demonstrating an extension of meaning from the concrete and 
physical to the abstract and mental, both the ontogenic and the phylogenie 
processes involve the splitting of the concept into two separate meanings from 
a preceding conflated sense.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented information that seems to indicate that 
the connection between the senses and intelligence may not be a 
straightforward case of metaphor as it is traditionally understood. If there are a 
number of instances of vocabulary for which the physical sense does not 
precede the mental sense developmentally or historically, and I believe these 
lexical items do exist, then it is misleading to discuss these in terms of source 
and target, since this implies extension from one concept to the other.
16 It is not impossible that this offers a partial explanation for some of the non-Indo-European 
data that I have considered. If it is the case that there are only traces of conflated sense-
intellection words in other language families, this could be because this has not been such an
important conceptual link in other societies as it is in the west. 1 make this suggestion very
cautiously though; it is also possible that influence from western society accounts for any
sense-intellection words in other cultures, although 1 would maintain that the distribution of
lexical items in the data 1 have examined does not support this.
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Chris Johnson highlights this problem in his explanation of the 
difference between this traditional view and his own theory.
The Conflation Hypothesis predicts that children pass through an intermediate stage
in which they produce uses of see that combine properties of its visual meaning with
properties of its metaphorical mental meaning. The Metaphorical Acquisition
Hypothesis does not predict any such intermediate stage, but rather, that see should
be learned and used first in one type of context and then extended abruptly to a very
different type of context. This second view of acquisition corresponds more closely
to the standard idea of what metaphor is, and follows quite naturally from the
representation of metaphor as a mapping between distinct conceptual domains
(Johnson 1999a: 182).
Other scholars have also made reference to the inappropriateness of this model 
of metaphorical extension in relation to sense-intellection vocabulary. 
Goldberg suggests that the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor is 
better described as a GENERIC IS SPECIFIC type metaphor, COGNITIVE 
AWARENESS IS COGNITIVE AWARENESS GAINED THROUGH 
VISION, since this is better motivated and accounts more convincingly for 
certain uses of “see” that imply awareness rather than understanding (pc). 
Presumably some of the examples of the use of ‘see’ presented by Johnson as 
examples of conflation would fit into this category, such as the “recognize’ 
sense that he identifies in “I see that there’s no more milk” (Johnson 
1999a: 151). By contrast, Feyaerts treats the problem somewhat differently in 
his analysis of domain matrices and metonymic relationships.
...who can say whether and why a particular description of a domain matrix is
correct or not? Intuitively, 1 experience the conceptual relationship between SEEING
and KNOWING to be of a different order than, for instance, the relationship between
LIVING and TRAVELING, which essentially reduces to a structural comparison
(‘life is like a journey’). Although 1 admit that both concepts can be stmeturany
mapped onto each other, involving ontological, image schematic and logical
structures, 1 claim that this description does not exhaust the conceptual relationship
between both concepts. An important aspect of this relationship is the causal-
conditional contiguity of both experiences, which indicates that a metonymic
extension (PERCEPTION FOR RESULT OF PERCEPTION) can be identified as
well. This observation seriously questions the hypothesis of two different domain
matrices being involved in this extension pattern (Feyaerts 1999:319).
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I would certainly agree with Feyaerts’ assertions that there are different 
types of metaphor, and that in this case a mapping from source to target over­
simplifies the relationship between the concepts involved. It seems to me that 
conflation theory offers a convincing explanation of the motivation behind the 
connection, especially when one considers this alongside the historical 
development of related vocabulary in Indo-European and other language 
families. Given that a simple source to target mapping seems to occur neither 
historically nor developmental^, I would contend that the connection between 
the senses and intellection must be re-evaluated. The SENSES data can only 
be viewed as the product of a metaphor if the term metaphor itself can be 
broadened to accommodate different types of motivation; whilst notation like 
KNOWING IS SEEING and UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING may be a 
useful, and intuitively appealing, shorthand, perhaps it perpetuates the idea 
that metaphor essentially has a single type of mechanism, and this can only 
serve to hinder a more comprehensive understanding of conceptual 
relationships.
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2.9 Evidence from Afroasiatic and Austronesian
2.9.1 VISION
Afroasiatic
root 219 (Ehret 1995:159): *-sim- “to pay attention to. take note of’ (Sem..
Eg.. Ch. innovation: added sense, “to listen to”)
SEMITIC A. samm “to examine closely”; *sm? “to hear” (stem + *5 part.;
semantics unclear); *smr “to guard” (stem + *r diffus.; semantics: 
guarding involves looking all around)
EGYPTIAN smt “to hear” (stem + *t dur.)
CHADIC *so mi “ear” (N; stem + *y deverb.) (J: *s3m-)
OMOTIC Majoid: Nao sem- “to see”
root 672 (Ehret 1995:345): *-gaaf- “to see”
CUSHITIC EC: Sidamo aaf- “to know”
OMOTIC *a:p- “eye” (Mocha a:po, Bench ap1; Yem aafs) SOm *a;f- “to 
see” (Ari aaf- “to find”)
root 720 (Ehret 1995:361): *-2il-/*-?al- “to see”; *?il-“eve”
CUSHITIC *2Tl- “eye”; PSC *?iley- “to know” (stem + *y in- choat. > dur.)
NOm: Mao *al- “to know”
root 729 (Ehret 1995:364): *-?ar- “to know”
CUSHITIC *2ar- “to know” (PSC “to see”)
root 730 (Ehret 1995:364): *?ark’- “to notice, become aware oP (root #729
+ *k’ intens. of effect)
EGYPTIAN crk “to perceive”
CUSHITIC *?ark’- “to see”
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root 961 (Ehret 1995:458): *-wah- “to look”
EGYPTIAN whc “to investigate” stem + *5 part.; semantics: “look out for”?; 
C.weh)
Austronesian
section 15.510 SEE (Tryon 1995 vol 4:211-2)
JAV Also ‘know’.
KAU Also ion ‘perceive with the eyes or ears’.
RAP tike Fa ‘see (contemplate)’; take?a ‘see (discovering)’; uH ‘see 
(observe; focusing on object)’.
section 15.550 SHOW (Tryon 1995 vol 4:215-6)
MAD tau ‘know’. pa-tau ‘cause to know’.
TOE ve (vb trans) ‘show, inform, tell’, vor-ve-ai (vb intrans), vsr- intrans, -
ai intrans.
MEK e-pa-kina(-i-a) ‘make (s.th.) appear’.
KIR Causative form, from oti ‘visible, clear, manifest’.
PON With directional suffixes; causative form; see sansal ‘clear, obvious’.
section 17.130 THINK ( = reflect) (Trvon 1995 vol 4:358)
MAB ‘do thinking about’; mat.a -ipgal ‘eye pierce’, ‘think about’; mata- ila
pa ‘eye goes to’, ‘think about’; mata- imHi ‘eye returns’, ‘think
back’.
KAU ‘eye-his follow’.
KWA -atarijaiso ‘listen’; -auar also ‘recall’; -arhi ‘concentrate’.
PON Also mwuserere (vb intrans); honpem (vb intrans), also ‘sense, feel’.
section 17.140 THINK f=be of the opinion) (Trvon 1995 vol 4:360-11
MAB -re keCbei ‘see like this’; -so ‘say’.
PON leme also ‘believe’; kupwureiopalso ‘feel’.
 74
section 17.160 UNDERSTAND fTrvon 1995 vol 4:364-61
Arabic: faham Sanskrit: arthi(n)- Spanish: entender
TAK ‘hear, perceive’(15.410).
ADZ ‘to hear, understand s.th.’.
MEK e-ikifa-lei-na ‘understand, comprehend’; Desnoes has e-ia-iopi-na (ia
is modem is a ‘see’) ‘understand, know, be aware of; see NW Mekeo
i-iobina ‘know, understand’.
KWA Also -ata ‘see’.
KIR at a also ‘know’; ota ‘clear, understood’.
section 17.190 IDEA. NOTION (Tryon 1995 vol 4:373-51
MEK opo means ‘(a) thought’, or/e means ‘mental image; idea’. See 17.110,
note.
KWA nataien ‘be wise’, also means ‘crack’, ‘snap’; narhlen ‘seeing’.
section 17.210 WISE (Tryon 1995 vol 4:375-6)
Sanskrit: vicaksana- ‘intelligent, wise’
KAU ‘eye-his discern behaviour’ (see 21.260).
section 17.220 FOOLISH. STUPID (Trvon 1995 vol 4:377-91
TAG Also gago / -a, [loko / -a], Spanish loco / -a ‘crazy’; gaguear
‘stammer’.
KIL Also verb phrase i-tuli taiga-la it-deaf ear-his ‘he is a fool!’
KWA Also nipwana- rapwia ‘forehead smooth’; -ata aua ‘see incorrectly’;
nukane-rdsdkai ‘head hard’; nukane-raranekan ‘head strong’.
section 17.340 CLEAR. PLAIN (Trvon 1995 vol 4:396-81
DOB ‘it does contents’ which can mean ‘it is clear’ or ‘it is tme’.
TAK ‘outside-at-PERFECT’ (12.060), i.e, ‘(it) is on the outside’, i.e. ‘it is 
plain’.
MAB ‘be in the light with respect to’ = be clear about.
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YAB ‘ it-lie outside ’.
MOT ‘to be open, be clear, appear’.
MEK e-malolo is primarily used of clear water but can also be used of e.g.
language. ai?apa\^s ‘clear’ of water, ‘plain’ of food.
MSH Also ‘evident, understood’; alikkar.
PON tete also ‘ evident’ ; sansal.
WLE xira also ‘obvious’, ffala also ‘real’.
section 17.350 OBSCURE (Tryon 1995 vol 4:398-400: NB section 17 is
‘mind, thought’)
TAG laboF+ma- ‘not clear’; also /agoF‘hidden from view’.
BLA ‘not clear’; ma-g-lidur/ ‘covered over, obscure’.
MUR Also mobdt (of sun, moon).
GOR mo-olomo (wolomo + mo-) (of vision/sight’; also Ja Fo-onuh-e (Ja
‘not’ + wonuhu + Fo--oe), of writing; Fo-onuh-e ‘can be seen clearly’.
BUR kabo ‘murky, cloudy, obscure’; dofo mohede ‘not yet straight/clear’.
YAB ‘it-lie inside’.
MEK e-upu is primarily used of murky water but can be used of a topic or 
discourse, e-pini means ‘complicated, difficult, involved’. East Mekeo 
e-upu corresponds with e-kopu, e-kobu in the other dialects.
SAM VdxfaFa-mnimo,faPa- CAUS, nimo (vb intrans) ‘vanish, disappear’.
section 17.380 EXPLAIN (Trvon 1995 vol 4:404-406)
MGY zava ‘clearness, transparency’.
MAD terrarj ‘clear’.
BAL See tlatar ‘clear, plain’.
SAS teraij ‘clear’, ‘plain’.
TOE va- CAUS, kapa ‘clear’; also va-metoto (see 17.160); va-nunure (see 
17.170).
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BUA ner tato ‘explain out loud, give directions’; tatapin ‘open something 
up, explain it’.
ADZ ‘explain-talk in the open’.
KIL -luki ‘tell’; -ulatim ‘open’.
MOT g^au-rai-a ‘to speak about’ {gwau ‘to say, speak’), maoro ‘straight, 
correct’. Also ani-na ha-hedinari-a ‘to cause the meaning to be 
clear’ {ani-na ‘content, substance’, hedinarai ‘to be clear, appear’), 
andg" au-rai-ahedinarati ‘to speak about clearly’.
MEK ‘make clever, wise’.
KWA -awahag ‘set straight, advise’; -fl ‘open up’; -ni sas ‘say correctly’; -
oseri ‘unroll, unwind, solve, translate’.
KIR CAUS of oti ‘plain, clear*.
SAM fa?a- CAUS, ma-tala (vb intrans) ‘be open’, ma- intrans, tala (vb 
trans) ‘unfold, undo’.
2.9.2 TOUCH
Afroasiatic
root 145 (Ehret 1995:133): *-dap- “to touch, feel, put the fingers on”
SEMITIC pPS *dp “to touch; to put hands on”
EGYPTIAN dp “to taste, experience” (semantics: as in English taste ; C. top)
Austronesian
section 11.160 GET. OBTAIN (Trvon 1995 vol 3:547-9)
KIL ‘take, g^f. (it)’’ also -bani ‘find’,
MEK Compare e-aga ‘bite’ (04.580); also euge-pa ‘receive, accept’.
MSH lo also ‘see’’
WLE wee/also‘see’’
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section 15.720 FEEL (Tryon 1995 vol 4:239-40)
TAG damdam + maka-Zma—an; also dama + -um-/-in ‘perceive’.
YAB ‘feel, test’; also -li ‘feel, stroke, caress’, -moasa? ‘touch, grope,
finger, feel’.
KAU saa for tactile sensation; also poi-pop ‘search by feeling’; hip ‘sense,
be aware of.
MAR haho ‘feel with hand’; haimi ‘sense’.
PAA Also ‘hear’.
MSH Also ‘experience, sense’; upiri also ‘touch’.
PON take also ‘touch’;pem ‘perceive, sense, think’; ken also ‘experience’. 
RAP haha ‘feel (examining, registering)’.
2.9.3 TASTE
Afroasiatic
root 145 (Ehret 1995:133): *-dap- “to touch, feel, put the fingers on”
SEMITIC pPS *dp “to touch; to put hands on”
EGYPTIAN dp “to taste, experience” (semantics: as in English taste ; C. top)
Austronesian
section 15.310 TASTE (Tryon 1995 vol 4:193-4)
MUR kin am (map- -in) also ‘try’; Hi? (map- -in) also ‘experience’.
BAL See 15.720, ‘feel’.
TAK ‘lick see’ (04.590, 15.510).
MOT mami-na ‘feeling, taste (noun)’; mami-a ‘to feel, test’, toho ‘to try’.
MEK pamupa ‘essence, flavour, spirit’ from pamu ‘root’? pamupa e-opo
‘taste something’.
POR ‘eat look-s.th.’.
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2.9.4 HEEARNG
Afroasiatic
root 219 (Ehret 1995:159): *-sim- “to pay attention to. take note oF' (Sem..
Eg.. Ch. innovation femboldened in origl: added sense, “to listen to”l
SEMITIC A. samm “to examine closely”; *sm? “to hear” (stem + *5 part.;
semantics unclear); *smr “to guard” (stem + *r diffus.; semantics: 
guarding involves looking all around)
EGYPTIAN smt “to hear” (stem + *t dur.)
CHADIC *ssmi “ear” (N; stem + *y deverb.) (J: *S3-)
OMOTIC Majoid: Nao sem- “to see”
root 728 (Ehret 1995:365): *-?anxw- to listen; ear” (root #723 + *xw extend,
fort.: *m > /n/ ([ nil /_ *xw)
CUSHITIC *?anx6-/*?mxw- “to listen, pay attention to” (Agaw “ear”;
Append. 2)
root 1015 (Ehret 1995:5241: ^-hWav- “to listen to. pay attention to” (Eg..
Sem. innovation: “pay attention to” > “watch over.” hence “protect”
SEMITIC A. h aim an “to guard, protect” (stem + *m n. suff. or *m extend. + 
*n non-fin.)
CUSHITIC PEC *hayy- “wisdom, wise advice” (semantics: hear > understand 
> be wise”)
OMOTIC NOm *h:ay- “ear” (Ometo *h2ayts-; Bench (h)ay 4, Mocha wai:mo
< *way- + *m n. suff.; Yem wees- “to hear”; NOm n. + *s caus. as 
denom.)
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Austronesian
section 04.960 DUMB (Trvon 1995 vol 2:622-4)
WOL Also oga; ka-moo-moo ‘dumb, mentally deficient’.
BUR Also geba te stori moo ‘person unable to speak’; geba ebele-n ‘stupid 
person, simpleton’; geba ebafa-n ‘dumb, unteachable, unmannered’.
TAK ‘senile’.
BUA kw a ma ‘not able to speak’; kwa papolap ‘able to make unintelligible 
sounds’; both mean ‘foolish, stupid’.
KIL ‘be foolish’, the usual derogatory description of the deaf-and-dumb 
person. Also to-mto-mota ‘person-continuous-hiccough’, ‘person 
speaking in unintelligible gasps’.
section 15.410 HEAR (Trvon 1995 vol 4:201-2)
TAK ‘hear, perceive’.
MEK e-lopo ‘perceive, hear, know’; initial /I-/ is an accretion in East Mekeo,
selective borrowing into North Mekeo and NW Mekeo gives opo
‘hear, perceive’, lopo ‘know’ in these dialects.
section 17.150 BELIEVE (Trvon 1995 vol 4:362-31
Sanskrit: pratyaya-
DOB fa-repin ‘hear, believe’, fokCalay m-repin-ni ‘don’t believe him’. 
MOT herefia ‘word’, abi-a dae ‘receive’ {abi-a ‘get, hold’, dae ‘go up’);
also kamonai (heni-a) ‘to hear, believe’; abidadama heni-a ‘to 
believe, have faith in’.
section 17.160 UNDERSTAND (Trvon 1995 vol 4:364-61
Arabic: faham Sanskrit: arthi(n)- Spanish: entender
TAK ‘hear, perceive’(15.410).
ADZ ‘to hear, understand s.th. ’.
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MEK e-ikifa-lei-na ‘understand, comprehend’; Desnoes has e-ia-iopi-na (ia
is modem is a ‘see’) ‘understand, know, be aware of; see NW Mekeo
i-iobina ‘know, understand’.
KWA Also -ata ‘see’.
KIR ata also ‘know’; ota ‘clear, understood’.
section 17.170 KNOW (Trvon 1995 vol 4:366-7)
TAK ‘hear, perceive’(15.410)
YAB Also -li?su ‘-see away’; -po su ‘-hear away’.
MEK e-lopo also ‘hear’ (see 15.410, note). NW Mekeo i-iobina,
section 17.220 FOOLISH. STUPID (Trvon 1995 vol 4:377-91
TAG Also gago / -a, [loko / -a], Spanish loco / -a ‘crazy’; gaguear
‘stammer’.
KIL Also verb phrase i-tuli taiga-la it-deaf ear-his ‘he is a fool! ’
KWA Also nipwana- rsp^ia ‘forehead smooth’; -ata aua ‘see incorrectly’; 
nuJ'&ie-rdsdkai ‘head hard’; nukwane-rdrsneksn ‘head strong’.
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3 ANIMALS
3.1 Introduction
Animals, in the widest sense of the term, a-e one of the richest 
metaphorical sources in English (and other languages), not only in the 
vocabulary of intelligence but in a huge number of semantic fields. At every 
level of society, people are described as animals of all kinds: one can 
encounter cows, dogs, sharks, worms, rats, weasels and lambs in everyday 
experience, and there are few animals that cannot be related to humans in 
some meaningful way.
Although many of the early studies of metaphor focused on ‘A is B’ 
type metaphor and animals were often used as examples of sources, little 
thorough research into animal metaphor appears to have been done, and there 
are certainly few studies based on empirical data. Within cognitive linguistics 
it has been largely ignored, though there are a few notable exceptions. For 
example, Uakoff & 'rumer give a general account of the mapping from animal 
to person, though this does not go into any detail about the associations of 
specific animals (1989:166ff), and Grady also offers some insight into the 
motivation of the mapping within his study of primary metaphor (1997:219ff).
3.2 Data
Ihe core category group ANIMAL accounts for 100 entries in total, 
making up just over 8% of the total data. I have split the entries into four 
subcategories: MAMMAL, BIRO, FISH and INSECT1. Almost all of the data 
is used to signify stupidity - 93 entries compared with only seven signifying 
cleverness. Strikingly, of these seven, one is used in a derogatory way, and all 
of the others bar one are pre-classified as SHARP or SHREWD. 3he
' This group includes snails, which are noi insects in ihe technical sense bui more correctly 
gastropods. I would contend ihai for most people these belong in ihe same working category
and, for ihe purposes of simplification, are best seen as part of the same group.
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exception is eagle-wit n 1665, which is labelled GENIUS; this has only one 
supporting quotation in the OED. Clearly, then, in the rare cases where 
intelligence is associated with animals, it is a particular type of intelligence; 
sharpness and shrewdness seem to indicate a worldly, practically applied 
cleverness, and perhaps also a certain lack of trustworthiness. Lhere is an 
implication that, in terms of mental faculties, it is not natural for animals to be 
associated with humans, so that when they are it cannot be entirely positive.
One of the noticeable features of the data is the high proportion of 
basic level category terms2 *. Cf superordinate level terms like those I have used 
to label the groups, mammal, bird, insect and fish, only bird can be found, in 
the entry bird-brain n 1943>. Ihis demonstrates the importance of the specific 
within this general concept group, and the importance of cultural associations 
made with particular animals. In the link between intelligence and any 
creature, it is not only the properties of animals in general that are relevant, but 
also the particular associations and qualities attributed to that animal. Ihis will 
be discussed in detail below.
3.2.1 MAMMALS
Ihis is narrowly the biggest group in the data, comprising 39 entries in 
total (ie around two fifths of the ANIMAL group, and just under 4% of the 
total data). Almost three quarters of these entries are related to three animal 
groups, the largest of which is DONKEY, made up of thirteen entries. Seven 
entries are derived from ass, two from donkey, and one from mule, there are 
two entries that denote donkeys less directly, long-eared ai 1605> and long- 
ears n 1845. and one that comes from a personal name used commonly of the 
donkey family, neddv n 1823>2. Ihe other large groups contain eight entries
2 This is perhaps unsurprising, given the privileged status of basic level categories, but it 
should be noted that the findings of Rosch ei al (1976) suggest that biological taxonomies do
not correspond to unscientific categorisation for all groups. The term 0a00al denotes a
superordinaie category for both traditional and current biology and folk classification of
animals, and terms like cat and dog (as well as many of the animal names in the
INTELLIGENCE data) are at the basic level. However, this is not the case for bird and fish,
which appear to be used as basic rather than superordinate level terms.
2 Both stages are noted in the core category field in the database, which is labelled 
PERSONAL NAME>ANIMAL-MAMMAL-DONKEY.
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each, from expressions for BOVINES and SHEEP. In the first, one entry is 
from a general term for animals of this family, bovine ai 1855+1879. and there 
are also two entries from expressions associated with male cows, bullhead n 
1624+1840 and ox-head n al 634+1806. and two from calf, as well as three 
entries derived from buffle (a variant form of buffalo which came into English 
through French).
Alongside these, there are three entries that the OED suggests are 
related to shrew, and which all signify CLEVERNESS (shrewd ai 1589> 
shrode ai 1594-1606 and shrewdish ai 1823>V Another entry, varment n 
1829>. from vermin4, has a similar meaning. Ihe rest of the entries are all 
STOPIO expressions: two are derived from terms for young dogs, puppy­
headed ai 1610 and dunderwhelp n 1621+al625 (from whelp), two are 
compounds of squirrel, and there is one entry has been placed in this group 
with the label ANIMAL-MAMMAL BODY PAR3, soft-horn n 1837> 
(discussed below in section 3.4.1.4). Finally, the earliest entry in the ANIMAL 
data, ape n cl390-1741. is also in this group.
3.2.2 BIRDS
3here are 36 entries in the BIRO category, making this the second 
largest sub-group of ANIMAL. As mentioned above, one of these is from the 
term bird itself (bird-brain n 1943>3 3he largest of the species-specific groups 
is GOOSE, which contains ten entries, seven derived from goose itself, one 
from the term used for a male goose, gander n 1553-1816. and two related to 
anserine (from Latin anser, ‘goose’). Lhere are also five entries derived from 
buzzard, and a further five from cock, which has the earliest meaning of 
‘domestic fowl’, but later came to be used to mean the male of a variety of 
birds. Four entries are labelled OAW (a small bird of the crow family, now 
more commonly known as a jackdaw), three derived from daw itself, and 
alongside these jav n 1884> (see section 3.4.2 for explanation). 3wo entries 
are from sparrow, and there are seven single entries that come from a variety
4 I have placed vermin ai 1829> in this group, since it is a general tern that can be applied to 
various small animals as well as some insects and birds, but obviously it could equally be
viewed alongside these other categories.
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of birds: dotterel n c 1440-1681. owl n 15Q8>. cuckoo n 1596>. widgeon n 
1612-1741, eagle-wit n 1665. dove n 1771. and as crazy as a loon ai 1845>. 
Finally, there are three entries in the group ANIMAL-BIRO BO3Y PART, 
and all of these are derived from comb, the red crest that is found on the head 
of the domestic fowl, particularly pronounced on males.
3.2.3 INSECT
This is a significantly smaller group, containing fifteen entries. Two of 
these have not been labelled in a more specific group, since they derive from 
dor, which has been used differently at different times to mean various insects. 
Five more entries are derived from beetle, and the OED suggests that the first 
element of bottlehead n 1654+1815, is a variant form of the same lexical item. 
A further four have been labelled SNAIL, and are derived from hoddy, which 
seems to have come to be associated with the snail indirectly: the OED notes 
that
The element dod is evidently the same as in DODMAN a shell-snail; hoddy-dod,
hoddy-doddy, hodman-dod, are perhaps in origin nursery reduplications; but the
element hoddy- appears itself to have come to be associated with or to mean ‘snail’
(or ? homed), as in several words that follow.
The other three entries in the group are derived from nit, ie the egg or young 
of a louse.
3.2.4 FISH
The FISH group contains the fewest entries in the ANIMAL data, a 
total of nine, and these relate to five different types of fish. Three entries each 
derive from cod and mullet, and there are two entries from other fish, smelt n 
1599-al625 and loach n 16O5-cl620. There is one other entry in this group 
which is not connected with a species of fish, and this is gubbins n 1916>: this 
is also classified in the core category VALUE, and the term originally meant 
fish parings, the fragments of scales etc that are discarded when a fish is 
prepared to be eaten.
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3.3 Motivation
Perhaps more than any other within the data, the ANIMAL group 
illustrates the complexity that can be involved in a seemingly simple mapping. 
It is possible to generalise about the motivation for the group as a whole, and 
this is a valuable and necessary starting point in examining the data. 3he 
connection between intelligence and animals in general can only itself be 
accounted for by reference to a number of mechanisms and principles, and 
these are discussed below.
3.3.1 Nature and nurture, the brain, and cognitive fluidity
It appears to be generally agreed by anthropologists and psychologists 
that our compulsion to see animals as humans, and humans as animals, is just 
that - a compulsion, that is the inevitable result of nature and nurture 
combined. In a discussion criticising the way in which anthropomorphism has 
hindered study of animal behaviour, Kennedy recognises that it is difficult to 
avoid because of its implicitness:
...anthropomorphic thinking about animal behaviour is built into us. We could not
abandon it even if we wished to. Besides, we do not wish io. It is dinned into us
culturally from earliest childhood. It has presumably also been ‘pre-programmed’
into our hereditary make-up by natural selection, perhaps because it proved io be
useful for predicting and controlling the behaviour of animals (Kennedy 1992:5).
It is easy to identify examples of the crossover between animals and humans 
in culture, because this occurs so pervasively. Literature and the media 
overflow with anthropomorphic images: animal characters are a staple of 
children’s fiction in books, LV and film, and adults are also encouraged to 
think of animals as semi-human, for example in the way that pet food and 
services are advertised. As some scholars have pointed out, language itself is 
anthropomorphic, since it is designed by and for humans - it “derives from 
human experience and, as a result, it inevitably presupposes consciousness. 
Lhere simply is no ‘neutral’ language in which to describe the behaviour of 
animals that does not prejudge the issue” (Ounbar 1984:45)2. Even though
2 Crist appears to disagree with this, suggesting that a distinction can be made between 
“ordinary” and “technical” language used to describe animals. Even if this is the case, though,
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some scientists argue that they are using particular language metaphorically 
(eg Krebs & Davies 1981:256; McFarland 1989), others, like Kennedy, 
believe that it is difficult to maintain awareness of this and ensure that 
observations about animal behaviour are always ‘translated’ by readers 
(Kennedy 1992:14-15). Furthermore, anthropomorphism in culture does not 
seem to be a recent tendency. Evidence of anthropomorphism in art dates as 
early as 40,000 years ago to the Palaeolithic era, for example in cave paintings 
depicting half-man, half-animal beings.
It is more difficult to explain the ‘nature’ element of our identification 
of animals with humans, that which gives rise to the emergence of this aspect 
of culture. One convincing account is given in Mithen’s exploration of the 
development of the imagination (Mithen 1996), where he suggests that 
anthropomorphic and zoomorphic thought (by which I mean the opposite) are 
a by-product of the way the brain has developed. Mithen argues that for early 
humans, the brain was essentially modular: different kinds of intelligence - 
technical intelligence, natural history intelligence and social intelligence 
(ibid:132ff) were isolated from one another by cognitive ‘barriers’, allowing 
little interaction. When these barriers were broken down, the brain became 
‘cognitively fluid’, so that the types of knowledge relating to each of the 
modules were able to be combined, and this was the trigger for the ‘cultural 
explosion’ that took place during Upper Palaeolithic times. Aside from the 
early art mentioned above, one particularly interesting piece of evidence for 
this change can be found in the gradual evolution of hunting practices from the 
time of Early to Modem Humans. Early Humans relied on “opportunistic” 
hunting, targeting individual animals of any species available at the time; by 
contrast, the methods of the first Modem Humans involved much more 
organisation and planning.
it is the ordinary language that is significant for wider usage and that will therefore affect
perceptions of animals, and of this she says the following:
The ordinary language of action is largely the everyday language of human affairs...
In virtue of its affiliation with everyday reasoning about human action, the use of the
ordinary language of action reflects a regard for animals as acting subjects, the
immanent, experiential perspective of animals is treated as real, recoverable, and
invaluable in the understanding of their actions and lives (Crist 1999:2).
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Although they continued to kill individual animals, or at most small groups, they
began to specialize on specific animals at specific sites... Indeed certain sites seem to
have been selected for ambush hunting, indicating that Modem Humans were much
better at predicting ihe movements of animals than Early Humans (ibid: 191).
Mithen contends that this ability to predict movements only develops when 
animals are ascribed thoughts and intentions - in other words, the basis of 
anthropomorphism - and this is only possible if natural history intelligence and 
social intelligence are not separate. Conversely, and crucially, if these two 
modules are integrated, anthropomorphic and zoomorphic thought seem 
inevitable.
3.3.2 Cultural influences: the medieval tradition and beyond
Aside from cognitive factors, there are also cultural influences that are 
equally important and should be taken into account. 3he cultural tradition of 
the Middle Ages is particularly rich in anthropomorphic images and symbols. 
Its inheritance from Antiquity embraces, amongst other influences, both the 
beast fable traditions epitomised by Aesop and the rich animal imagery found 
in the Bible and absorbed into subsequent Christian writings. 3hese fed into 
the popular medieval bestiaries, about which Hassig makes the following 
comments:
...is it really surprising that imaginative thinking about animals became a medieval
preoccupation? With a gradually accumulated and rich store of symbolic
associations, animals were excellent figurative vehicles for religious allegory,
political satire, and moral instmction. The medieval bestiary was the culmination and
apogee of allegorical functions for animals, assembling stories and pictures of beasts
and birds for the purposes of moral instruction and courtly entertainment. It is
indisputable that the bestiaries were an important medieval contribution to didactic
religious literature. Bui far from comprising an isolated, specialist’s genre available
only to the religious and literate elite, bestiaries also addressed concerns central to
virtually all walks of Christian life. That is, familiarity with the bestiary stories did
noi necessarily require direct access to ihe bestiary manuscripts, as the stories were
available from a multitude of sources, some textual, some visual, some word of
mouth (Hassig 1999:xi).
Hassig points out that bestiaries were central to religious teaching, and whilst 
this is certainly the case, it is important to remember the influence of the Bible 
itself. 3he Old and New 3estaments are both permeated with animal imagery.
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and particular animals are found again and again. For example, a range of 
animals including sheep, goats, snakes, wolves and asses (donkeys) are central 
to biblical narrative* 6, and came to be used fairly conventionally in later 
allegorical art and literature (and in bestiaries) to represent specific human 
characteristics.
Perhaps the earliest and most important of all the sources of the 
medieval bestiary tradition were Aesop’s fables. These had been well-known 
and popular in classical times and were pervasive in Greek and Roman 
culture; the earliest evidence for them is found in Herodotus, writing in the 
fifth century BCE, but it is clear from this that familiarity with the fables was 
widespread by the time he committed them to the page. Gibbs discusses a 
reference to them in Aristophanes’ The Birds (late fifth century BCE), which 
gives a sense of their significance.
What exactly does Aristophanes mean by someone ‘going over’ their Aesop? The
Greek verb he uses is pepatekas, which literally means to ‘have walked or
‘gone over’ Aesop. Citing precisely this passage in Aristophanes, the Liddell-Scott
dictionary of Greek suggests that the verb should also mean ‘to thumb through’, or
‘to be always thumbing Aesop’. Such a translation, however, misses the mark. To
‘thumb through’ Aesop implies that there was a text of Aesop to read, like the book
you are holding in your hands right now and which you can certainly ‘thumb
through’ at your leisure. In fifth-century Athens, however, there were no books of
Aesop to be thumbed through, since the first written collections of Aesop did not yet
exist. It is very hard for us as modem readers to appreciate the fact that Aesop could
still be an authority whom you had to consult, even if he were not an author of books
to be kept on the shelf. To ‘go over’ or ‘mn through’ Aesop meant to bring to mind
all the many occasions on which you had heard the stories of Aesop told at public
assemblies, at dinner parties, and in private conversation. Aesop’s fables and the
anecdotes about Aesop’s famous exploits were clearly a familiar way of speaking in
classical Greece, a body of popular knowledge that was meant to be regularly ‘gone
over’ and brought to mind as needed (Gibbs 2002:x-xi).
In the Middle Ages, when there was renewed interest in antiquity, Aesop 
enjoyed a resurgence in popularity, and seems to have been disseminated by 
similar means. Medieval audiences, or at least readers, would certainly have
® A huge amount of information about what these animals came to symbolise is available in 
various dictionaries of the Bible; see for example Achtemeier 1985, Douglas 1982 or Metzer
& Coogan 1993.
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been aware of classical retellings such as the Latin verse fables of Phaedrus 
and the Greek verse fables of Babrius, and later versions like Odo’s 
Christianized medieval Latin texts (thirteenth century), but it was not until 
much later that any of the fables were translated into English on the page. The 
first English edition was translated by Caxton, and it is telling that this was 
one of the earliest texts to become available in print (1484), only eight years 
after the printing press had been brought to Britain. It may not be true that 
Aesop’s fables were core to the bestiaries in themselves, but the way in which 
they established a tradition of animal allegory bound together with morality 
was central to the way in which bestiaries were written, and to their didactic 
and social function.
One account of the way in which these sources and others are related, 
and form a tradition of animal narrative, is given by White in the diagram 
below. With such a strong tradition established, it is unsurprising that this 
continues to be an important and central part of western culture and 
specifically English language texts of all kinds.
It is only in medieval Europe that a more elaborate narrative form begins to emerge
with the medieval ‘beast epic’ stories of Reynard the fox, inveterate rival of
Ysengrimus, the wolf. In the beast epics, the animals become self-aware individuals,
endowed with memory, motivation and - perhaps more importantly - personal
names. It is but a slight jump from this tradition to the horse named Boxer in
Orwell's Animal Farm, the famous pigs named Wilbur or Babe or Porky, not to
mention Bugs Bunny, Mickey Mouse, and innumerable other cartoon animals, along
with the extraordinary comic-book animals in Spiegelman’s Maus (Gibbs 2002 :xx).
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Herodotus d. 4 r 5 5 th century
Ctesias c. 398
and others
4th century
Aristotle d. 322
The Septuagini
3rd century
B.C.
Aelian c,
St Ambrose c. 360
The
Vulgate
392
Isidore of Seville
c. 630
T ravellers
Commentators
on above
Pliny d. a.d. 79
Solinus r. 218
220
Physiologus c. ?
(influenced by much of the above)
THE BESTIARY
fi. 12 th century
(which continues to expand as
is copied)
it
O.
I2ih century
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16th-century naturalists such as Gesner,
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Sir Thomas Browne’s Vulgar Errors
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There may be other factors worth considering as well. The way in 
which animals are viewed in general depends on how familiar people are with 
them, and this seems to have changed during and after the Middle Ages 
because of circumstances. Obviously animals had always been important, and 
were familiar in everyday life, but for the majority of people (and especially 
the lower classes) real-life experience of animals was restricted to a fairly 
limited group, mainly semi-domesticated farm animals and indigenous wild 
animals. Animal ownership was governed by necessity rather than choice, and 
animals had practical purposes, for the survival and benefit of humans. Other 
animals that were not encountered daily would have undoubtedly been well- 
known, but in a much more remote way; these were unfamiliar and exotic 
creatures found in literature and tradition . However, with the advancement of 
science and technology, and greatly improved opportunities to travel, better- 
informed knowledge about a wide range of animals became much more 
widespread. There was a huge surge of interest in animal behaviour during the 
Renaissance, reflected in and perpetuated by the appearance of zoology books. 
According to the Encyclopedia Brittaraca:
Zoology continued in the Aristotelian tradition for many centuries in the
Mediterranean region and by the Middle Ages, in Europe, it had accumulated
considerable folklore, superstition, and moral symbolisms, which were added to
otherwise objective information about animals. Gradually, much of this
misinformation was sifted out: naturalists became more critical as they compared
directly observed animal life in Europe with that described in ancient texts. The use
of the printing press in the 15 th century made possible an accurate transmission of
information.
It seems certain that this increased attention had an indirect impact on the 
extent to which people thought of animals and humans as similar. As Mithen
7 The extent to which these were unfamiliar is demonstrated by their representations in 
illustrations and sculpture - there are many examples of elephants, lions and other animals
portrayed quite inaccurately in medieval art. The lion sculptures on a column of Modena
Cathedral from c. 1100 have body shapes similar to that of a horse, short defined fringes of
hair on the forehead and thick ‘moustaches’, and bird-like talons (pictured in Salvini
1969:fig.51). The elephant portrayed some 400 years later in the Bestiary of Ann Walsh
(Kongelige Bibliotek, Gl. kgl. S. 1633 4o), Folio 6v, is no more accurate: it has cloven hoofs,
a long bushy tail and short, dog-like ears (digital facsimile online at
http://base.kb.dk/pls/hsk_web/hsk_vis.side?p_hs_loebem=3&p_sidenr=14&p_iHnr=0&p_fre
m= 1 O&p tilbage= 12&p navtvpe=rel&p lang=danV
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points out (discussed above), it is when the motivation for animal behaviour is 
considered that people begin to anthropomorphize, since the obvious reference 
point for any kind of mental process is the human mind. If there is greater 
focus on animal behaviour, presumably people will be more susceptible to 
anthropomorphic thought. This is likely to be further perpetuated by 
sentimentality about animals, and this appears to have surfaced around the 
same time, as the status of animals in society began to be different. As living 
conditions and practices changed, animals began to be kept for pleasure rather 
than practical purposes, and were domesticated to a greater extent. In the 
middle ages, some animals and birds were kept by the aristocracy; very 
gradually, over the following centuries, pet ownership became less uncommon 
and spread to the middle classes.
3.3.3 Dating issues: a pi^<^lbl<^im?
In an analysis of the role and importance of animals in the Middle 
Ages, Salisbury claims that
...animals of the imagination shaped people’s views of animals so much that if you
wanted to insult someone, you would call him a dog; whereas if you wanted to praise
someone, you would call her a lion (Salisbury 1996:49-50).
However, evidence from the INTELLIGENCE data does not reflect this claim. 
A noticeable feature of the ANIMAL group is the fact that the entries are 
dated surprisingly late, most of them significantly later than the medieval 
period. Only six entries (ie, just under 6% of the total data) date to pre-1500, 
and the earliest entry dates to cl330 (ane n cl330-1741). Without extensive 
research, it is difficult to say conclusively whether this is the case for all 
animal terms applied to humans or whether it is only a feature of 
INTELLIGENCE terminology. It seems likely that some of the earliest 
transferred animal names might be those of animals found in Bible narratives, 
and that an investigation of these might be a helpful starting point in gauging 
this. Biblical material was hugely influential in the middle ages, and there are 
numerous references to animals throughout the Bible, used allegorically to
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portray human characteristics; a few representative animals, which are
Q
considered below, are sheep, wolves, pigs and dogs; .
Sheep are perhaps the most commonly found animals - one web-based 
online study Bible picks up 179 verses that contain the word.2, though 
obviously many of these are references to the animals themselves. When used 
in a transferred or symbolic sense, they stand for the followers of God, who 
are unable to look after themselves and get lost very easily^. The OED entry 
makes it clear that there are early examples of sheep used with a transferred 
sense (and draws attention to biblical influence), but the possible definitions 
and supporting quotations seem to indicate that straightforward metaphorical 
usage, where sheep is used directly to mean ‘person’, is relatively late. The 
numbered sense definition which acts as a heading for the lettered subsenses 
calls this group “Similative (often passing into figurative) uses”, and the next 
level subheading uses the term “allusions” to describe the way it is used:
a. In allusions to:
(a) The sheep’s timidity, defencelessness, inoffensiveness, tendency to stray and get
lost: chiefly in echoes of biblical passages, and sometimes with allusion to sense 4.
(b) The fabled assumption by a wolf (or other beast of prey) of the skin of a
slaughtered sheep.
(c) The division into ‘sheep’ and ‘goats’ (saved and lost) at the Last Judgement. Also
attrib., as sheep-and-goat.
(d) The infection of the whole flock by one sheep.
(e) The shearing of sheep; with suggestion of ‘fleecing’ or robbing.
The wolf is also found in both the Old and New Testaments, and is the 
representative of vicious people, often those attacking the followers and
* I have selected these fairly randomly, although they are all mentioned in Bible dictionaries as 
examples of animals that are used figuratively of humans. The Oxford Companion to the Bible
specifically mentions sheep, wolves and dogs in its ‘Animal Imagery’ section (Meizer &
Coogan 1993:29-30); in its entry for swine, Harper's Bible Dictionary says that “The low
estate to which ihe prodigal son fell is signified by his occupation as a swineherd”
(Achiemeier 1985:1002). Both volumes have more extensive sections on animals in the Bible;
see also Douglas 1982:38ff.
2 www.crosswalk.com
101 refer here to adult sheep. Lambs are also very common in the Bible, but have quite 
different and far more positive connotations; ihe most recurring use of lamb is to refer to ihe
Christ, who is seen as the innocent sacrifice for the sins of humankind.
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doctrines of the church: “its habits of tearing its prey and stealing upon it at 
night-time are...symbolical of dishonest persons, oppressors and extortioners” 
(Bolton 1901:19). As with sheep, wolf is applied to people very early - the 
OED dates it as far back as 900 - and its metaphorical use is strongly 
influenced by the Bible. But again, the quotations in the OED indicate that it is 
not used more generally for people until the fifteenth and sixteenth century, 
and the relevant definitions use the same phrase, “in allusion to” to describe 
some usages. Metaphorical uses applied to people fall into the following two 
senses. The first of these is not confined to humans in its application:
lb. In comparisons, with allusion to the fierceness or rapacity of the beast; often in
contrast with the meekness of the sheep or lamb.
The second displays a more direct connection with the human.
5a. A person or being having the character of a wolf; one of a cmel, ferocious, or
rapacious disposition. In early use a^^plied esp. to the Devil or his agents {wolf of
hell)] later most freq., in allusion to certain biblical passages (e.g. Matt. vii. 15, Acts
xx. 29), to enemies or persecutors attacking the ‘flocks’ of the faithful.
Pigs (or swine) and dogs were both seen as unclean animals in the 
Jewish tradition, and are therefore used a symbols of filthy, sub-human 
creatures, “standing for what is despicable and hated” (Douglas 1982:41). The 
OED entry for swine refers to this symbolism within the definition of the first 
sense of the word, which also deals with the literal meaning itself. The 
quotations supporting this definition date from as early as 725.
An animal of the genus Sus or family Suidw, comprising bristle-bearing non­
ruminant hoofed mammals, of which the full-grown male is called a boar, the full-
grown female a sow, esp. the common species Sus scrofa, domesticated from early
times by Gentile nations for its flesh, and regarded as a type of greediness and
uncleanness.
There is also an entry for the word “In proverbial and allusive expressions, and 
in fig. context”, with supporting quotations dating from 1000 onwards. The 
more direct metaphorical sense is separated into a later sense,
2. fig. Applild o pprobriouslytoa s ensual, degraded, or c oarsep erson; also( inmod. 
use) as a mere term of contempt or abuse.
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Dog is the only one of the four animals for which no intermediate 
‘allusive’ stage of usage is listed, and a single relevant definition is given that 
connects the term directly with humans.
Applied to a person;
a. in reproach, abuse, or contempt: A worthless, despicable, surly, or cowardly
fellow. (Cf. CUR 1 b.)
The supporting quotations date from cl325, ie relatively early, though a good 
deal later than the OE period; it should be pointed out that the earliest 
quotation for the term used literally of the animal only dates to cl050, ie 
relatively late”. In all of quotations given with the definition above, dog is 
used as a direct term for a person, in some cases as a term of address.
Without any larger scale study into the transfer of animal terms, it does 
not seem impossible that the INTELLIGENCE data might reflect a general 
trend in animal metaphors that apply to humans. However, there is some 
evidence that appears to contradict these findings, and for this reason any 
suggestions offered here are made tentatively. Thornton’s (1988) study of 
animal names used in noun phrases for GOOO and EVIL, based on 164 items, 
found 31 items (just under 19% of the total data) dating to pre-1500. Although 
this total may not be directly comparable to my own’6, this figure must still be 
taken into account.
On balance, it seems likely that, for at least some animals, straight 
metaphorical transfer does not occur even though the connotations and 
symbolism from which this draws may be in place, and this is the case for the
' ' This may be because the term hund was also found in OE, and seems to have been more
common than dog.
12 Thornton’s analysis differs from mine in its approach. Firstly, it preserves the classification 
of HTE more faithfully. Apart from general intelligence types assigned in pre-classification, I
have used data without retaining precise labelling; by contrast, Thornton presents entries with
their sub-heading ‘definitions’. This means that two terms are repeated in different sub­
heading groups (shrew and whelp). In addition to this, some items would be classed as
variants of the same entry in my own data: shrew, sherew and shrow. which are only
identified as variant spellings in the OED, are all found within the same sub-heading group,
OE docga and its reflex dog both appear, and hellehund and hellhound are listed as separate
entries. Taking account of this differing methodology to bring it in line with my own would
reduce the number of entries in the group to 25; without examining all the rest of the data in
the same way it is not clear whether this would affect the percentage total.
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lexical items within my data. Almost without exception, it is possible to find 
some reference or tradition relating to each of the animals in the data 
(discussed below) which makes it available as a source concept for 
INTELLIGENCE; in all cases, this shared folk-knowledge pre-dates the 
emergence of the animal metaphor that reflects it. However, if it is the case 
that the ‘architecture’ of the brain gives rise to human-animal thought, one 
would expect to find evidence of this in the lexis very early indeed, and it 
seems surprising that there is such a long delay between the evidence of folk 
traditions relating to these animals and the straight metaphorical usage of their 
names as terms for humans.
One possibility is that the dates recorded for these entries are 
inaccurate. As is discussed in chapter 1 section 1.2, current revisions on the 
OED suggests that redating will apply to a significant number of entries, and it 
may be that the ANIMAL group will be affected to an unusually large extent. 
There are also other factors of a similar nature that must also be taken into 
account. It is only written language that is used as evidence of lexis, and this 
can vary substantially from spoken language, in terms of both timescale and 
register. Revised and expanded editions of synchronic dictionaries 
demonstrate that at best there is a substantial delay between the emergence of 
spoken language and the time at which it is written down, even for well- 
established spoken forms, and in earlier periods this transfer may not have 
occurred at all for some vocabulary. As well as this, early evidence of the 
vocabulary linked to a particular semantic field is dependent on surviving 
texts, and to a certain degree these demonstrate the nature of written sources in 
any period. The majority of early medieval texts appear to have been fairly 
formal in register, and many dealt with biblical material; presumably, even if 
there was other material dealing with ‘lower’ matters it may not have been 
considered as respectable or important, and its lower status may have made it 
less likely to survive. In this respect it is unsurprising that few metaphorical 
animal terms are found within them; these items are more associated with 
spoken language and are very often considered to be slang, and therefore it 
would be uncommon for them to be used in written texts. This is especially 
true given that almost all of the terms in the data presented here denote
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stupidity and are therefore derogatory. It seems that this concept is much more 
likely to be associated with colloquial and informal language than, for 
example, GOOD/EVIL, and this might account in part for the imbalance 
between the number of metaphorical animals dating to pre-EME in the 
INTELLIGENCE data compared to that included in Thornton’s study.
In general though, colloquial language tends to be written down much 
more from EME onwards, when the type of material available begins to be far 
more varied. This is exemplified in the work of Shakespeare, whose plays 
include dialogue full of colloquialisms as well as more ‘high-flown’ rhetoric 
in which one is unlikely to find abusive terms. Even more simply, it is 
significant that during the Renaissance period there was simply much more 
literature available in English, and also that the English lexicon underwent 
enormous expansion. The emergence of more animal terms must in part reflect 
a tendency throughout the lexicon (and indeed within the data included in this 
thesis).
3.3.4 Dero(gaSory terms and ihe Great d^s^in metaphor
The association of people with animals in general tends to be used in a 
derogatory way to indicate some quality perceived as ‘less than human’ . To 
call someone an animal is to imply that some element of their humanness is 
lacking; one OED definition for animal is
Contemptuously or humorously for: a human being who is no better than a brute, or
whose animal nature has the ascendancy over his reason; a mere animal. (Cf. similar
use of creature.)
Similarly beast can mean “A human being under the sway of animal 
propensities” or, worse,
13 Interestingly, there is one entry in the data that seems to carry the opposite idea, and is 
classified as HUMAN. Cretin n 1884+1930> was used earliest in English as a term for a class
of people who lived in certain valleys in the Alps, who were (as defined in the OED) “dwarfed
and specially deformed idiots”. Amongst the etymological information given for this term, the
OED suggests that cretin came through French and Swiss from Latin Christianum, ‘human
creature’, and was used as a term for these individuals “the sense being here that these beings
are really human, though so deformed physically and mentally”.
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‘A brutal, savage man; a man acting in any manner unworthy of a reasonable
creature.’ J. In earlier usage, often connoting stupidity or folly (cf. Fr. bete); in
modem phraseology opprobriously employed to express disgust or merely aversion.
Now freq. in weaker sense.
The definition presented here makes indirect reference to the traditional view 
of the division between man and animal, resting on man’s possession of 
reason, which animals lack. This links up with the way in which reason and 
emotion have been seen as separate, emotion being closer to the instinct 
associated with animals. It also goes some way to explaining the fact that, in 
general, animal terms that are transferred to humans become derogatory. 
Anecdotal evidence and general observation bears this out, and Leach 
comments that “Most of the monosyllables denoting familiar animals may be 
stretched to describe the qualities of human beings. Such usage is often 
abusive but not always so” (Leach 1964:47). However, there is also some 
corpus-based evidence for the bias. In Thornton’s study of animal names used 
to signify GOOD and EVIL, the bias is even more marked than in the 
INTELLIGENCE data, with 157 out of 164 items (95.7%) signifying EVIL 
(Thornton 1988:411). Moreover, this does not seem to be the case only in 
English. The study that is currently being undertaken by Hsieh is an analysis 
of 2980 Mandarin Chinese and 2630 German animal fixed expressions, and 
Hsieh comments that “The present corpora demonstrate that about 80% of 
AEs [animal expressions] are used to scorn or warn people. Thus, we can say 
AEs are a vocabulary of peoples’ values. They convey values from different 
cultures and societies” (Hseih 2003:5-6).
This division between the human and non-human fits into a broad 
schema, a sort of ‘order of being’, that has existed since medieval times. This 
is discussed and formalised by Lakoff & Turner, who refer to it as a “cultural 
model” which they believe is an important factor in the way in which humans 
understand the world and relate it to themselves.
The Great Chain of Being is a cultural model that concerns kinds of being and their
properties and places them on a vertical scale with “higher” beings and properties
above “lower” beings and properties. When we talk about man's “higher” faculties,
we mean his aesthetic and moral sense and rational capacity, not his physical
characteristics, his animal desires, or his raw emotions. We speak of higher and lower
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forms of life. The Great Chain is a scale of forms of being - human, animal, plant and
inanimate object - and consequently a scale of the properties that charcterize forms of
being - reason, instinctual behaviour, biological function, physical attributes, and so
on...
In the cultural model comprising the basic Great Chain, part of any being’s
nature is shared with lower beings. For example, it is noi our instincts that separate us
from beasts, because beasts also have instincts. It is the basic Great Chain that makes
it sensible for us to speak of our “bestial instincts” and our “animal drives”. Though
we are not beasts, we share these properties with beasts and not with trees or algae.
They are called “bestial instincts” because such instincts are a property that beasts
and beings above them have while lower order beings don’t.
At any level in the basic Great Chain, the highest properties of beings at that
level characterize that being. For example, the highest level properties of animals are
their instincts... Similarly, the mental, the moral, and the aesthetic are generic-level
parameters of human beings; though different people have different mental capacities
and different moral and aesthetic sensibilities, all human beings nonetheless have
some of these or other. Thus, there is a generic-level characterization of our implicit
unconscious cultural model of the basic Great Chain, a characterization that does not
distinguish among kinds of humans, among kinds of higher animals, among kinds of
lower animals, among kinds of plants, and so on. What defines a level are the
attributes distinguishing it from the next level below (Lakoff & Turner 1989:167-8).
The crucial point about this is that the Great Chain underlies all ANIMAL 
metaphors, regardless of the particular animal, bird, fish or insect involved. In 
one sense, employing any animal metaphor (or at least any derogatory one) 
has as its foundation the denial of human status - in other words, the emphasis 
is on sub-humanity rather than actual animality (ie, [-human] rather than 
[+animal]). This is particularly true for metaphors using basic-level category 
terms, represented by the dictionary entries above.
This also goes some way to explaining the high percentage of entries 
(around a quarter of the total ANIMAL group) that are compounds formed 
with a HEAD/BRAIN element. This element appears simply to act as a 
marker, making it clear that the ‘similarity’ to animals is being made with the 
mind and mental faculties. As with the other HEAD/BRAIN groups, there is 
a clear implication that a stupid person does not have the kind of mind proper 
to humans, but has something in its place that is different and inappropriate. 
This is discussed more fully in the next chapter (section 4.4).
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3.3.5 An analysis of ammaa metaphorizaston
Although I would not argue that it is a conscious linear process, the 
basic principle of animal metaphorization can be broken down into several key 
elements, which combine to form an intuitive, gestalt-like source of 
description of people as animals.
The first of these stages involves some of the most general of human 
tendencies in dealing with non-human entities, the most important being 
personification, in other words, the way in which humans ascribe, more or less 
deliberately, human qualities to non-human entities. Personification is very 
common, and is evident in the way we deal with all sorts of entities; some 
specific examples can be found in mappings identified in metaphor corpora, 
for example IDEAS AS PERSONS OR OTHER ANIMATE BEINGS 
(Bamden 1997), MACHINES ARE PEOPLE (Lakoff 1994) and THEORIES 
ARE PEOPLE (ibid.). As I have mentioned already, several scholars have 
pointed out (with reference to anthropomorphism) that the language we use is 
designed to deal with human issues and therefore “presupposes 
consciousness” (Dunbar 1984:45); whether this is the result of the 
personification tendency or something that causes it is a moot point.
In the case of animals specifically, this is called anthropomorphism. 
Although the basic principle is the same, in that the non-human is attributed 
human mentality, controversy about the nature of animal consciousness 
renders the connection somewhat more complex. Many (and probably most) 
people would argue that at least some animals do have mental facilities close 
to those of humans, whereas inanimate objects are an entirely different 
proposition; however, there still appears to be an almost total lack of 
consensus amongst the scientific community about how much animals and 
humans can be said to be comparable mentally. Anthropomorphic thought is 
attacked by some scholars who contend that it hinders the study of animal 
behaviour, because it is unconducive to theoretically sound evaluation. 
Kennedy goes as far as to say that “...our penchant for anthropomorphic
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interpretations of animal behaviour is a drag on the scientific study of the 
causal mechanisms of it... If the study of animal behaviour is to mature as a 
science, the process of liberation from the delusions of anthropomorphism 
must go on” (Kennedy 1992:5). As Mitchell et al. point out, 
anthropomorphism is often linked with the fact that much of the most 
persuasive evidence for strong similarity between humans and animals is 
anecdotal in nature (Mitchell et al. 1997:7), and is often criticised for this 
reason - Dennet dismisses anecdotes as “officially unusable” in contemporary 
science (Dennet 1987:250). But even the extensive investigations into 
individual species that have been carried out do not seem to have gone any 
distance to resolving the debate, since any findings are subject to 
interpretation, sometimes resulting in completely conflicting viewpoints. In 
some cases even the experimenters themselves have changed their opinions on 
their own studies. For example, Kennedy cites one investigation into language 
learning by chimpanzees, where the researcher. Terrace, first concluded that 
his subject had mastered some grammatical rules, but later withdrew this after 
re-examining material he himself had collected (Kennedy 1992:42). Clearly, 
then, it is an issue that looks unlikely to be resolved in the near future. The 
important point in relation to this thesis is that anthropomorphic thought is 
unquestionably powerful, whether it is based on fact, folk theory or a 
combination of the two. If it is a powerful conceptual tool within scientific 
communities where its use is regarded suspiciously at best, it is certainly even 
more pervasive in non-scientific discourse and thought.
Coupled with this tendency to anthropomorphize is another process 
that is common to human conceptualisation, and this is our propensity to 
reduce entities to a single feature, which is selected on the basis of what 
appears most typical or distinguishing. Lakoff & Turner refer to this as the 
“quintessential property”, and give a few examples: piety as quintessential to 
saints, filthiness as quintessential to pigs, and courage as quintessential to 
lions (Lakoff & Turner 1989:196). This is fundamental to a huge number of 
metaphors; many explicit examples can be found in formulaic similes (of the 
form ‘as - as a -’), where a single property is picked out and implied as the 
defining characteristic of an entity, very often an animal. It seems to me to be
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loosely related to a similar phenomenon that occurs with inanimate objects, 
and is connected with prototypicality. Within an analysis of metaphorical 
vehicles, Glucksberg & Keysar discuss this:
Parts of objects vary in “goodness” (Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). Good parts are
those that are functionally significant and often perceptually salient. The wing of an
airplane is a good part, the floor of an airplane is not. This concept of pari goodness
is theoretically analogous to the concept of prototypicality or goodness of a category
member, and so the goodness of a part may, for this purpose, be analogous to the
prototypicality of a metaphor vehicle in simple nominative metaphors (Glucksberg &
Keysar 1993:420).
For animals, it is characteristics that “vary in goodness”. The crucial element 
of this process is that it is rooted in human perception - what is quintessential 
about any animal is dependent solely on the status of this animal in relation to 
people.
3.3.6 Simiiarity theory
Similarity (or comparison) theory tends to be associated with a 
classical view of metaphor, which sees metaphor as a matter of language 
rather than thought. Because this has been so much criticised within the past 
twenty years, especially within cognitive linguistics, similarity theory in its 
oldest form was also considered to be irrelevant and outdated, and in recent 
work most attention was shifted away from the kind of examples that had been 
explained mainly with reference to a comparison between source and target. 
Older studies tend to describe ‘A is B’ metaphors, whereas more recently there 
has been a focus on metaphors more logically and convincingly accounted for 
by reference to the role of physical experience in conceptualisation. The 
SENSE group exemplifies this kind of mapping - it would be very difficult to 
argue for an objective similarity between seeing and understanding, but it 
seems more acceptable to suggest the mapping is motivated by the way 
knowledge is first gained. In spite of this, traditional similarity theory is still 
the most commonly held view of metaphor”, perhaps because it is intuitive in
14 Dictionary definitions obviously seek to define the core meanings of a term as it is 
commonly and popularly used and as part of the rhetorical tradition, rather than as a technical
term in modem linguistics, and accordingly these tend io reflect this older view. Two recent
definitions are given at the beginning of chapter one, where this issue is discussed more fully.
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its appeal. In accounting for the ANIMAL mapping, some version of 
similarity theory seems to be an unavoidable and crucial element, especially in 
light of the other processes discussed in this chapter.
One of the earliest criticisms of similarity theory was that made in the 
sixties by Max Black, within an account of his celebrated ‘interaction theory’. 
Black used the term ‘comparison’ rather than similarity, and argued that any 
explanation of metaphor based on this was essentially inadequate and failed to 
describe the fundamental nature of metaphor.
The main objection against a comparison view is that it suffers from a vagueness that
borders upon vacuity. We are supposed to be puzzled as to how some expression {M),
used metaphorically, can function in place of some literal expression (L) that is held
to be an approximate synonym; and the answer offered is that what M stands for (in
its literal use) is similar to what L stands for. But how informative is this? There is
some temptation to think of similarities as “objectively given,” so that a question of
the form, “Is A like B in respect of f?” has a definite and predetermined answer. If
this were so, similes might be governed by rules as strict as those controlling the
statements of physics... We need the metaphors in just the cases when there can be no
question as yet of the precision of scientific statement. Metaphorical statement is not
a substitute for a formal comparison or any other kind of literal statement, but has its
own distinctive capacities and achievements... It would be more illuminating in some
of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it
formulates some similarity antecedently existing (Black 1962:36-7).
This idea that metaphor can create similarity, rather than simply reflect 
it, has been taken up by scholars arguing against an objectivist philosophical 
stance where entities are believed to have inherent properties. Lakoff & 
Johnson reason that our conceptual system relies so heavily on basic, 
conventional metaphors - what they later term primary metaphors - that many 
metaphorical mappings, though they may appear to be obvious and self­
supporting, are themselves rooted in metaphor.
Since we see similarities in terms of the categories of our conceptual system and in
terms of the natural kinds of experiences we have (both of which may be
metaphorical), it follows that many of the similarities that we perceive are a result of
the conventional metaphors that are part of our conceptual system (Lakoff & Johnson
1980:147).
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In other words, many of the metaphors that seem natural follow on from 
primary metaphors, and themselves create the impression that the source and 
target are similar.
It seems to me that this explanation holds for many metaphors, but that 
different kinds of metaphors work in quite different ways. In the case of the 
ANIMAL metaphors, the mapping does depend on basic common processes of 
conceptualisation, but these are not exactly metaphorical in nature. Whilst 
there is obviously no direct and objective similarity between animals and 
people, it also seems misleading to say that there is any creation of similarity. 
In my opinion, the simplest and most logical way to account for the mapping 
is to say that there is a subjective but shared interpretation of animals that 
equates particular types of behaviour or characteristics with those of humans; 
in other words, the similarity may not relate to any scientific or factual reality 
or be in any way objective, but it is no less real for those observing it. In his 
consideration of animal terms used for humans, Richards comes to this 
conclusion, making a brief reference to metaphors “which work through some 
common attitude which we may (often through accidental and extraneous 
reasons) take up towards them both [the tenor and the vehicle]” (Richards 
1936:117). Grady gives a much fuller explanation in his discussion of non­
primary metaphors.
Why do we project human bravery onto aspects of lions’ instinctive behavior, and
vice versa? I propose that the simplest explanation is that we do perceive something
in common between the behavior of certain lions and the behavior of courageous
people (or some influential person once did, and created a stereotypic image of
leonine behavior which still shapes our naive schemas of lions). Lions and
courageous people both (appear to) confront dangerous opponents without fear. Let
me make it as clear as possible that I am not advocating the “similarity theory” which
Lakoff & Turner (as well as Lakoff & Johnson and others) have successfully
discredited. My proposal does not imply that there is any literal similarity whatsoever
between brave people and lions. It is helpful, though, to recognize that the
metaphorical association between them - involving projection in whichever direction
- is most likely based on the perception of common aspects in their behavior. I will
call this proposition the “resemblance hypothesis,” in order to distinguish it from the
“similarity theory,” and to highlight the role of our perceptions, as opposed to facts
about the world (Grady 1997:222).
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It is at this stage that folk theories, mythology and cultural values also 
influence the process, since they tend to become part of the shared folk 
knowledge of a community, and are thus involved in the stereotyping that 
influences the later perceptions of particular animals.
3.4 Particular animals found
As well as examining the general background to the metaphorical 
mapping between animals and intelligence, it is crucial to consider each of the 
core category groups within ANIMAL individually, and more specifically, to 
look at the data within each group. This must be done in context of a wide 
range of sources that inform folk beliefs, since these are often more influential 
than real world knowledge in determining the metaphors associated with 
particular animals and the ways in which these can be motivated. Black makes 
this point in his brief consideration of animal metaphors:
Consider the statement, “Man is a wolf.”... What is needed is not so much that ihe
reader shall know ihe standard dictionary meaning of “wolf” - or be able to use that
word in literal senses - as that he shall know what I will call the system of associated
commonplaces. Imagine some layman required to say, without taking special
thought, those things he held to be tme about wolves; the set of statements resulting
would approximate to what I am here calling the system of commonplaces associated
with the word “wolf.”... From the expert’s standpoint, the system of commonplaces
may include half-tmths or downright lies...; but the important thing for the
metaphor’s effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they
should be readily and freely evoked (Black 1962:39-40).
I would agree that it is not possible to reach an adequate account of any group 
of entries without examining cultural beliefs, symbolism and folklore, both 
contemporary and historical. The sources I have discussed above give a 
valuable insight into the way in which particular animals were regarded, and 
the characteristics they came to represent. For example, in the bestiaries and 
the Fables, animals tended to be portrayed not as individuals so much as 
“generic representatives of their species” (Gibbs 2002:xx). In the following 
section I have tried to give a brief account of each of the groups in the data, 
which draws from these sources whilst also considering the rationale that
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might lead to their characterisations of animals. My approach is intended to 
follow on from comments made by Spence in his article ‘The Human 
Bestiary’:
The original inspiration for the associations has to be sought mainly in human
psychology and its varying perceptions of points of similarity between particular
animals and particular types of human or types of human behaviour, but one would
have to distinguish different layers, both chronological and cultural, given that some
parallels are not only ancient but have religious, symbolic, or literary origins,
whereas others, humorous, cynical, or affectionate, are more popular, in the sense of
belonging to popular culture, and often more transitory in nature (Spence 2001:913).
There is a single entry in the ANIMAL group that I have not placed 
into any specific category, and this is plant-animal n 1673-1706. In its source 
sense, this refers to a zoophyte, and can therefore be applied to either the very 
lowest level animals, ie as “A general name for various animals of low 
organization, formerly classed as intermediate between animals and plants”, or 
to the highest level plants, ie “certain plants having or supposed to have some 
qualities of animals”. I assume in this case that the transfer of meaning of this 
item is motivated simply by the Great Chain, since this is by no means a 
common organism, to the extent that it would have been unknown to most 
speakers. However, the term is formed from two familiar and basic elements 
so that its meaning is not opaque, and this perhaps makes it more readily 
‘available’ to speakers (though they may not be using it in a technically 
correct way). This idea is supported by the fact that the more specialised 
synonym zoophyte does not undergo the same metaphorical extension.
3.4.1 MAMMALS
The bias towards MAMMALS in the data seems entirely 
understandable if it is true that the most ‘successful’ metaphors of this kind are 
those for which the source and target are not perceived to be too dissimilar, as 
various scholars have contended - for example, Katz states that “There is a 
wealth of evidence that a strong predictor of perceived metaphor goodness is 
the number and saliency of features shared in common by the concepts”
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(1989:487)15. Furthermore, it is consistent with Thornton’s findings in her 
investigation of animal-related terminology for good and evil:
The greatest number [of items] belongs to the mammals - the class which is most
familiar and similar to mankind (and to which mankind also belongs). The smallest
number is in the class which is probably least similar to mankind - the Cmstaceans.
The pattern is roughly, but not entirely, borne out by the numbers in between. Insects,
birds and mammals are all familiar to man and are well-represented (Thornton
1988:443).
Whilst it seems logical that it should be more insulting to metaphorize 
a person in terms of a fish or insect, and that this should signify lesser 
intelligence, in reality this may be less convincing. Lakoff & Turner point out 
that, in relation to the Great Chain, this group is further classified by criteria 
like “functional structure” and “interior state”.
We think of humans as higher-order beings than animals, animals as higher than
plants, and plants as higher than inanimate substances. Within each of these levels,
there are higher and lower sublevels, so that dogs are higher-order beings than
insects, and trees higher than algae. This scale of beings embodies a scale of
properties. While a rock is mere substance, a chair additionally has a part-whole
functional structure, that is, it has a seat, a back, and legs, each of which serves some
function. A tree has both substance and part-whole functional structure, and in
addition it has life. An insect has all of these properties - substance, a complex
functional structure, life - and in addition animal behaviour such as self-propulsion.
According to our commonplace knowledge, higher animals like dogs have all of
these properties plus interior states such as desires, (like wanting to play), emotions
(like fear), limited cognitive abilities (like memory), and so on. Humans have all
these properties plus capacity for abstract reasoning, aesthetics, morality,
communication, highly developed consciousness, and so on. Thus, where a being
falls in the scale of beings depends strictly on its highest property (Laikc^iTf & Turner
1989:167-8).
This places individual animals in direct comparison to humans, since, by 
implication, to call a human an animal is to draw attention to exactly those 
‘functions’ they lack. It may be that a less exaggerated comparison, with an 
animal that is only one or two ‘levels’ lower than humans, is a more
15 There is perhaps also a parallel with the density data: in the same way that very dense 
substances (eg stone, metals) are not exploited to the same extent as substances that can be
penetrated with difficulty, creatures that are ‘closer’ to humans seem to be more suitable as
sources than those that are further removed in the Great Chain.
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convincing insult in terms of intelligence. As I will discuss below in section 
3.4.3, levels too far below that of humans may be more usefully employed 
with reference to characteristics other than intelligence, since this implies they 
are altogether less ‘human’. Insect terms tend to be used most commonly to 
indicate a particular kind of disgust. Mammals, by contrast, have more 
obvious similarities to humans in terms of intelligence, (and, of course, in 
physical structure) which is why they are more commonly anthropomorphized, 
and why issues about their treatment tend to be seen as having moral 
implications. The very fact of their greater similarity seems to render them 
more suitable as metaphorical sources for this semantic field.
In his investigation of animal terms used for verbal abuse, Leach 
theorises that taboo entities always belong to the interstices between clearly 
separate things: “it is the ambiguous categories that attract the maximum 
interest and the most intense feelings of taboo...taboo applies to categories 
which are anomalous with respect to clear-cut category oppositions” (Leach 
1964:39). He goes on to set out a hierarchy of animals in relation to their 
status as food for humans, and draws up four categories:
1. Those who are very close -‘pets,’ always strongly inedible.
2. Those who are tame but not very close - ‘farm animals,’ mostly edible but only
if immature or castrated. We seldom eat a sexually intact, mature farm beast.
3. Field animals, ‘game’ - a category toward which we alternate friendship and
hostility. Game animals live under human protection but they are not tame. They
are edible in sexually intact form, but are killed only at set seasons of the year in
accordance with set hunting rituals.
4. Remote wild animals - not subject to human control, inedible (ibid:44).
He concludes that it is the animals in categories 2 and 3 that are potentially 
most taboo; pets are so close to humans that they can be viewed as themselves 
semi-human, whilst wild animals are completely separate and therefore 
‘irrelevant’16.
16 Thornton makes a similar point whilst considering the lack of primate terms in her data, 
saying that “perhaps names of primates are just too familiar, and too close to man, to be freely
applied to people in a derogatory fashion” (Thornton 1988:444). This is plausible, but it
should be noted that in another sense, primates are noi at all familiar; most of the animal terms
that become eonventionalised figuratively, and that tend io fall into long term usage, seem to
be those of well-known, usually indigenous animals.
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Whilst I am unsure about Leach’s ‘edibility’ criteria, his categories 
correspond to the animals found in this data remarkably closely, and I believe 
that a more general point that comes out of his analysis is fundamental to 
understanding animal metaphor: for metaphorization purposes, the most 
important feature of any animal or animal group is its status in relation to 
humans. Regardless of whether or not their members can be eaten, the 
categories ‘pet’, ‘farm animal’, ‘field animal’ and ‘wild animal’ all relate to 
the human-defined purposes that animals serve, and the relationship between 
each ‘level’ of animal is often the result of human intervention. Which animals 
are domesticated or used in farming is a matter of human judgement about 
their suitability; this is informed by the varying temperaments of different 
animals, and the potential products that can be acquired from them, and to 
some extent it can also be arbitrary, but it results solely from human 
perspective. This is also true of the Great Chain; its hierarchical structure is 
based on the complexity and sophistication of the organisms involved, but this 
is by no means objectively determined, depending instead on how the creature 
is popularly perceived. In terms of cognitive abilities, there may be no 
significant theoretical difference between the animals Lakoff & Turner 
identify as higher on the scale, like dogs, and lower ones within the same 
group, for example cows or goats, but there is a marked difference in the roles 
they are assigned by people, equating to the “properties” Lakoff & Turner 
discuss above.
3.4.1.1 DONKEYS/MULES
This is the largest of the mammal sub-groups, and represents a long 
established mapping. The donkey is probably the animal most 
characteristically used as a symbol of stupidity, and there are a number of 
well-known examples in literature. In Aesop ' Fables, donkeys are portrayed 
as senseless, fairly passive creatures that often bring about their own downfalls 
through lack of judgement. For example, in one fable, a donkey admires a 
cricket so much that it imitates its diet of fresh air and dew, eventually 
starving to death (Gibbs 2002:163); in another, discontented with its own lot, 
it dresses up in a lion skin to fool others but is clubbed to death when the
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disguise is unsuccessful (ibid: 155). In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, it is a 
donkey’s head that Puck attaches to Bottom to “make an ass of’ him, or in 
other words make him look foolish. Spence has pointed out that donkey 
metaphors are common in a number of languages:
...the names of the donkey are used in all the languages to designate a fool, on their
own or in phrasal combinations: compare the English donkey, ass, and jackass, the
French ane, un ane bate, ‘a complete ass’ (literally ‘a donkey wearing a packsaddle’),
un ane rouge, ‘a stupid and malicious person’, une bourrique, ‘a stubborn or stupid
person’, the German ein alter Esel, the Spanish burro (feminine, burra, ‘stupid
woman’), un burro cargado de letras, ‘a pompous ass’ (literally ‘a donkey loaded
with book-learning’), and the Italian asino, un pezzo d’asino ‘a fool’, somaro, and
ciuco (Spence 2001:916).
Amongst the adages collected by Erasmus, there are a huge number featuring 
donkeys, and again these focus on the animal’s reputation for stupidity. One of 
the most direct is Dvo? ev peXlrracs, A donkey among bees, which Erasmus 
explains by saying “This occurs when a person finds himself among satirical 
and insolent people, himself being a dull fellow whom they mock with 
impunity” (Phillips & Mynors 1982:421).
Donkeys have always had a specific and limited purpose for humans - 
like oxen, they are traditionally designated as ‘beasts of burden’, farm animals 
that are kept to do heavy jobs like lifting, carrying and pulling. These are 
menial, routine tasks, and it is significant that donkey work has come to mean 
“hard, boring, monotonous, “no-brain” work...[requiring] little intelligence” 
(Palmatier 1995:119). For this reason, they have quite a different status from 
horses, which are not found in the data at all, though both are equines. Horses 
have high value and high prestige, and have tended to be used to carry people, 
whereas donkeys are far less desirable and have been used more to carry loads, 
and they are associated more with the lower classes. Palmatier makes the point 
that “When the horse came along, with its speed and ability to carry knights in 
shining armour, the donkey, although also an equine, lost even more status by 
comparison” (Palmatier 1995:119). In the biblical story commemorated on 
Palm Sunday, Christ rides into Jerusalem on a donkey, and this story had such 
resonance and power precisely because it was not considered a worthy or 
dignified mode of transport for the nobility or royalty. In the gospels this is
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said to fulfil the prophesy in Zechariah 9:9, where the donkey represents the 
humbleness of Christ:
Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion!
Shout aloud, O daughter of Jerusalem!
Lo, your king comes to you;
triumphant and victorious is he,
humble and riding on an ass,
on a colt the foal of an ass17.
The contrast between the way horses and donkeys have always been perceived 
is illustrated by one of the Greek proverbs found in Erasmus, 
Af L7T7Tocov eV ovovs, From horses to asses, which was used “When a man turns 
aside from an honourable vocation to something less reputable...[or] when 
someone has sunk from affluence to a humbler station” (Mynors 1989:83). 
Interestingly, one entry in the data is mule n cl470: a mule is the sterile 
offspring of a female horse and a male donkey. The negative associations of 
the latter seem to have entirely cancelled out the positive ones of the former, 
and this is the subject of one of the Fables, The Boastful Mule.
Feeling his oats, so io speak, he burst into a run, whinnying and shaking his head to
and fro. ‘My mother is a horse,’ he shouted, ‘and I am no worse at racing than she
is! ’ But suddenly he drew to a halt and hung his head in shame, remembering ihai his
father was only a donkey (Gibbs 2002:104).
As the data analysis above shows, most of the words in this group are 
compounds of ass. Despite the fact that ass has been largely superseded by the 
term donkey, several of these compounds continue into current usage. One 
reason for this may be that they have become conventionalised to the extent 
that they are now fixed expressions, but it also seems likely that they have 
been influenced by British arse and American ass, both meaning buttocks; in 
fact the phonological overlap with these terms may be largely responsible for 
both the decline of ass used as an animal name and its success as a term for a 
stupid person, concurrently. According to some research, the process of sound 
change that accounts for the confusion between the British forms appears to 
have happened over a long period, and had its beginnings as early as the 
seventeenth century.
17 All biblical passages are quoted from the Revised Standard Version.
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Another instance of the avoidance of unpleasant associations is the case of ass... The
reasons which account for the substitution of ass with donkey are both phonetic and
semantic. By 1600 the /r/ in syllable final position, when followed by another
consonant, stopped being pronounced with the subsequent lengthening of the
previous vowel (see Dobson 1968:724ff). Thus, arse came to be pronounced with a
long a. By the end of the 17th century there was also a lengthening of short a
followed by the voiceless alveolar fricative, which made ass homophone of arse.
Fairman refers to the process (1994:31-34) and dates the avoidance strategies
between the years 1760-1730. He explains that the first strategy was to employ 
jackass, but failed soon, because it ceased to mean the male of animals and “became 
a lexical determiner”, in such a way that speakers continued using ass. Several
substitutes took its place in different parts of the country... According to Fanman
(1994:32), the first instance of donkey is in a list in Robert Nares’ grammar (1784);
the OED gives his second reference Francis Grose (1785) as the first record of the
word. Gradually, donkey was gaining ground and favoured the decline of ass.
However, he admits that there are still unclear aspects and the topic is open to
discussion. Barber assures that ass underwent a modification in its pronunciation in
order to avoid such an objectionable merger and the variant with /$/ became
standardized, although the long vowel can still be heard occasionally in expressions
like silly ass (1976:312-313) (de la Cruz Cabanillas & Tejedor Martinez 2002:239).
Both arse and ass appear in the data listed under BODY PART-SEXUAL, 
which contains a total of 10 items, and because this is a well-known and 
commonly used source field it is natural that it might be understood to 
motivate the ass entries, even though this might not be the actual etymological 
root. A similar phenomenon can be seen in other entries in the 
INTELLIGENCE data, notably stunpoll n al794>, which is listed in the core 
category group DENSITY and discussed in chapter 4.
3.4.1.2 SHEEP
In his discussion of sheep metaphors, Palmatier concludes that the 
sheep’s reputation for stupidity comes from the behaviour of female and 
young animals, rather than that of the ram which tends to have an entirely 
different character.
The sheep is, at the same time, both the most forceful mammal (the ram) and the
most defenseless mammal (the ewe), and the lamb is the most defenseless of all
sheep. A person who is a sheep is vulnerable, gullible, impressionable, and easily
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influenced by others. The analogy is to the ewe or lamb, not to the ram (Palmatier
1995:341).
From the sources I have examined, it seems as though sheep are not seen as 
stupid in quite the same way that some other animals are. They are perceived 
primarily as being passive and lacking any independent thought, this trait 
manifested by the fact that they belong to flocks rather than living 
individually. Their association with stupidity is the indirect result of this.
This is certainly the case in Aesop S Fables such as The Butcher and
the Flock'.
Some castrated sheep had been gathered together in a flock with the rams. Although
the sheep realized that the butcher had come into the flock they pretended not to see
him... In the end there was only one sheep left. This is what he reportedly said to the
butcher when he saw that he too was about to be taken away: ‘We deserve to be
slaughtered one after another since we didn’t realize what was happening until it was
too late... (Gibbs 2002:31).
It is also consistent with the way in which sheep are portrayed in the Bible. 
Throughout both the Old and New Testaments, sheep are used allegorically to 
stand for people. They are not represented in a particularly negative light, but 
the impression given is that they have no ability to act individually or 
safeguard their own survival. In Isaiah humanity is described as being “like 
sheep [that] have gone astray...every one to his own way” (Isaiah 53:6); later 
on, in the gospels, Jesus sees a large crowd and “he had compassion on them, 
because they were like sheep without a shepherd” (Mark 6:34). A more 
modem example of this can be found in the Far Side cartoons drawn by Gary 
Larson, many of which feature sheep (which, like all the animals in his 
cartoons, tend to be ‘humanized’). One picture shows a flock of sheep at a 
party, one of whom is obviously the host, and the caption reads “Henry! Our 
party's total chaos! No one knows when to eat, where to stand, what to... Oh, 
thank God! Here comes a border collie!”.
Also central to the mapping is that sheep, like donkeys, have a 
particular and limited use for humans. Whilst donkeys can be used for labour, 
sheep are bred and kept specifically for the products that they yield, mainly 
food and wool. In one medieval bestiary, this usefulness to man is listed as
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part of the qualification for herd animals: “Properly speaking, the word ‘herd’ 
is applied to those animals which are bred for food (like sheep) or which are 
otherwise suitable for the use of man (like horses and cows)” (White 1954:71).
Although Palmatier’s notion that rams are not involved in the metaphor 
seems logical, it is not home out by my data. Half of the entries in the group 
relate to male sheep, deriving from the root ram or tup or from wether, a 
castrated male sheep. It may be that this is simply a case of the term being 
used in an over-general way because it is a hyponym of sheep. However, it is 
also possible that the motivation for these entries is slightly different, and is 
not based on the same characteristic of passiveness and dependence. One 
feature of all these entries is that they are compounds with HEAD/BRAIN 
elements; in general, sheep seem to be systematically linked with lack of 
intelligence, but this does not seem to be the case with rams. In other contexts 
ram has associations with force or violence (as in to ram, or ram as defined in 
the OED, “a sexually aggressive man; a lecher”), presumably as a result of the 
ram’s tendency to react violently, butting other animals to assert dominance 
and defend territory and status. It seems likely that it is this behaviour that 
accounts for the fact that Latin aries could mean either ram or the military 
device used to demolish walls, translated directly to battering ram in English. 
As the OED points out, the wood and iron element of the device that would 
strike the wall first was sometimes in the form of a ram’s head. This imagery, 
and the term battering ram itself, are also likely to have further highlighted 
this particular aspect of rams’ behaviour. Rams are also commonly used in the 
names and logos of wrestling clubs (for example, the Lafayette Rams and the 
Wyalusing Rams18 19) and this may be related to the fact that in the middle ages 
a ram was the usual prize in a wrestling match (see Kirkpatrick 1992:847). In 
Chaucer’s portrait of the Miller, in the General Prologue to The Canterbury
Tales, one of the Miller’s features is that “At wrastlinge he wolde have alwey 
the ram” (Benson 1987:32, line 548/8. For these reasons, it seems plausible
18 This information is taken from http://collegiatewrestling.com/links.htmh accessed 15^ 
October 2003.
19 In this passage, the narrator goes on to say of the Miller that “Ther was no dore that he 
nolde heve of harre, / Or breke it ai a renning with his heed” (Benson 1987:32 lines 550-1). It
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that the ‘quintessential property’ attributed to male sheep may be rooted in this 
behaviour pattern, rather than in the herd mentality most associated with sheep 
in general. If this is the case, perhaps the association with stupidity is a 
metaphorical reference to ‘charging in’ to solve problems, rather than to lack 
of independent thought. The fact that the specific source for this mapping 
comes from the same species as another one with the same target is 
presumably advantageous, since it increases the familiarity and 
conventionality of the metaphor.
There are other entries in the data that can helpfully be viewed 
alongside this group, and which may be helpful in understanding the mapping. 
Three entries have hammer as an element, hammer-head n 1532-1628 + 1947. 
hammer-headed ai 1552> and ninnv-hammer n 1592-1853. It seems likely that 
these are motivated by the same idea, the practice of blindly and pointlessly 
knocking against things instead of directing one’s efforts to negotiate them 
more effectively. If this is the case, one corollary of the mapping is that the 
mind is a physical, active agent, rather than the passive receiver or container 
of idea20, and this aligns it with a number of other core categories. One of 
these is SHARP/PIERCING, one of the larger groups in the data which 
accounts for 42 entries, and I would suggest that this is a roughly opposite 
group that provides a symmetrical counterpart to the ram and hammer entries. 
If the role of the mind is to penetrate or ‘get into’ physical ideas (which are 
themselves similar to containers, in that knowledge is ‘enclosed’ inside), then 
it is logical that an individual with a sharp or piercing mind will possess 
intelligence since they are able to do this with precision and ease. By contrast, 
the mind of a stupid person must be unable to do this. This is consistent with 
the data in SHARP/PIERCING, in which there are entries like obtuse ai 15Q9> 
and unpenetrating ai 1748 that signify stupidity, as well as a large number of 
entries related to the notion of sharpness that signify cleverness. The hammer
is clear from Chaucer’s descriptions of the Miller that he is not regarded as a clever man, and
this is a subtle comment that is part of this, since it amounts to the most positive characteristic
attributed to the Miller. This provides a parallel to the ram entries in the way that it pdctcays
stupidity and connects it to this particular physical behaviour of knocking against things with
the head.
20 This is discussed in chapter 5, section 5.1.1.
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entries are an extension of this idea, with the added element of force: instead 
of being able to pierce an idea, a hammer-head strikes it clumsily, in the same 
way that a ram reacts to situations by butting with its head rather than 
responding in a more logical and constructive way.
The mapping between sheep and stupidity is not restricted to English. 
Spence points out that “the names of the adult sheep are often associated with 
timidity and stupidity: compare the English sheep, ‘stupid, poor-spirited 
person’, and German Schaf and Schafskopf, ‘dolt, ninny”’ (Spence 2001:918). 
If it is the case that there is some biblical influence in the way that sheep are 
perceived, one would expect to find similar terms in other languages found in 
countries where the Bible has been central to culture as well. Since the biblical 
portrayal of sheep comes from Hebrew culture, it is likely that this is also the 
case for other Afroasiatic languages, but further research is required before 
any definitive statement about this can be made.
3.4.1.3 BOVINES
The connection between the bovine family and stupidity is not 
immediately obvious, but it appears to be similar to that of the SHEEP group 
in that it results from an indirect link between characteristics and types of 
behaviour and lack of intelligence. Rather than being motivated by a single 
(real or perceived) characteristic of bovines, or even one that stands out as the 
most salient, there are several strands that might be significant in this 
mapping, and these combine to create a cognitively cohesive source that is 
intuitively convincing. Moreover, each one is paralleled elsewhere in the data, 
and this is an important indication that these low-level metaphorical 
connections are ‘real’ for speakers even if they exist entirely unconsciously.
Like sheep, bovines tend to be kept as farm animals, and again the fact 
that they are herd animals can be perceived as indicating a lack of independent 
thought (see above). Unlike the SHEEP group, however, there are no entries in 
this group that relate specifically to female bovines, and in fact half of the 
entries are connected specifically with either the males of the species (or
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animals more commonly thought of as male) or young animals. One possible 
reason for this is the role of females: cows are kept for milk, rather than 
simply to be eaten, and this is a role that may be perceived differently from 
that of other herd animals, and be seen as more sophisticated or even more 
individualistic. By contrast, male bovines tend to be reared specifically for 
food, or, like donkeys, as ‘beasts of burden’ that carry out heavy work 
requiring strength, like pulling ploughs. The OED entry for ox draws attention 
to these fimctions, commonly associated with cattle:
The domestic bovine quadruped (sexually distinguished as bull and cow); in common
use, applied to the male castrated and used for draught purposes, or reared to serve as
food.
Additionally, the entry bullhead n 1624+1840 may share some of the 
connotations that motivate the male sheep entries discussed above. Rams are 
famous for violent behaviour including butting, and similarly bulls are known 
for reckless destruction and charging, as in the phrase like a bull in a china
shop.
The entries that derive from young bovines are both from calf; calf n 
al553-1711 and calvish ai 1570-1834 are the earliest dated entries in the 
group. As with all six entries in the core category AGE, age is taken as 
equating to experience and intelligence, and is therefore symbolic of 
intelligence. By contrast, youth pairs with inexperience and so lack of 
intelligence. The only two entries in the ANIMAL group that relate to dogs, 
puppv-headed ai 1610 and dunderwhelp n 1621+al625. can be explained by 
the same reasoning, as can green goose n 1768+1877. Green is the colour of 
plants and often of unripe fruit, and this has led to its identification with 
immaturity and lack of development; in this case it has undergone the same 
semantic shift to signify stupidity.
Three of the entries in the group derive from buffalo; these are buffle n 
1655+1710. bufflehead n 1659> and buffle-headed ai 1675+1871. The OED
definition shows that this term has been used with reference to various bovine 
species, though none of these are indigenous to Britain. This lack of 
familiarity would seem to render buffalo a less appropriate metaphorical
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source, but it is clear from the etymology of the term that the English form 
buffle has come from vulgar Latin through French, in which the metaphor 
already existed, so that it could be ‘imported’ directly. However, the term was 
also borrowed with its animal meaning in English, and presumably the general 
identification of bovines with stupidity further reinforced the metaphorical 
meaning in English. The feature that seems to make buffalo suitable for the 
mapping in either language is size. Bovines tend to be large, bulky animals, 
and this is particularly true of buffalo (as well as, to a lesser extent, bulls). 
Similarly, large size is an element common to a number of other groups and 
entries in the data. For example, the WOOD group contains sources that are 
large blocks (see discussion in chapter 4, section 4.4.3), and there is a group in 
the data that appears to centre on LUMP, which carries this idea of bulkiness 
or unwieldiness. SIZE is most commonly discussed as correlated to status, as 
in the mapping IMPORTANCE IS SIZE listed as a primary metaphor by 
Grady with the motivation “The correlation between size/volume of objects 
and the value, threat, difficulty etc. they represent as we interact with them” 
(Grady 1997:291). This may explain one entry with no parallels in the data 
that signifies cleverness, large ai 1535-1667. However, in the case of the 
BOVINE entries, where large correlates to STUPID, the motivation must be 
different, and it seems most likely that it relates to SPEED. Entities that are 
large, like buffalo and large chunks of wood, tend to be constrained by size so 
that they can only move (or be moved) slowly. SPEED is an important concept 
in the way that intelligence is perceived, both historically and currently. From 
the core category group SPEED, it is evident that many lexical items that can 
be seen etymologically to have come from other semantic fields (such as 
ALIVE/ANIMATE, the earliest meaning of quick) develop to be more closely 
associated with speed, and it seems likely that this is the association that folk 
etymology would make to explain these items. As well as this, SPEED is an 
important element of various other mappings, including some entries 
discussed in the following chapter. Lack of speed is certainly associated with 
cattle, so this does not seem unlikely as a factor in the mapping.
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3.4.1.4 Other annmals
The remaining ten entries in the MAMMAL group relate to a variety of 
different animals. As the smaller number of entries for each animal indicates, 
these are not found so pervasively in English, and correspondingly the 
motivation for these groups is less clear and supported by a smaller amount of 
secondary literature. The remarks that I offer here by way of explanation for 
each group are therefore made tentatively, and are not intended to form a 
complete commentary on the metaphorical links discussed.
The most general term that yields any data is vermin, the root of 
varment ai 1829>. Historically vermin has had a wide range of reference, and 
it has been applied to animals “of a noxious or objectionable kind” {OED) that 
are parasitic or infest, including insects, rodents and certain birds. Varment ai 
1829> is one of the few entries in the animal group meaning CLEVER and 
this seems unusual given the negative connotations of the source. However, as 
I mentioned above, the HTE pre-classification associates this with 
SHARPNESS, and although this denotes intelligence its connotations are not 
always so flattering. I would conjecture that the salient characteristic of all 
vermin is the fact that they are difficult to catch, control and remove, and in 
human terms this is interpreted as conscious, crafty behaviour. This may 
account for its use to signify CLEVERNESS. It may be telling that vermin can 
also be applied to humans with a more straightforwardly derogatory meaning, 
which the OED defines as being “Applied to persons of a noxious, vile, 
objectionable, or offensive character or type. Freq. used as a term of abuse or 
opprobrium; in mod. dial, sometimes without serious implication of bad 
qualities” . Three other entries may have similar motivation, since they come 
from shrew21 2, and these also signify CLEVERNESS (specifically 
SHARP/SHREWD): shrewd ai 1589>, shrode ai 1594-1606 and shrewdish ai
21 This might be further evidence that it is unusual for a term to be metaphorically transferred 
to mean two separate and different human characteristics, but more likely for it to be used to
mean two slightly different but connected characteristics.
22 The connection between shrew meaning ‘animal’ and ‘person’ is unclear, since there are 
several etymological possibilities that might account for their derivation (see the OED for a
full discussion). However, the animal sense is evidenced earlier, and it is undisputed that they
are closely related and from a common source.
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1823>. Again, shrew can be applied to humans with a number of meanings 
ranging from “A wicked, evil-disposed, or malignant man; a mischievous or 
vexatious person; a rascal, villain” to “A person, esp. (now only) a woman 
given to railing or scolding or other perverse or malignant behaviour; ffeq. a 
scolding or turbulent wife”. All of these are negative, and they denote and 
connote a variety of characteristics including untrustworthiness, viciousness, 
evilness and wretchedness; clearly, a shrewd person may be crafty, but this is 
a worldly kind of intelligence that may be held in suspicion and regarded with 
discomfort.
There are two more entries from an animal that is a rodent and may 
therefore qualify as vermin: squirrel-headed aj 1637+1953> and squirrel- 
minded ai 1837. both meaning STUPID. However, it is my impression that, in 
current usage at least, squirrels are not seen as noxious in the same way that 
many other rodents are, and some of the quotations in the OED also seem to 
indicate that this was the case historically. For example, one supporting 
quotation from cl 381 is Chaucer’s reference, in the Parliament of Fowls, to 
“Squyrelis & bestes smale of gentil kynde” (Benson 1987:388 line 196). 
Squirrels were eaten as game animals, and this may be relevant, but equally 
this group may be motivated by the way that squirrels behave. One action 
commonly associated with squirrels is their agility in scurrying about, which 
gives rise to the verb squirrel, meaning “To go round in circles like a caged 
squirrel; to run or scurry (round) like a squirrel”. Both entries are compounds 
with HEAD/BRAIN elements, suggesting that the squirrel-like behaviour is 
being directly compared with human thought processes, which are similarly 
energy-wasteful and irrational; in other words it may be that this indirectly 
implies a lack of logical thought. Cn the other hand, squirrels are also known 
for hoarding, and this may be the characteristic being mapped with the 
implication that the individual is indiscriminate in the way they collect 
knowledge (drawing heavily on the CONTAINER metaphor).
I have already referred to the entries relating to DOGS in section 3.2.1 
above - it seems likely that both of these relate specifically to young animals, 
ie puppies, so that this is more of a reference to AGE and the behaviour of
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young animals than to dogs themselves. This idea seems to be strengthened by 
the fact that, although most strongly associated with dogs, whelp could be used 
more generally in reference to the young of various wild animals, and by the 
fifteenth century it was used to mean ‘children’ as well. The same 
phenomenon is found in Thornton’s data, and she makes the same point.
The fact that the animal name is applied to a young animal may be the reason why it
is used contemptuously of a person. Contempt is more easily shown for something
which is obviously inferior or insignificant in some way...and any young creature,
simply by virtue of being young, can be regarded as possessing both these qualities...
(Thornton 1988:447).
It should be pointed out that puppv-headed ai 1610 is not unproblematic. The 
quotation to support the mapping to STUPID is from Shakespeare’s The
Tempest; from the evidence available, including Shakespeare’s other uses of 
the term puppy and other compounds in which puppy is an element, this does 
seem to be related to ANIMAL and also specifically to AGE. However, the 
etymology of the term is confused and it is defined in several different ways in 
the OED, so that this is not the only possibility that might motivate the entry. 
The earliest meaning of puppy in English is “A small dog used as a lady’s pet 
or plaything; a toy dog” (OED), and this reflects the origins of the term, which 
is thought to have come from French poupee, meaning ‘doll’ and having 
various related senses. It is not implausible that this connotation of lack of 
practical value might affect the mapping, especially in light of another entry in 
the data, dollv n 1865-0922) which may be motivated in a very similar way. 
This also incorporates the idea of inanimate nature, which is represented in the 
data in the section ALIVE/ANIMATE.
The entry that stands out in the group because of its lack of similarity 
to others in the group is also the earliest in the ANIMAL data, and this is ape n 
cl33Q-1741. Obviously primates were never native to Britain, so although 
apes were relatively well known in theory and through hearsay, the 
metaphorical use of this term cannot result from familiarity of the kind that is 
possessed by farm or woodland animals. However, the OED definition for ape
seems to offer a clue to the motivation behind this transfer of meaning.
An animal of the monkey tribe (Simiadw); before the introduction of ‘monkey’ (16th
c.), the generic name, and still (since 1700) sometimes so used poetically or
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rhetorically, or when their uncouth resemblance to men and mimicry of human action 
is the main idea (due to reaction of the vb. ape upon the n. whence it was formed).
To ape something is to mimic it, coming from the idea that apes 
characteristically try to imitate humans. As this definition shows, although the 
verb was formed from the noun, in turn it had an important influence on its 
possible meaning. It seems likely that, although the ‘primate’ sense is at the 
root of the metaphor, it is this reflex sense that has had a more immediate 
bearing on its use as a metaphor for a stupid person.
There is also one entry that I have classified as ANIMAL-MAMMAL- 
BODY PART, soft-hom n 1837>. This sits a little uncomfortably in this 
group, and presumably its main motivation relates to its first element, which 
fits in with the other data in HARD/SOFT. Having said that, there are a 
number of entries that are compounds with one element that is a human body 
part, and considering the quantity of animal data this may not be particularly 
remarkable. There are several possibilities about the development of horn.
One possibility is that since it is located on an animal’s head, horn is simply 
used to signify the human head, paralleling the roughly similar use of cap (as 
in goose-cap n 1589-G8281). Although this is not found in the OED, there are 
three entries in BIRD that contain the element comb (discussed below) that 
might support this idea. Equally, it could be used like an elided form to mean 
‘a homed animal’, and in this case it is possible that the entry could be linked 
to AGE since young animals’ horns are relatively soft when they are very 
young.
3.4.2 BIRDS
Birds, like mammals, have always been a familiar and everyday part of 
life in this country; as with the other animals, it is natural that they should be 
drawn upon to denote intellectual prowess. Metaphor dictionaries testify to the 
huge number of bird metaphors that are found in current English, and there are 
many examples of anthropomorphized birds in culture, ranging from the 
characters in The Owl and the Nightingale and Chaucer’s Parliament of
Fowls, to more recent creations like cartoon characters Donald Duck and 
Tweety Pie. In line with the ANIMAL group as a whole, all but three of the
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entries in this section denote stupidity. This seems to be consistent with bird 
metaphors in general; Spence observes that “In the main, the associations with 
humans do not flatter birds, with a preponderance of terms evoking stupidity, 
eccentricity, cowardice, and ugliness: the vulture and the crow share more 
sinister auras” (Spence 2001:294). The only entry in this section from the 
general term bird is bird-brain n 1943>. This is negative, and it is interesting 
that the phrase (strictly) for the birds also reflects this generally negative 
connotation (the OED defines this phrase as “trivial, worthless; appealing only 
to gullible people”). The only other items in the data that are potentially 
species non-specific are four compounds ending with the element cock, which 
can be used to mean the male of any bird, but this can also mean specifically 
the male domestic fowl, which seems possible given that farm animals are 
common in expressions signifying STUPIDITY. It is perhaps surprising that 
there are so few entries in the data relating to general temis, given that ‘bird’ is 
a basic-level category and that the majority of the MAMMAL data is 
connected with categories of this kind. The most likely explanation for this is 
that although ‘bird’ is a basic-level category on one level, in terms of 
biological taxonomy it is at the superordinate level . Accordingly, different 
species of bird seem to have quite different associations, and can be mapped 
metaphorically for a divergent range of properties; by using a species name 
instead of a general term this extra ‘layer’ of associations can be exploited. 
Obviously, in this group of data there are few high-status birds, in line with the 
lack of CLEVERNESS entries.
There are various possible reasons why, predominantly, birds tend to 
be metaphorically associated with stupidity, and the entries in the group 
exhibit a number of parallels with other groups of the ANIMAL data. As with 
most of these, ‘herd mentality’ seems to be a key characteristic in the
23 This is evidenced by the study conducted by Rosch et al. (1976), in which the authors 
concluded that although they initially expected general use to reflect the biological taxonomy,
data suggested ihai this was noi the case. They suggest that species names of birds indicate
that at one time these were categories at the basic level, but that changing society, with its
general move towards urban lifestyle, has affected the level at which this category operates.
The same appears to have occurred in relation io fish.
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mapping24, and is especially relevant to some of the bird species that appear. 
Ten of the entries relate to geese, which have long been farmed in groups, and 
it is to this that Palmatier attributes their perceived stupidity.
Silly goose, or just plain goose, is a polite appellation for someone who has done or
said something foolish but is assumed to have knovm better. The goose has been
regarded as a stupid bird for centuries, perhaps because of its tendency to follow the
leader in a flock (Palmatier 1995:347).
Birds are also similar to many of the MAMMAL entries, as well as those in 
the FISH group, because they have a restricted role in relation to humans. 
Farmed birds are kept to produce eggs and to be killed for food; wild birds are 
caught for the latter reason. It is noticeable that birds that are kept for other 
reasons, such as those used in falconry, are not mapped for stupidity - 
presumably this is beeause the tasks that they carry out are perceived to be 
more ‘intelligent’, requiring more sophisticated behaviour. There is one bird of 
prey in the data, the buzzard, from which five entries are derived, and this 
seems to support this idea. Although buzzards are falcons, the OED notes that 
“The buzzard was an inferior kind of ' hawk, useless for falconry”, and 
attributes the conneetion with stupidity to this characteristic.
Several of the birds in the data are indigenous wild birds that are 
common in the UK, and their mapping to stupidity may be connected with 
this. There is another core concept group in the data, HUMBLE/ORDINARY, 
containing 14 entries derived from simple. In its earliest use this does not 
appear to be derogatory, or is at least unmarked, but like other words in the 
same semantic field such as common, ordinary and usual it has pejorated 
quickly to mean ‘inferior’. Something of the same semantie shift seems to 
underlie the entries connected with sparrows, and possibly other common 
birds including crows. Daw, an element in three entries, is the term for one of 
the small birds in the crow family; iav n 1884> was also used to mean 
‘jackdaw’, which later became the more common form of this word, and so it 
is possible that this fits into the same group. In the gospels, both sparrows and 
crows are used as examples of creatures of low worth, and specifically of
24 This is also alluded to in phrases like birds of a feather flock together.
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lower value than humans. In Matthew 10:29-31, Christ says the following 
about sparrows:
Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground
without your Father’s will... Fear not, therefore; you are of more value than many
sparrows.
Luke 12:24 contains a similar reference to birds (translated as ‘ravens’ in the
Revised Standard Version, but as ‘crows’ in some other editions of the Bible, 
eg the Good News Bible)'.
Consider the ravens: they neither sow nor reap, they have neither storehouse nor
bam, and yet God feeds them. Of how much more value are you than the birds!
One unusual feature of this group is the fact that there are two entries from 
sparrow with different meanings: the later of these is sparrow-brain ai 1930>. 
and this has the motivation discussed above and signifies STUPIDITY, but the 
other, earlier entry sparrow n 1861> signifies CLEVERNESS (specifically 
SHARPNESS). The OED entry for this meaning draws attention to the fact 
that this is associated with a particular group of people, and is commonly 
found in a collocation: “A chirpy, quick-witted person; used spec, of a 
Londoner, in cockney sparrow, etc.”. There are various factors that might be 
considered to explain the way in which sparrow appears on both sides of the 
data. The first important point about this concerns the forms of each of the 
lexical items. The expression used with reference to STUPIDITY is a 
compound with the element brain, and like many other entries, the use of this 
element seems to make the particular respect in which a stupid person is 
similar to a sparrow explicit; rather than having an appropriate human brain, 
the lack of intelligence is explained by the presence of an inappropriate, non­
human brain with lesser capability. As well as this, it is significant that the 
other item has a restricted usage, with a narrow range of reference. 
Presumably this is much more culturally informed: it is conneeted with a 
particular place, London, and depends on the fact that in the UK sparrows can 
be found in this city, and must adapt to survive in that environment by 
becoming resourceful in a way that they would not be in the countryside. This 
seems to be the characteristic that is referred to in the OED definition. Without 
this very specific association, it seems less likely that the two sparrow terms 
could co-exist, but as it is they have quite different areas of application.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
139
Perhaps the most surprising entry amongst those denoting STUPIDITY 
is dove n 1771. In general, doves are regarded as high status birds with 
positive associations; in the Old Testament book of Genesis, the dove becomes 
a symbol of hope when Noah uses it to find out whether the Great Flood has 
subsided (Genesis 8:8-12), and in modem times, through the influence of the 
Bible, the dove has beeome a common symbol for peace. Spence discusses the 
way in whieh this has influenced lexis:
In spite of the importance of the dove as a symbol of peace, it has not featured very
much in associations, other than ihe recent lexicalizations of the terms for ‘dove’ and
‘hawk’ (or, more frequently, ‘falcon’) to denote, on the one hand, pacifically inclined
leaders, and on ihe other, those who adopt an aggressive stance: dove ~ hawk,
colombe ~ faucon, Taube ~ Habicht, paloma ~ halcon, colomba ~ falco. As far from
gentle birds, the hawk and the falcon provide an obvious contrast (Spence 2001:294).
The use of dove to mean ‘stupid person’ seems to me to be indirectly linked to 
these comments. Related to the association of doves with peace, the OED
definition of dove includes the fact that “The dove has been, from the 
institution of Christianity, the type of gentleness and harmlessness”. This can 
also include the idea of innocence, which is another meaning listed in the OED
(alongside its use as a term of affection, especially for women). The term 
innocent itself extends semantically to mean ‘stupid’, and silly (labelled 
HAPPINESS>INNCCENCE in the database) goes through a similar stage 
before shifting to its current sense; it looks likely that this particular use of 
dove can also be understood with reference to the same semantic development. 
It is noticeable that there is only a single supporting quotation for this meaning 
in the OED, and in all probability this is because the generally positive 
connotations of the dove are stronger and have ‘overridden’ this meaning.
One entry that might be influenced by folk etymology is as crazy as a 
loon ai 1845>. According to the OED, loon in ‘as crazy as a loon’ is said to 
come from the bird meaning, but ‘loon’ has also been used to mean ‘worthless 
person’ etc, having come through a different etymological route. In practice, it 
is not unlikely that both meanings may have informed the connection with 
stupidity, even if one of these is the sole source of the expression.
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Aside from sparrow n 1861>, discussed above, there are two other 
entries that denote cleverness, and these are owl n 1508> and eagle-wit n 
1665. The first of these is not actually used in a positive way; the OED gives 
the following definition:
Applied to a pecidn in allusidn...to appearance of gravity and wisdom (often with
implication of underlying itueidity), etc. Hence = wiseacre, solemn dullard.
In Erasmus, the following adage featuring both an eagle and an owl is listed, 
and the explanation supplied for this seems to give a clue to why owl n 1508 is 
derogatory.
^4^ yXcvuKi, ovyKpiveis, You match eagle and owl... The eagle has exceptionally
keen sight, so much so that it can gaze straight at the sun without winking; and some
aver that the bird uses this as a test to decide whether its offspring are legitimate or
not. The owl, on the other hand, shuns the sun’s light by every means in its power
(Mynors 1989:190).
Owls are nocturnal animals, and their daytime vision is very poor despite their 
large eyes. As the SENSES data shows, VISION is closely connected with 
INTELLIGENCE; the fact that owls have large eyes means that outwardly 
they appear to be clever, but in fact this is not true. This may be the reason that 
owl can be extended to mean a person who appears or believes themself to be 
wise, but who is actually lacking in intelligence. The only entry that represents 
an unqualified positive metaphor for an intelligent person is eagle-wit n 1665. 
Eagles have long been regarded very positively in western culture, and this is 
home out in Aesop as well as Erasmus. In a number of the fables, the eagle are 
portrayed as the strongest and most powerful bird, recognised to be superior 
by other animals. In classical mythology, the eagle is the favourite bird of the 
Jupiter, the king of the gods, and in modem times it has been used in the 
names and logos of a huge number of groups and products, including boy 
scouts, cars, communications companies and sports associations, as well as by 
America itself as a symbol of freedom. The positive connotations evoked by 
eagle are not found only in English.
The eagle, an even more redoubtable bird of prey than the hawk and the falcon.. .has
long enjoyed favourable associations as a symbol of strength and power. Rather
curiously, it is intelligence rather than strength that has been highlighted in
expressions like ce n 'estpas un aigle, meaning ‘he’s not very bright’; sera un aguila,
‘he’s no genius’. English and German do not seem to have direct identifications of
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humans with eagles, and expressions like eagle-eyed relate to the bird’s sight, not to 
its strength or intelligence (Spence 2001:924).
Because of its consistently positive associations, it is surprising that there are 
no other entries that have eagle as a source. However, it may be that it is not 
associated with intelligence so much as with other positive qualities of 
character, and often as a very general shorthand for the positive. In compound 
with wit it is successful as a modifier, but on its own it is not clearly linked to 
cleverness. If this association were more conventional, it seems likely that 
there would be other linguistic items to evidence this. Spence’s comments 
above support this, and suggest that English (as well as German) contrasts 
with French in this respect.
Paralleling the entry in MAMMAL discussed above, there are three 
entries in this group that I have categorised as BIRD BODY PART, and these 
all contain the element comb, as in cock’s comb, the crest on the head of a 
cock. The earliest of these entries is coxcomb n 1577-1604. and this has 
undergone an intermediate semantic stage (as well as changing spelling) 
before mapping to STUPIDITY. It is this stage that seems to make clear the 
motivation for this particular mapping, and by analogy this may also explain 
the use of comb in other compounds signifying STUPIDITY (the OED makes 
this connection for duncecomb n 1630 but not for nodeecomb n 1593-1596). 
In the sixteenth century the coloured cap that became part of the standard 
costume worn by professional fools was known as a coxcomb, and this 
association explains the indirect link with fools in general and with 
STUPIDITY.
3.4.3 INSECTS
The final two groups, INSECT and BIRD, have far fewer entries than 
those discussed above, fitting in with Thornton’s findings and perhaps with the 
idea that animals further from man in the Great Chain may be less suitable as 
source fields. Intuitively, there do seem to be a good number of INSECT 
metaphors for humans, though many of these seem to be generally derogatory 
labels expressing disapprobation or disgust. Terms like worm, maggot, louse,
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grub and slu^5 can be used to describe individuals regarded with contempt, 
and at its most basic level these may simply imply that these individuals are a 
Tower’ form of life than humanity, as with general terms like animal and 
beast. One reason for this, and one that might account in part for the attitude 
of contempt that is often displayed towards insects (or at least for the 
rationalisation of this attitude) is suggested by one of the Fables, The Bees and
the Beetles.
Once upon a time, the bees invited the beetles to dinner. The beetles arrived, and
when dinner was served ihe bees offered the beetles some honey and honeycomb.
The beetles barely ate anything and then flew away. Next the beetles invited the bees,
and when dinner was served, they offered the bees a plate full of dung. The bees
wouldn’t eat even a single bite and instead they flew straight back home (Gibbs
2002:187).
In Erasmus there is evidence that in Greek the term for beetle was also used of 
people in a derogatory way (Mynors 1992:131), and the explanation for one of 
the adages makes the same connection with unclean food:
Alp , alpe pLCL^av (Ls rdxicora KavOaptp, A dung-cakc, quick quick for the dung-
beetle... It may be used whenever filthy food is set before an unclean guest
(ibid: 130).
This suggests that part of the idea that insects are a Tower’ form of life may be 
their eating habits, and this is a certainly a common taboo in many cultures.
One important feature of all insects in relation to humans is size, and 
this may be relevant here. SIZE is an asymmetrical core category group in the 
data, since both LARGE and SMALL can be mapped to stupidity with 
particular motivations. Largeness and bulkiness can be associated with 
clumsiness and lack of speed, so that it is negative and denotes stupidity, but 
equally smallness or slightness can be mapped to lack of importance and 
inferiority and carry a negative sense. Given that many of the entries in this 
group are compounds with HEAD or BRAIN words, SIZE here is directly 
linked with the physical size of the mind, and, in line with the MIND AS A 
CONTAINER metaphor, smallness indicates lack of mental capacity. This 
seems particularly relevant to the NIT group, since nit usually refers to the egg
25 The etymology of this term is discussed below.
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of a louse or similar animal (although it can also mean the young of the 
insect), and this is well known for its tiny size and the difficulty this creates 
for its detection. It is also interesting that the original mapping for the 
BEETLE words, discussed below, may be connected with either SMALL or 
LARGE - either of these is convincing, and can function successfully.
In the case of the SNAIL words, another of the core categories is 
significant. As phrases like snail' pace or snail-paced, snail-slow and snail­
like attest, the snail has long been viewed as characteristically slow; in the 
OED entry one definition is “Used with reference or allusion to the 
exceptionally slow motion of the snail”, and from the evidence listed this dates 
back as far as alOOO. SPEED is central to the way intelligence is 
conceptualised, even though the core category group in the data is relatively 
small at fifteen entries. Unlike SIZE, as a source concept SPEED is 
symmetrical, and slowness is always equated with stupidity.
As described earlier in section 3.2.3, there is a high level of repetition 
of forms within this group. Twelve of the fourteen entries relate to BEETLE, 
SNAIL and NIT, and the other two are from dor. As well as this, eight entries 
in the group (including seven of these) are formed with a HEAD/BRAIN 
element , and as with many of the entries in the ANIMAL group this may be 
a more direct way of indicating that the connection that is being made between 
insects and humans is specifically concerned with mental abilities. It may be 
that, as in the case of eaele-wit n 1665 (discussed above) there is not a strong 
conventionalised link between INSECT and intelligence, so that in most cases 
the insect name is used as a modifier for another element which is specifically 
connected with the intellect.
From the information given in the OED, dor, which yields dorhead n 
1577 and dor n 1599. has a less specific meaning than the other insect terms in 
the data, and is used generally in reference to flying insects (including.
26 One more entry, hoddvpeakn 1500-1589, may also relate indirectly to the head, since the 
sense of peak seems most likely to be that of a garment worn on the head. Like cap, which
appears in several other compounded entries, this may simply have transferred to mean ‘head’.
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variously, bees, hornets, flies and beetles). The relevant characteristic involved 
in the mapping seems to be the noise these insects make when flying, and this 
would fit with some of the entries in the core concept group SOUND such as 
dunderwhelp n 1621-al625, the first element of which appears to be an 
onomatopoeic nonsense word. These seem to share the motivation of the core 
category group SPEECH (discussed briefly in chapter 2), and this is the idea 
that a person’s intelligence correlates with their ability to speak, or to speak 
clearly or sensibly. By this token, a person who simply makes unintelligible 
noise that sounds like the drone of an insect is held to be stupid. For the entry 
dorhead n 1577, the OED also suggests that there is a parallel with beetle that 
may influence the formation.
There are two groups of entries, each with a common element, for 
which OED suggests a more likely etymology, and these are the entries from 
beetle and nit. Five entries have BEETLE as a source: three of these are 
compounds with a HEAD/BRAIN element, and one is the phrase deaf/dumb 
as a beetle ai 1566>. The OED does make reference to the parallel meaning 
‘insect’ in the entries for these items, but etymologically it links them to the 
other meaning of beetle, which is defined as having the following earliest 
meaning:
1. An implement consisting of a heavy weight or ‘head,’ usually of wood, with a
handle or stock, used for driving wedges or pegs, ramming down paving stones, or
for crushing, bruising, beating, flattening, or smoothing, in various industrial and
domestic operations, and having various shapes according to the purpose for which it
is used; a mall, three-man beetle: one that requires three men to lift it, used in
ramming paving-stones, etc.
This would align these entries with those derived from hammer (discussed in 
section 3.4.1.2) and possibly link them with the WOOD data rather than with 
the INSECT group. There is a similar problem with nitwit ai 1922>, nitwit n 
1922> and nitwitted 1931>. Though the OED does not make any definite 
claim about the etymology of these terms, it suggests that they may ultimately 
derive from nix, which has itself come into English from “colloquial Du. and 
G. nix, for (nichs) nichts”, meaning ‘nothing’ or ‘no’; in other words, if this is 
correct then these entries are similar to many in the core category
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COMPLETION, which contains entries such as lackwit n 1667> which 
suggest either a lack or entire absence of mind or mental facility.
Although it is less dubious in terms of its connection with 
INTELLIGENCE, the etymology of the root of the SNAIL entries is also 
somewhat indistinct. According to the OED, hoddy came to mean ‘snail shell’ 
after it became part of a compound, hoddy-dod, and was influenced by the 
meaning of the other element. Its meaning appears to have drifted after this.
The element dod is evidently the same as in DODMAN a shell-snail; hoddy-
dod, hoddy-doddy, hodman-dod, are perhaps in origin nursery reduplications; 
but the element hoddy- appears itself to have come to be associated with or to 
mean ‘snail’ (or ? homed), as in several words that follow.
As all of the above information indicates, the evidence for this group is 
problematic, and it may be that the connection between INSECT and 
INTELLIGENCE owes much to folk etymology. For most of the entries in 
this group, the etymological information supplied by the OED is suggested 
tentatively, since there is more than one homonymous form that might account 
for the transferred INTELLIGENCE sense. The INSECT entries fit in to four 
groups: entries derived from beetle, from hoddy (which is associated with the 
snail), from nit, and from dor. With the exception of the SNAIL group, which 
is discussed below, for each of the INSECT entries another etymological root 
is proposed by the OED as the more likely origin of the STUPID sense of the 
item. However, the connection with INSECT is also supplied, and this is an 
indication that folk etymology is likely to have been an influence, even though 
it makes an erroneous assumption. A further piece of evidence for this can be 
found in an entry that has not been included in the INSECT group, but which 
is found elsewhere in the data. Sluggard ai cl450> is in the core category 
group SPEED; according to the OED, the earliest sense of the term is “One 
who is naturally or habitually slow, lazy, or idle; one who is disinclined for 
work or exertion of any kind; a slothful or indolent person”. The earliest 
quotation to support slug as a noun dates to cl425, and the definition listed for 
this is “A slow, lazy fellow; a sluggard. fAlso personified, slothftilness”. 
These terms seem to be derived from a Scandinavian root, which cognates
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suggest meant something like ‘slow’ or ‘sluggish’. Slug meaning ‘gastropod’ 
comes from this, but the term does not appear until significantly later, in 1704. 
Despite this, an informal investigation into the folk etymology of sluggish 
indicates that, for most people, the meaning ‘gastropod’ is assumed to be the 
earliest, and other senses relating to slowness or laziness must be transferred 
metaphorically from this. It seems likely that the psychological credibility of 
this kind of connection between INSECT and human abilities is not new. Even 
for the obsolete BEETLE words, the homonymous INSECT meaning may 
have affected speakers’ perception of the concept, despite the fact that this is 
an etymologically false relationship. By the seventeenth century, when the 
beetle group is first attested with a connection to INTELLIGENCE, animal 
metaphors were common, and as the OED proposes, it seems short-sighted to 
discount the possibility that speakers may have made this connection. For this 
reason I have presented this data in a group, whilst attempting to be clear 
about other possibilities of source field.
3.4.4 FISH
This is the smallest group in ANIMAL, and my impression is that this 
is in line with the overall balance in animal-related vocabulary in English. 
Spence, whose observations are based on the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, describes around six fish metaphors and then comments that 
“Unlike French, English is otherwise not rich in fish associations” (Spence 
2001:926). All of the entries in this group signify stupidity, and in general it 
would seem that fish carry negative connotations when associated with 
humans. The OED describes the usage of fish to mean ‘person’ as 
“unceremonious”, whilst Brewer’s Concise Dictionary of Phrase and Fable
observes that “Fish as applied to a human being is mildly derogatory” 
(Kirkpatrick 1992:388).
It seems probable that this generally negative implication, and 
specifically the association of fish with stupidity, again relates mainly to the 
Great Chain, since fish are considered to be a fairly ‘low’ life form that is 
further down the scale of beings than mammals. However, there are other
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factors worth considering, and these offer parallels with other groups in the 
data. Like most of the other animals functioning as sources, fish tend to be 
found in groups; in one Latin bestiary from the twelfth century, the author 
refers to this to explain the etymology of their name, commenting that “Fish 
(pisces), like cattle (pecus), get their name because they browse in flocks (a 
pascendo)” (White 1954:195). Again, as with the farmyard animals, this may 
be interpreted as demonstrating lack of independent thought. Even more 
important than this, until very recently when they have been kept for 
ornamental purposes, fish have always been utilised solely for food, and this 
means they do not tend to be thought of as sentient beings. This is home out 
by the way they are portrayed in literature, for example in the Fables. Fish do 
not appear in many of these, and where they do feature they tend to be drawn 
as passive creatures that are aware and accepting of their fate. Fable 190 is a 
rare example of a fable in which fish are the protagonists, and tells the story of 
two fish, one saltwater and the other freshwater. The freshwater fish boasts 
that he has more prestige, and the saltwater fish retorts by saying that, if they 
are both caught, “I will be able to prove to you just who is more highly 
regarded by the crowd of onlookers; you will see that I am bought by the 
connoisseur at a very high price indeed, while you will be sold to an 
undiscriminating commoner for a mere penny or two!” ” (Gibbs 2002:97).
Another possibility is the fact that, unlike any of the other animals 
except the INSECT group, fish are unable to make any vocal sound. One of 
the proverbs listed and discussed by Erasmus is Magis mutus quam pisces, ‘As 
dumb as the fishes’, and in his description of the reasoning behind this he 
presents a relatively lengthy commentary citing the beliefs of Pliny, Aristotle 
and several other Greek scholars and writers on why fish are unable to 
produce sounds. Although the proverb appears to be associated more with 
inarticulacy than stupidity, his comments about its usage suggest that it can 
also connote a lack of mental efficacy.
’Ajjwvorepos ro)v ixOvcuv, As dumb as the very fishes; a proverbial metaphor about
quite inarticulate people, who have no gift of speech. It will also suit a man of
extraordinary taciturnity. Horace in the Odes: ‘Thou that couldst lend the swan’s
song to dumb fish / If it pleased thee.’ For fish make no sound, except for a very few,
  
 
 
148
among them the dog-fish. Lucian Against An Ignoramus: ‘Truly you are as dumb as a
fish.’ Again in Gallus: ‘I shall be much more silent than fish.’...their silence [is] a
thing peculiar to fish among all living creatures. All ihe rest have their own voices...
Fish alone have no voice (Phillips & Mynors 1982:408-9).
Most of the entries in the group relate to varieties of fish that are well 
known as food, cod (three entries) and mullet (three entries). One of the mullet
entries is the adjective phrase like a stunned mullet 1953>. referring to the 
way that fish are knocked on the head after they have been caught to stop them 
moving. This correlates with the core category group HIT/STUN, as well as 
relating to the ALIVE/ANIMATE data. Loaches and smelts (with one entry 
each) were also eaten, and are both small fish, which also seems particularly 
important in their mapping to stupidity. As discussed above in section 3.4.1.3, 
smallness is generally associated with low status; there are parallel phrases 
like small fry which allude to lack of importance or inferiority.
There is one entry in the data that stands out because unlike all the 
other items it does not relate to the edible, and this is gubbins n 1916>. The 
OED defines this as “Fragments, esp. of fish; fish-parings. In later use (also 
const, sing.), trash; anything of little value; a gadget, thingummy”. Although 
this is unlike the other entries, it seems reasonable to assume that it is 
motivated by the idea of worthlessness and lack of value. As well as this, one 
of the most curious entries in the data is the noun phrase cod’s head and 
shoulders 1886. Although there are a huge number of other head compounds 
in the data, there is no comparable entry with shoulder as an element. This 
perhaps accounts for the non-survival of this term, but the reason for its 
emergence is entirely unclear.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to give some impression of the 
complexity of some types of metaphorical mapping, and the subtlety that can 
be involved when both cognitive and cultural factors are taken into account.
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Although the information that I have presented is not by any means 
comprehensive, I hope to have sketched many of the issues that should be 
considered in any attempt to give a full account of a given metaphor. The 
ANIMAL group is one that is not generally viewed as presenting any 
particular problems, and yet it offers an excellent example of the widely 
varying processes and mechanisms that influence transference of meaning 
from one domain to another. One recent theory that seems especially helpful 
in the way it deals with this range of influences is Blending Theory, proposed 
recently by Fauconnier & Turner (discussed briefly in section 1.1). A full 
account of the theory, and the way in which it offers a helpful framework for 
some of the INTELLIGENCE data, is given in the following chapter on 
DENSITY.
One area that I have touched on in this chapter has been the similarities 
in animal metaphors cross-culturally. My own enquiries suggest that there are 
a number of relatively small-scale projects comparing a few languages (though 
some of these, like the study by Hseih cited in this chapter, deal with large 
quantities of data) but as yet no study with a more comprehensive approach 
has been attempted. In my opinion this would be an interesting and valuable 
line of research. Although it would be a particularly difficult and challenging 
undertaking, it would be possible if the various analyses that exist could be 
linked and expanded, and this would have the advantage of involving a high 
number of native speakers of different languages whose intuitions would be 
crucial for the accuracy of the research.
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4 DENSITY
4.1 Introduction
The final group of INTELLIGENCE data I will examine is made up of 
entries related to DENSITY, ie the property of having physically close texture. 
This is a notably different kind of source concept from the other two large 
groups that have been presented here, and in the context of the other data, it 
appears to be a much more specific and narrow concept than either of these. 
The SENSES are integrally bound up with the mental, whereas DENSITY 
seems intuitively to be much more marginal in the way INTELLIGENCE is 
understood. On the other hand, ANIMALS are metaphorically related to 
humans in a relatively predictable and systematic way, not only to express 
INTELLIGENCE. By contrast, in general there is no acknowledged habitual 
mapping between physical textures and human characteristics that is 
comparable with this ANIMAL mapping.
Correspondingly, DENSITY as a source concept has received little 
attention from any area of language study; in fact, its metaphorical link with 
intelligence only seems to have been picked up in a single isolated account (in 
an article that provided the initial impetus for the present study). This gives a 
preliminary description of the evidence and motivation for the mapping.
...to express the abstract idea of stupidity in Modem English, we consistently draw
on the more tangible domain of texture, that is the texture of material objects: we talk
about a head made of concrete, impenetrable stupidity (which nothing can pierce
through); we refer to a person as being thick, dense, cloth-headed, wooden-headed, or
even, in the vernacular, as thick as two short planks., .the metaphor can be expressed
as a proposition...: Stupidity is close texture (Kay 2000:277).
The lack of attention to the DENSITY metaphor elsewhere is a surprising 
oversight. From the data presented here, it appears to have been a relatively 
important conceptual source for several centuries, accounting for a good 
number of expressions. My impression is that even though it may not be at the 
core of the way INTELLIGENCE is conceptualised to the same extent as the 
SENSES or ANIMALS, it is still highly productive as a means to metaphorize
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stupidity. This is evidenced by the appearance of recent expressions like thick
as shit or Scots thick as mince (discussed further below).
It may be that one reason for the omission of research into the mapping 
is that the DENSITY group represents a particular kind of metaphor, and one 
that does not sit well against that background of metaphor research conducted 
in the past. Early enquiries into metaphor, within philosophy and later literary 
criticism, dealt mainly with creative and novel metaphor found in literature 
and fairly high-register genres. Neither afforded much attention to low-register 
colloquial language, and it is with this kind of language that the DENSITY 
group is associated. 21 entries (around 24%) in the group are labelled either 
slang, colloquial or dialectal, based on the somewhat erratic labelling in OED.
Without examining each of the quotations for each entry it is difficult to 
ascertain whether this figure is accurate, but it may be meaningful that more 
than half of the entries in the group, 50 entries, share some etymological 
history with these 21 \ Although I would not argue that this figure is a precise 
reflection of the number of entries that should be identified with low-register 
or spoken language, it does indicate that in this case OED labelling may not be 
consistent or comprehensive.
Within the Lakoffian tradition and cognitive linguistics, there has been 
more work on spoken language and slang. At the same time, though, the bulk 
of attention has been concentrated on a fairly limited set of metaphors, which 
can be clearly shown to be motivated cognitively and experientially, and 
which are conceptual in that they underlie the way a whole concept is 
structured. This has allowed room for the thorough investigation and 
deconstruction of particular mappings in a way that was not previously 
attempted, and to a large extent the approach has demystified the mapping 
process by endeavouring to root it in real human experience. However, 
conversely it has drawn attention away from metaphors that are more
1 To gain this information I ran a query in the database, specifying any of the same relevant 
derivation words in the ‘derivation’ field. For example, one of the entries that is labelled slang
is grout-headed ai 1578-1694+1847/78; a query using grout in the ‘derivation’ field finds a
further two entries with this element.
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culturally conditioned, and which affect conceptualisation in a smaller scale. I 
would contend that the DENSITY group reflects a metaphor of this kind, and 
it is for this reason that it has been largely ignored.
4.2 Oata
The interesting thing about the DENSITY group is that the source 
concepts from which individual entries derive are unexpectedly specific, and 
there are a very limited number of these. I have identified three broad groups 
by source, WOOD, EARTH and FOOD, and around 70% of the entries are 
connected with one of these (possible reasons for this are discussed below). 
There is no particular bias towards either nouns or adjectives within the group.
All of the entries in this group signify stupidity; there are no 
expressions at all in the data that are related to cleverness, including negated 
compounds , and correspondingly, every one of the entries are related to close 
texture as opposed to loose texture. As well as this, there does not seem to be a 
binary and symmetrical opposition between dense meaning stupid and non­
dense meaning clever, as there is in many of the other source concepts relating 
to properties, including STRENGTH/WEAKNESS, HEALTH, 
COMPLETION and SPEED. Part of the reason for this may be that it simply 
is not a symmetrical concept; there is no single word that is commonly used to 
express the opposite of density without introducing another seme3, and this 
may indicate that there is no central antonymous concept. There are a very few 
words in the data that might arguably be associated with loose texture; the 
most straightforward of these is Scots and dialectal fozv ai 1894> defined in 
the OED as ‘spongy, loose-textured’ (and classified as LOOSE TEXTURE), 
but like the DENSITY entries this also signifies stupidity. * 2
2 The opposite situation can be found in, for example, the SENSES group, where a number of 
entries are formed from lexical roots found elsewhere in the group with a negative prefix.
2 Roget’s Thesaurus places density next to rarity, but as the OED points out, this is usually 
associated with air. In addition, its use is not widespread or common.
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4.2.1 General Terms
There are surprisingly few general terms within the data. Of the total of 
89 entries in the group, only eighteen are derived from general terms, all of 
which are adjectives meaning ‘dense’. Almost all of these, fourteen of the 
entries, are variants of thick (mainly in compounds), and of the remaining 
entries two are from gross and a single entry each derive from dense and
crass.
One of the entries in this section is also listed under WOOD/TREE, 
and deserves comment. This is the simile as thick as two planks ai 1974>. My 
own intuition and the comments of others suggest that the formula as thick as - 
is common and still highly productive, demonstrating the continued use of the 
DENSITY mapping. Some of the current conventional phrases that have been 
drawn to my attention are thick as a brick, thick as (pig/dog) shit, Scots thick
as mince, and Irish thick as a ditch\ a number of occasional uses have also 
been recorded. The first OED quotation supporting thick ai 1597>. from 
Shakespeare’s The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth, is a simile of this 
form: the character Falstaff says “...his Wit is as thicke as Tewksburie 
Mustard” (line 262). Partridge lists a much more recent example, thick as a
docker’s sandwich, from a 1973 Morecambe and Wise Show (Partridge 
1984:1219), and Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable lists as thick as a
doorpost. This continuing productivity seems to me to be further evidence that 
the phrase ‘dead metaphor’ is not appropriate, since it calls into question the 
assumption that highly conventional metaphors like this have simply become 
new linguistic forms and no longer have associations with the original, source 
concept. It does not seem possible to prove that terms like this, with image- 
based origins, still call up mental images of physical entities for speakers, but 
given that new and original phrases with the same motivation can be coined, it 
seems unhelpful to dismiss this possibility entirely. As Richards points out, 
“.. .however stone dead such metaphors seem, we can easily wake them up...” 
(Richards 1936:101). As well as this, it lends credence to the idea that in
4 www.c_ichesitecom, accessed 3rd February 2003.
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certain cases simile can be one stage in the process cf linguistic 
metaphcrizaticc (discussed below in section 4.4.3).
4.D.D WOOD
There are 34 entries in the WOOD group, and most of these derive 
from a small number of roots. Seven entries, five of them compounds with a 
HOAD element, are from block, and a further six are from log (four of these 
are more specifically from the later logger5}, again, in all but one of these 
head is the second element of the item. There are also five entries that derive 
from wood. The remaining sixteen entries have a range of roots, and apart 
from two entries that contain a general term for wood, timber-headed ai 1666 
and timber-head n 1849. all of these derive from terms for pieces of wood. 
One entry, as thick as ftwoi plankfsi ai 1974> is exceptional in this group 
since it is not from a term specifically denoting a large chunk of wood. Of the 
others, two entries each derive from stock, stub6, chuckle, nog and chump. The 
remaining items are hulver-head ai a!700, stump n 1825>— and the curious 
phrase as sad as any mallet aj 1645.
5 According to the OED, this developed as “app. a word invented as expressing by its sound 
the notion of something heavy and clumsy”, in a parallel way to log, though it does not say
that it is a direct descendant of this. As well as this, contrary to the intuitions of a number of
people with whom 1 have discussed the DENSITY data, the expression loggerhead is attested
earlier with the meaning ‘a stupid person’ than to refer to any kind of blunt instrument. It
therefore seems unlikely to have been motivated by the idea of a blunt instrument knocking
against something clumsily as in the phrase at loggerheads (cf. the ram entries in the SHEEP
category, discussed in the previous chapter), although it may subsequently have been
influenced by this.
6 One of these is stob n 1825: the OED suggests that this is “partly a variant (sometimes 
merely graphic), partly a cognate, of STUB”.
’ This is slightly more complex etymologically. The earliest attested example refers to the part 
of the body left after a limb is amputated, and a cognate adjective in Middle Dutch is defined
in the OED as “mutilated, blunt, dull”; the meaning connected with wood is attested a little
later. There are a number of other entries that are connected with body parts in the
INTELLIGENCE data, but none of these seem to be comparable and therefore 1 have not
judged this other element of the meaning to be relevant. 1 have placed the entry in the category
WOOD because it appears more likely to be primarily motivated by this later meaning in the
context of the rest of the group, and 1 have also included the label LEFTOVER in the core
category database field.
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4.2.3 EARTH
The twelve entries in this group are derived from only three roots, and 
again these are predominantly in compounds with a HEAD element. Six items 
are derived from clod, and one of these, clod-skull n 1707 is one of only six 
entries in the INTELLIGENCE data with the element skull for HEAD. There 
are five entries from mud, and the final entry in the group is turf n 1607.
4.2.4 FOOO
This is the second largest group in DENSITY, and the sixteen entries 
are mainly related either to meat substances or course-textured grain-type 
substances. Of the MEAT entries, which total eight, two derive from meat
itself, four from beef, and two from mutton. There are also two other entries 
that do not come from meat but are from a substance closely linked to this 
subgroup, and these are suet-brained ai 1921> and suet-headed ai 1937>-. The 
entries in the group I have labelled GRAIN are all from two roots: three 
entries have grout as a root, and two are derived from pudding (which is likely 
to be from the older sense of a dish made from a mixture of ingredients, with a 
gritty texture).
4.2.5 Miscellaneous
This group contains nine entries, although two of these are similar to 
entries in other DENSITY groups. Clav-brained ai 1596 seems fairly closely 
aligned to the EARTH entries, and similarly knuckle-head n 1944> may not be 
unconnected with the MEAT entries, since it may relate to knuckle as a food 
substance used as the basis of soup etc. Of the other entries, two derive from 
bone and another from ivory, there are also two entries from stone (one of 
them from a variant form, stunpoll n al794>L and the final two entries in the 
group derive from leather-.
8 There are other entries that might also belong to this group, although I have not categorised 
them as such, which are from fat; it is unclear whether these are more closely linked to fat as
an edible substance, as suet tends to be, or whether they come from the idea of fat as a part of
the body, as I am inclined to assume.
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4.3 Dates
As with the ANIMAL group, there are no entries dating to pre-1500, 
and this corresponds to the lack of early STUPIDITY words in the data as a 
whole, as well as to the balance of data in the Thesaurus of Old English, in 
which the opposite is true and there are far more entries relating to cleverness 
than stupidity. There are a total of 226 entries in the INTELLIGENCE data for 
which the earliest recorded example is dated to pre-1500 (including those 
dated al5OO, hut not 1500 or cl500), compared with 849 entries dates 1500 
and later. Within these two time periods, the balance between STUPID and 
CLEVER entries is quite different: pre-1500, there are 73 signifying 
STUPIDITY (sixteen relating to vision) and 153 CLEVERNESS; from 1500 
onwards, there are 575 and 274 respectively. As I have discussed in section 
3.3, although there are no early ANIMAL entries there was already a well- 
established tradition of animal-human thought that made animals an available 
source concept for the indication of intelligence (and lack of intelligence). For 
the DENSITY group, it seems far more difficult to determine whether the 
conceptual link between texture and intelligence had already been widely 
made by the time there is written evidence of the metaphor. However, it does 
not seem unlikely that the primary metaphors that underlie the DENSITY 
mapping were already core to early conceptualisation of the intellect. For 
example, it is uncontroversial to suggest that the MIND AS CONTAINER 
metaphor was well-established in Old English, where it is common to talk 
about things being ‘in’ mind, and in fact one entry in the data attests this: idel 
ai OE also means ‘empty’. A number of cognates suggest that this is the 
earliest sense of the root (see the OED entry for idle). This would indicate that 
even if DENSITY was not commonly associated with stupidity, the building 
blocks for this link were in place.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167
4.4 Motivation
The motivation for the DENSITY mapping is not immediately 
obvious, but I would suggest that these are the product of the complex 
interaction of a number of processes that are variously cognitive, cultural and 
intra-linguistic. The group has parallels with the ANIMAL group in its gestalt­
like nature, but the specific ‘reasoning’ that lies behind the metaphor is quite 
different from this conceptually.
In their work on blending theory, Fauconnier & Turner discuss the 
metaphorical sentence He digested the book. The way in which they analyse 
this gives an important insight into the way certain metaphors can be 
grounded, and this is integral to the way in which the DENSITY mapping is 
motivated.
A fundamental motivating factor of blending is the integration of several events into
a single unit... Even metaphoric mappings that ostensibly look most as if they depend
entirely on the construction of metaphoric counterparts can have integration of events
as a principal motivation and product. “He digested the book” of course has
metaphoric counterparts, such as food and book, but it also projects an integration of
events. In the source, digesting already constitutes an integration of a number of
different events. But its counterpart in the target is, independent of the metaphor, a
series of discrete events - taking up the book, reading it, parsing its individual
sentences, finishing it, thinking about it, understanding it as a whole, and so on. The
integrity in the source is projected to the blend so that this array of events in the
target acquires a conceptual integration of its events into a unit. On one hand, the
metaphor blends conceptual counterparts in the two spaces - eating and reading. On
the other hand, the metaphor helps us to integrate some distinct event sequences in
the space of reading.
The blend exploits the integrity of events already present in the space of eating, and
exports that integrity of events to the target space of reading. In the “digesting”
metaphor, we export the integrity in the blend to induce an integrity of events in the
target (picking up book, reading lines, finishing book, thinking about it, etc.)
(Fauconnier & Turner 1998:158).
This makes an important distinction between the metaphor at its simplest level 
- in which the source concept is mapped to a second, target concept - and the 
projected source ‘process’ that provides a basic motivation for this mapping.
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In a similar way to that described here by Fauconnier & Turner for the 
metaphor “He digested a book”, the mapping has two metaphoric 
‘counterparts’: these are a dense substance and intelligence (or rather, 
stupidity). But the motivation for the metaphor is rooted in “an integration of a 
number of different events” - it is based on an image, and works almost like a 
narrative. As the high number of compounds formed with HEAD/BRAIN 
words indicates, the DENSITY mapping is derived from the idea of the 
compositionality of the mind, seen as a physical part of the body. The basic 
idea is presumably that if something is dense in its physical texture, it will be 
difficult to penetrate, so if a person’s mind is dense, ideas and knowledge 
cannot easily get in or through. A number of common phrases have the same 
basis: it is natural and conventional to talk about getting something through
one’s head or skull, or to say that an idea or theory won ' go in. Important to 
this conceptualisation is the idea of impediment to motion, since the density of 
the mind prevents the passage of ideas, and metaphorically this can also cause 
a temporary problem, when one has a mental block, as opposed to 
experiencing a flow of ideas.
This appears to contrast sharply with the motivation for other core 
category groups within the data, notably those that can be explained with 
reference to primary metaphor theory like the SENSES group. However, the 
account I have suggested does have a number of entailments, dependent on 
certain other metaphors fundamental to the way the mind is conceptualised. 
For the mind to have any sort of texture, it must be a physical, bounded entity, 
and this is a common and well documented mapping: ATT-Meta lists MIND 
AS PHYSICAU ENTITY (Bamden 1997), and the Conceptual Metaphor 
Homepage includes THE MIND IS A BODY and THE MIND IS A 
MACHINE, both specific examples of this (Uakoff 1994). For things to get 
‘through’ the mind’s boundary and ‘inside’ it, a container schema must be 
closely aligned with the mapping. This fits in with other core category groups 
within the data, including CONTAINER itself, as well as the entries relating to 
grasping, which I referred to above within the SENSES group - a basic way of 
accounting for grasp is roughly as a blend of TOUCH and CONTAINER. A
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common mapping related to the container metaphor is IMPORTANT IS 
CENTRAL (Grady 1997:284), and this seems relevant as well.
Like the ANIMAL data, an important part of the motivation of this 
group is the negative implication of the metaphor. Comparing a human to an 
animal in terms of intelligence denies them fully human status in that respect 
and implies that they are intellectually ‘lower’. In a similar way, assigning any 
physical texture to the head or brain, the crucial centre of intellectual activity, 
implies that this is not correctly composed; in other words, the individual 
being referred to with any of these entries is described as lacking the proper 
matter that enables intelligent thought. To a greater extent than the ANIMAL 
group, a high percentage of these entries are compounds with a 
HEAD/BRAIN element, and this indicates explicitly that terms are concerned 
with the intellect.
As discussed in section 1.3.5, a huge number of entries overall are 
compounds of HEAD or BRAIN; several of these (eg those labelled 
CONTAINER, HARD/SOFT) are similar to this group in that they also 
conceptualise intelligence in terms of the physical composition of the mind, 
and presumably the fact that a person is stupid because this is composed of the 
wrong material. In his study of approximately 500 German idiomatic 
expressions for stupidity, Feyaerts schematizes the conceptual relationships 
involved in the mapping between stupidity and its various source fields 
(Feyaerts 1999:323ff). He argues that the key feature that characterises all the 
expressions and motivates their mapping to stupidity is that they deal with 
“deviant human properties”; he then proposes various sub-categories at 
different hierarchical levels of his classification. All of the phrases he has 
found that are associated with the head or brain being constituted from 
physical objects or substances (other than a properly functioning brain) are 
subsumed under the heading “deficient head/brain”. Similarly, Jonathan 
Charteris-Black’s work comparing English and Malay phraseology, part of 
which deals with figurative phrases containing English head or Malay kepala
(Charteris-Black 2003), identifies a number of phrases in each language that 
link the physical composition of the head with lack of intelligence. As I will
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go on to discuss in this chapter, there are certainly other considerations that 
operate alongside this general motivation, and it is noticeable that through 
time certain substances, and certain types of substances, are repeatedly used in 
the mapping. These can have additional, secondary motivations that support 
and strengthen the link with intelligence. However, it is important to recognise 
that these fit into a broader framework, and one that is also found in languages 
other than English9.
Some of the metaphors that fit into this more general group are also 
image-based, and there are several entries in the DENSITY data with a first 
element that comes from an object that is very roughly head-shaped. Much of 
the WOOD data falls into this category, since a number of entries are drawn 
from lumps of wood, such as chuckle-headed ai 1764> and nog-head n 
cl800>. It is also true of most of the entries in the FRUITWEG category 
mentioned above, as well as for others including pot-headed ai 1533 
(categorised as OBJECT&CONTAINER) and possibly knottv-pated ai 1596 
(categorised as LUMP). I would guess that this kind of source is particularly 
appropriate because associated entities can be mentally ‘substituted’ for the 
head very easily in image terms.
The individual motivations for each of the specific substances that 
occur as sources will be discussed in the sections below, but taking these as a 
group it is possible to make generalisations about what makes any particular 
substance successful as a source. Paralleling the ANIMAL group, the 
subgroups within DENSITY are all from very common, everyday entities 
which would have been familiar to speakers at the time and are still part of 
daily human experience. None is of particularly high value: though wood and 
food can be important commodities, they tend not to be costly in their crude, 
uncrafted state and are certainly not perceived as prestigious items of worth. 
Furthermore, all of the substances involved are of basic rather than complex 
structure, with uniform consistency, reflected by the fact that most of them are
2 Although the ANIMAL data does not fit into this group neatly, it is certainly analogous in
the way that it emphasises the connection between stupidity and a less-than-human brain.
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mass nouns or are constituted from mass noun substances. For example, logs
are countable but are units of wood, and in the same way potatoes have a 
single texture throughout even though they are discrete bounded items.
However, as with all the other core category groups I have presented 
within this thesis, this explanation of the motivation of the group does not 
provide a full explanation for all the DENSITY data. As I have pointed out 
above, a high proportion of the entries I have assigned to this group are 
particularly interesting in their specificity. DENSITY is proposed here because 
it appears to fit the data, but this is a subjective judgement made only on the 
strength of a number of clues, which include the general density terms within 
the group and the thick as similes (discussed above). For some entries, density 
seems like the most obviously relevant property of the source substance, but 
for others this is more questionable, and this group perhaps more than any 
other highlights the problems of interpreting the basic metaphor involved in 
any particular mapping. It should be pointed out that the most important aspect 
of my approach to the data is that it forms part of a corpus, and that the 
classification that I imposed here was reached from an analysis of the data, 
rather than being theory-based. It is for this reason that I would argue for its 
validity, even where individual entries require further discussion or 
justification.
I will go on to discuss this in more detail in relation to each of the core 
category groups in the sections below. In general though, it seems to me that 
the idea of cognitive ‘cohesion’ is helpful here. These entries do seem to me to 
have a basic property in common, but I acknowledge that the source concepts 
are not suitable to express lack of intelligence only because they are dense 
substances. Other properties must also be relevant, and perhaps the 
combination of properties make them more cognitively ‘convincing’, 
especially since metaphorical sources are not selected as a result of conscious 
reasoning about motivation. Furthermore, it may also be the case that even 
though a particular item is not originally motivated in the same way as some 
others that appear similar, it may still be influenced by these and this may 
even account for its continued usage, at least in part. As I have already
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indicated, the importance of folk etymology is by now widely recognised; it 
seems logical that similar mechanisms might lie behind (conscious or 
subconscious) reasoning about metaphorical mappings.
4.4.1 Blending theory
Because it allows for a range of different processes and connections 
like those discussed throughout this chapter whilst also acknowledging the 
conceptual importance of primary metaphor, I would suggest that in a general 
way blending theory provides a helpful framework in which to analyse the 
DENSITY group. This approach has been most closely associated with novel 
metaphor, part of ‘online’ mental processing, but Fauconnier & Turner do 
point out that it can also be relevant to “fixed projections”, found linguistically 
in conventionalised metaphorical expressions (or expressions that can be 
assigned to conventionalised mappings).
Like other forms of thought and action, blends can be either entrenched or novel.
“Digging your own grave” is a complex blend entrenched conceptually and
linguistically... We often recruit entrenched projections to help us to do on-line
conceptual projection. On-line projections and entrenched projections are not
different in kind; entrenched projections are on-line projections that have become
entrenched. Our seemingly fixed projections are highly entrenched projections of an
imaginative sort (Fauconnier & Turner 1998:161).
As Grady et al point out, blending theory and conceptual metaphor theory 
have been seen as incongruous by some scholars, but are in fact 
complementary approaches that can combine to form a framework that can be 
both structured and flexible (Grady et al 1999:101)10. Whilst metaphor study 
has traditionally focused on the unidirectional relationship between two
10 This article goes on to point out that blending theory parallels Grady’s theory of primary 
metaphor in the way that it focuses on conceptual ‘building blocks’ that combine to produce
something different and yet meaningful:
The idea that simple metaphors interact to yield more elaborate conceptualizations
has been discussed by researchers working in the CMT framework. (See, for
instance, Lakoff & Turner’s 1989 discussion of ‘composite’ metaphors, and Grady’s
1997 more explicit analysis of the ‘unification’ or ‘binding’ of metaphors.) The
blending framework offers a neat way of representing this complex interaction of
concepts and links, since it explicitly allows for multiple spaces and multiple
iterations of the integration process (Grady et al 1999:109).
In fact, both theories have elements reminiscent of Max Black’s interaction theory, in which
he argued that the meaning of any metaphor is the result of the interaction between the source
and target (or in his terminology, tenor and vehicle), rather than a simple ‘addition’ of the two
(Black 196D, discussed in section 1.1).
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concepts, the source and target of the mapping, blending theory allows for a 
more complex interaction of a number of elements that result in a ‘blend’. 
Input is taken from a number of mental ‘spaces’, each the source of 
information of a variety of sorts. It might be of the nature of a particular type 
of reasoning, such as analogical mapping; it might involve some background 
knowledge about a particular situation or scenario, for example, a ‘frame’; or 
it might activate a commonly made link between two particular conceptual 
entities, including conventional metaphors or metonymies. These pieces of 
information are then combined selectively to produce a new conceptual unit, 
which might itself become conventional, and can be one source of input for 
subsequent blends.
I would argue that blending theory is particularly helpful because it 
allows for such a wide range of influences on any one mapping. As I have 
argued above, whilst any metaphor may have one principal motivation, it may 
be especially successful because it is cognitively cohesive in the way that it 
can evoke other possible motivations as well. This also allows for the 
influence of folk etymology on the way a metaphor is understood, and 
recognises these kinds of supporting motivations as equally valid elements of 
the mapping. One of the examples that Fauconnier & Turner analyse illustrates 
some of the possibilities for inputs that can be involved in any blend.
Blends can combine non-counterpart elements that come from different inputs.
Consider The Grim Reaper, which is a blend with several input spaces, including a
space of harvest and a space of particular human death...elements in a single input
space that are metonymically related can be combined in the blend. Priests, monks,
mourners, and members of lay brotherhood that are associated with dying, funerals,
burial and afterlife are metonymically associated with Death. They are not
counterparts of Death, but in the blend, an attire we associate with them - robe and
cowl - can be the attire of The Grim Reaper... The possibility of combining non­
counterparts on the basis of metonymic connections - like the connection between
Death and a skeleton - gives blending a great power: the blend can combine elements
that contribute to the desired effect even though those elements are not counterparts.
The combined elements “go together” according to the counterpart connections
between the input spaces... Composition, completion, and elaboration all recruit
selectively from our most favored patterns of knowing and thinking. This makes
blending a powerful conceptual instrument, but it also makes it highly subject to bias.
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Composition, completion, and elaboration operate for the most part automatically and
below the horizon of conscious observation. This makes the detection of biases
difficult. Seepage into the blend can come from defaults, prototypes, category
information, conventional scenarios, and any other routine knowledge (Fauconnier &
Turner 1998:161-2).
The “seepage” that is mentioned at the end of this passage may be a helpful 
notion in considering the ANIMAL data, since a good deal of anecdotal 
information tends to be involved in the blend. This can continue to happen 
even when the metaphor is conventionalised and has become relatively fixed. 
At each stage of the fable tradition described in chapter 3, or at any other point 
in time, another Tayer’ of fact or fiction can affect the folk knowledge about 
any animal and be integrated into the metaphor.
4.4.2 General terms vs specific substances
As mentioned in the data section above, entries derived from general 
terms for density found in the data constitute just under one fifth of the group. 
This draws attention to the question of why DENSITY should be mapped 
predominantly through the specific, rather than through more ‘central’ 
vocabulary related to the source concept like these general terms. If the 
motivation for the specific groups is DENSITY, as I suggest here, it is unclear 
why specific substances are preferred to represent the mapping, since the 
motivation of these does appear to be relatively opaque. Linking the general 
concept with INTELLIGENCE does not present the problems of interpretation 
that specific substances with the same general property can, so that it would 
seem more logical for the mapping to be restricted to these.
However, there do seem to be various possible reasons for this. To a 
certain extent there may be a connection with the point Feyaerts makes about 
the general mapping between stupidity and a deficient head/brain (Feyaerts 
1999:323ft). Using a specific substance or entity fits into this ‘model’ far more 
neatly and naturally, thereby plugging these metaphors into a more established 
pattern that can support and strengthen the blend. As well as this, the selection 
of a specific entity rather than a more general property may be connected to 
the way in which humans tend to process the world around them and relate
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concepts to known, familiar sources. A number of scholars have observed that 
abstract notions tend to be conceptualised in terms of concrete objects, and in 
general this is the direction that metaphorical mappings tend to follow. 
Mapping INTEUUIGENCE to DENSITY utilises a less abstract source 
domain, since density is a concept that is used with reference to concrete 
physical entities, but using a specific, physically apprehensible entity to stand 
for this concept may be an even better source because of its more concrete 
nature. This must be affected by the fact that the DENSITY mapping is based 
(at least in part) on a mental image, ie that of something trying to penetrate the 
mind. In order to form a mental picture of density, some substance that has 
the property of being dense must be involved.
The issue of cognitive ‘cohesion’ may also be related to the selection of 
particular sources. As I suggest above, it may be that the most convincing or 
‘successful’ metaphors are those that potentially relate to a number of 
motivations, and selecting a particular entity as the source of a mapping allows 
for greater flexibility in this sense than using a more general property. In other 
words, it may be the very opaqueness of the motivation for some of these 
mappings that make them particularly apt. If several motivations are possible 
and a metaphorical expression can therefore be interpreted in several ways, 
this may be more effective, even though this process of interpretation is not 
conscious, and in fact these possible motivations may combine so that each 
adds an extra ‘layer’ to the blend. In the following sections I will go on to look 
in more detail at some of the properties connected with each of the subgroups 
aside from density.
4.4.3 WOOD
This is the largest subgroup in the DENSITY data, and as well as this it 
has the highest percentage of words still in current use of all the specific 
substance groups, twelve entries out of 35. (In the GENERAU group nearly 
half of the entries, ten out of the total of eighteen, are marked current.) It is my 
impression that, intuitively as well as theoretically, it is the most recognisable 
and prominent of the specific groups in its connection with stupidity, although
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for a number of these words the etymology is probably not generally 
recognised. For example, chump may not be widely known as a term for a 
piece of wood, and block has come to be used of a range of substances, such as 
manufactured materials including concrete, rather than only with wood 
(though this may still be its most common collocation). In fact, the way in 
which block has widened may be further proof of the importance of familiar 
substances in even general terminology, since it seems unlikely that a term 
connected with a less familiar substance would develop semantically so that it 
could be used in such a general way. Nugget seems to exemplify this. In its 
earliest use in Standard English it specifically referred to ‘a lump of gold’, and 
although the OED lists the definition “A lump of anything” for the term (with 
two supporting quotations from the end of the nineteenth century), in practice 
it tend to be used of a very limited number of substances in PDE. Furthermore, 
these tend to be comparable to gold either in terms of appearance or value.
The entries in this group are not simply connected with wood, but tend 
to be from words for wood of particular specifications. Apart from the general 
terms wood and timber, a high proportion of the entries are formed from terms 
denoting pieces of wood - there are entries from block, stock, log and logger,
hulver and chump — and almost all of these more specifically connote large 
chunks of wood. As well as carrying the idea of being dense substances, they 
are also unwieldy, awkwardly-sized, heavy lumps that are uncrafted, and all of 
this makes them more cognitively ‘convincing’ or ‘cohesive’ as sources. In 
fact, in its notes about etymology, the OED suggests that logger was “invented 
as expressing by its sound the notion of something heavy and clumsy”. There 
are a few entries in the rest of the INTELLIGENCE data that parallel these 
characteristics, and as well as this largeness and heaviness can correlate with 
slowness, and SPEED is very important in the way intelligence is 
conceptualised. Similarly, the idea of form vs formlessness can be found 
elsewhere in our vocabulary for the mental - we talk about ideas ‘taking 
shape’ or ‘being shaped’ by external influences.
One of the entries in the group, stock n 1594> may give a clue to the 
way in which this mapping became established. Stock is from OE stoc, tree
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trunk, which has a number of cognates in other Germanic languages. The OED
lists the later meaning ‘a senseless or stupid person’ as part of a wider 
definition, and the supporting quotations illustrate the subtle progression from 
association between concepts to well-established, conventional mapping.
As the type of what is lifeless, motionless, or void of sensation. Hence, a senseless or
stupid person.
1303 R. Brunne Handl. Synne 940 Dowun he smote hys mattok, And fyl hym self
ded as a stok.
cl330 Arth. & Merl. 3855 Arthour on hors sat stef so stok.
cl407 Lydg. Reson & Sens. 6411 As deffe as stok or ston.
cl440 Alphabet of Tales 356 Evur sho talkid vnto hym wurdis to provoce hym to
luste of his bodie, and yit be no wyse myght sho induce hym berto,...he was a stokk,
sho sayd, & no man.
1569 T. Underdown Heliodorus iv. 59 Yee vnhappy people, howe longe will ye sitte
still, dombe like stockes?
1594 Spenser Amoretti xliii. That nether I may speake nor thinke at all. But like a
stupid stock in silence die!
1640 Sir E. Dering Carmelite (1641) B ij, I am not so credulous to thinke every Stock
a Stoicke.
1644 Milton Educ. 3,1 doubt not but ye shall have more adoe to drive our dullest and
laziest youth, our stocks and stubbs from the infinite desire of such a happy nurture
then we have now [etc.].
These quotations demonstrate that wood can also be metaphorically associated 
with a lack of feeling, and this draws attention to the fact that wood, like all 
the sources associated with DENSITY, is inanimate and static. Another set of 
entries, which I have categorised as ALIVE/ANIMATE1 \ has this as its 
primary motivation. In the quotations for stock, wood is more specifically used 
as something to exemplify deafness and dumbness (in the cl407 and 1569 
quotations respectively), as well a lack of physical or emotional sensitivity 
(particularly in the cl440 quotation). In this respect the DENSITY group links 
in with the SENSES data, and again this relates to the idea of cognitive 
cohesion.
' This is a symmetrical category, containing both entries like quick ai 1484>. relating to 
liveness and animatedness, and a small number of entries that use the opposite quality like
dead from the neck up ai 1930>.
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The cl407 and 1569 quotations, in particular, show a clear connection 
between the physical sense of stock and an emergent mental signification, but 
in these cases it is found within a simile with the relevant property explicitly 
stated rather than a more implicitly understood metaphor. The fact that both 
kinds of usage of stock can be found historically would support the view that 
metaphors and similes are of the same order and that it is difficult to draw any 
precise distinction between the two; there are some cases in which it seems 
only to be a matter of convention whether one or the other is used. Any 
distinction between the two other than a purely linguistic one is particularly 
unconvincing in cases where metaphor can be seen to develop from simile. As 
Kay has pointed out, diachronic data indicates that it is possible for similes to 
become conventionalised to the level that they are still understood when they 
are condensed in language, for example, when someone is called a plank
rather than being described as as thick as two short planks.
...creative literary metaphor [is] where a concept in one area of meaning is expressed
and made more vivid by words taken from another domain... Often such a metaphor
may start life as a simile, since the establishment of likeness is implicit in any
metaphor, and then progress to full metaphorical status (Kay 2000:276).
Though Kay separates creative literary metaphor from conventional metaphor 
here, it has been pointed out that creative literary metaphor is very often an 
extension or elaboration of conventional metaphor, so that this statement may 
have wider implications for the way that metaphor is viewed in relation to 
simile. Where one is only a conventionalisation of the other, this is the only 
difference between them, and since the underlying mapping is the same it is 
simply a historical difference.
As regards the expressions examined in section 4.2.1, it may be that at 
the time these are recorded, the source substances are not sufficiently 
conventionalised to be used in straightforward metaphor; however, substances 
that are found in a number of entries in the database, including straightforward 
metaphor, must have reached a point where they are associated strongly 
enough with intelligence that they do not present any problems when used 
metaphorically. The mapping has simply become conventionalised to the
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extent that any reference to the characteristic selected has been lost in some 
linguistic expressions.
There are three other entries that should be mentioned alongside this 
group, and these are all compounds of stick' clever-boots/-sides/-sticks n 
1847> barm-stick n 1924> and poop-stick n 193Q>. These do present a 
question for this group, and in fact have not been classified alongside the 
WOOD group. Although they are obviously constituted from wood, the 
motivation does not appear to be associated with density. In these entries, stick
appears to be an element that simply means ‘person’; the OED gives this as a 
definition, with quotations dated from 1682 onwards:
12. a. Applied, with qualifying adj., to a person, orig. with figurative notion of sense
2 or 4, as tough stick., crooked {Sc. thrown) stick, a perverse, cross-grained person.
Exactly why stick should denote a person is unclear. There are several 
possibilities, of which more than one may be relevant. For example, this may 
be a simple imagistic metaphor drawn from the everyday. Sticks are familiar 
objects that are very roughly human-shaped in that they are long and narrow 
(attested by the fact that from early times, sticks have been fashioned into 
human figurines, for ritualistic purposes or as children’s toys). As well as this, 
sticks have traditionally been used for, or made into, a variety of tools and 
weapons, and as the OED entry attests many of these have also been referred 
to as ‘sticks’. It is quite common for the equipment that is typically used for a 
particular purpose to be extended metonymically to mean the individual using 
it, and this may account for some uses of stick transferred to denote people. 
This is the case in both OED senses 4e and lOe, where particular senses of 
stick are associated with particular pursuits or professions. In the first instance 
the definition given is “A rod of dignity or office, a baton; also the bearer of 
such a stick”, and in the second, “The hammer or mallet with which a 
dulcimer or drum is struck. Hence pi, a nickname for a drummer {Naval
slang}”. If this kind of motivation accounts for these three entries, they are 
unrelated to the DENSITY mapping. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that 
they may have been influenced to some limited extent by the other WOOD 
entries, and because of this I have included them here for the purposes of 
comparison.
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4.4.4 EARTH
As the above figures indicate, the EARTH group is substantially 
smaller than WOOD, and most of the entries in the group have a 
comparatively short life-span. As well as this, most of the entries are derived 
from either clod and mud: eleven out of fourteen entries, around 79% of the 
group, have one of these as an element. Both factors seem to fit in with my 
own intuition that this is a less central source concept for STUPIDITY than 
WOOD. Although this group has a less well established link with 
INTELLIGENCE, it is interesting that the substances within it form a 
reasonably clear group, and that there is so much variation in words with a 
common source. For this reason it is presented here as a core category.
EARTH substances fit all the suggested criteria for a source field given 
above. Earth is common, familiar and, at least in its natural state, considered 
worthless. Additionally, it lacks any definite form, and is commonly found in 
an unstructured mass or in rough lumps. Like WOOD, it is an organic 
substance, and perhaps in a very general way this adds to their commonalities 
as substances. There is one entry, turf n 1607, that is not central to this group, 
but has been included because it is conceptually close.
Other factors may affect the individual entries and groups of entries 
within this subcategory, and in particular those derived from the two roots 
given above, mud and clod, are likely to have been influenced by associations 
particular to the substances that they signify. More than other substances in the 
group, mud has turbidity as one of its salient properties, especially in its liquid 
form, and this may link it with the idea of lack of clarity. As chapter 2 attests, 
this is central to the way intelligence is conceptualised because it is so closely 
linked with VISION, and even though is may not follow logically that lack of 
ability to perceive visually relates to the opaqueness of a physical substance, a 
vague connection still seems possible and cannot be dismissed12. It is
12 This may be similar to the way in which mince is associated with stupidity in Scots. A 
stupid person can be thick as mince or having mince for brains, but ideas that are not regarded
as sensible or rational can also be described as mince. Other substances, such as shit, can be
used in the same way, as can a huge variety of lexical items such as dumb, lame and even
stupid itself. This may relate to point made in chapter 5, section 5.1.1 about the opposite and
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interesting that the etymology of muddle shows the same root as mud:
according to the OED muddle is derived from mud, as the equivalents are in 
Middle Dutch. Again, this may reinforce the link with lack of mental faculty. 
In a similar way, the fact that a clod is a cohesive body of earth aligns it with 
entries categorised as UUMP1—. The OED definition for the most general sense 
of lump is “A compact mass of no particular shape; a shapeless piece or mass; 
often with implication of excessive size, protuberant outline, or clumsiness”. 
Obviously several elements of this definition tie in with other core categories 
in TNTELUIGENCE: there is a reference to shape (or rather lack of it), which 
is relevant to the DENSITY group as a whole and may relate to the 
corresponding small number of SHAPE entries; SIZE also appears in the data, 
and largeness is correlated with stupidity; and closely associated with size, 
clumsiness is also relevant to a number of other mappings, including some of 
the ANIMAU entries and most of the WOOD group. The description of a lump
as a “compact mass” is also significant, since this suggests that, like the 
FRUIT/VEG entries, any lump is easily substituted for the head in terms of 
mental image, since the prototypical shape of a compact mass tends to be very 
roughly spherical without any sharp distensions, as the head is. Again, this 
relates to Feyaerts’ point about the mapping between stupidity and a deficient 
head/brain, since a lump is perhaps the least complex, most basic conceptual 
entity relating to physical substances in general (Feyaerts 1999, discussed 
above in section 4.4).
conflicting general ways intelligence is conceptualised; on one hand, the mind can be the
agent, as in the SENSES metaphors and ANIMAL metaphors, but on the other it can be the
passive recipient of active ideas, as in the DENSITY metaphors.
13 It may be that these should be placed alongside the EARTH data as part of the DENSITY 
group. The reason I have not classified them in this way is that the image element of the
concept LUMP which is discussed in this section seems to be equally as important as
DENSITY, so that assigning the LUMP entries to a separate core category group whilst
acknowledging them alongside DENSITY intuitively seems preferable. For the same reason,
the FRUITWEG group have also been categorised separately, but for both cases I would
accept that this is questionable, and the entries should perhaps have been placed in both
categories.
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4.4.5 FOOD
Like all of the substances in the WOOD and EARTH categories, 
FOOD appears to be appropriate as a source concept for DENSITY because it 
is so familiar in daily life; furthermore, just as in both of these groups, the 
entries in FOOD are derived from a small number of specific substances, as 
the data section shows. Eight out of the nineteen entries are related to MEAT, 
and it is noticeable that all of the entries from specific kinds of meat come 
from either beef or mutton. In fact, this provides a notable counterpart to the 
ANIMAL data, since BOVINES and SHEEP, the animals from which these 
meats come, are the two largest subgroups in the category. This can 
presumably be explained in a parallel way, again correlating with the fact that 
these have always been amongst the most common, familiar animals for 
English people, so that logically the types of meat that they yield are equally 
familiar. Two more entries are compounds of a related substance, suet, which 
the OED defines as “The solid fat round the loins and kidneys of certain 
animals, esp. that of the ox and sheep, which, chopped up, is used in cooking, 
and, when rendered down, forms tallow. (Occas. applied to the corresponding 
fat in the human body.)”.
A further three entries come from grout. This has various senses, but 
the OED connects these entries to meanings relating to grain or meal, and 
aligns the items with another two entries in this group that have a similar 
source:
grout-head...[f. grout n., taken as the type of something big and coarse; cf. pudding- 
head...]
Pudding in these entries seems to carry the older sense of a savoury mixture of 
minced meat and course grain or oats, held together and boiled in the stomach 
of an animal (usually a sheep or pig). As well as being similar in texture to 
grout, again puddings are roughly head-shaped, and must have this as an 
additional part of their motivation.
The final entry in the group is macaroon n al 631-a1633. This is not 
motivated as clearly by DENSITY as other entries in the group, though in light 
of the other data it may have this as a motivating factor. Macaroon is related
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to macaroni, and appears to have as its source meaning the paste that is used 
to make pasta. The extension of the term to signify stupidity seems only to be 
related to this early sense indirectly. The OED suggests that this follows the 
same path as the alternative form macaroni and supplies the following 
background information about the semantic development of the term.
2. Hist. An exquisite of a class which arose in England about 1760 and consisted of
young men who had travelled and affected the tastes and fashions prevalent in
continental society,
b. dial. A fop, dandy.
[This use seems to be from the name of the Macaroni Club, a designation prob.
adopted to indicate the preference of the members for foreign cookery, macaroni
being at that time little eaten in England. There appears to be no connexion with the
transferred use of It. maccherone in the senses ‘blockhead, fool, mountebank’,
referred to in 1711 by Addison Sped. No. 47 3 5.]
The FOOD group was perhaps the most challenging to classify, and I 
think that it highlights the difficulty of interpreting the basic metaphor 
involved in the transfer of meaning from a highly specific source even more 
than the other data presented in this chapter. Within the group, the variation in 
type of source is intuitively much greater than in the WOOD or EARTH 
groups, and this relates to Rosch et al’s ideas about basic level categories 
(Rosch et al 1976). Wood and earth both qualify as basic-level categories: it is 
not difficult to visualise a prototypical piece of wood, or a prototypical mass 
of earth. FOOD, on the other hand, is a much broader, superordinate category, 
which includes basic-level entities including some of those found in the group, 
like MEAT, as well as lower-order substances like particular types of meat 
and the other sources in the group. Because FOOD is such a broad category, it 
might be criticised as a less convincing core category for this data. It is 
certainly true that a substantial proportion of the group is related to MEAT, 
whilst the rest of the entries come from a variety of other, quite different 
substances of various kinds.
However, these entries are presented together as part of a single group 
because they all appear to be principally motivated by DENSITY, and it seems 
significant that they are all edible substances. This is especially true because
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there are a number of other groups in the data that contain entries related to 
edible substances, which appear not to have the same motivation. The first of 
these is the group mentioned above, FRUIT/VEGETABUE. As I have already 
suggested, it seems likely that this is largely motivated by image. With the 
exception of nana n 1965>. all of the sources within the group, which are 
mainly vegetables, are roughly spherical, and like some of the other 
DENSITY entries these can be mentally ‘substituted’ for the head very easily. 
Many of them can also be related to DENSITY - this is true of turnips and 
potatoes in their raw form, in particular - but I would guess that their shape is 
more important in the mapping (or at the very least, equally important).
There is also a group that I have labelled UIQUID/SEMI-UIQUI^D. 
There are thirteen entries in this group, derived from five different specific 
substances and one more general meaning1—. Two entries, dope n 1851> and 
dopev ai 1896>. are derived from Dutch doop ‘dipping, sauce’ (from doopen
‘to dip’). Although this has been used for various substances'—, it seems to 
have been most closely associated with food-related substances; the first listed 
OED sense defines dope as “Any thick liquid or semi-fluid used as an article 
of food, or as a lubricant”. The entries vappe n 1657. whey-brained ai 1660 
and barm-stick n 1924> all derive from edible liquids: vappe n 1657 is from 
Uatin vappa, flat or sour wine; whev-brained ai 1660 is from PDE whey, the 
watery liquid that separates from curds when milk coagulates; and barm-stick 
n 1924> is from OE beorma (>PDE beer), originally the froth that forms on
14 This term, mess n 1936> merits some attention, and as with many other terms its 
metaphorical link with INTELLIGENCE is related to the semantic changes that the term had
already undergone. The earliest recorded meaning is simply a serving or prepared dish of
food; with the development of some parallel meanings, this gradually extended to imply food
of a particular pulpy or semi-liquid texture, and then to be used with its most common current
meaning of a muddle or jumble, sometimes with the suggestion of dirtiness. All of these
meanings may feed into the meaning ‘a stupid person’.
15 It seems likely that the use of dope to mean ‘stupid person’ is reinforced by the sense listed 
in OED as “Also (U.S. slang), a person under the influence of, or addicted to, some dmg”.
This comes from dope “drug not specifically named”, later becoming “stupifying drugs and
narcotics in general”. There are several other entries in the data connected with intoxication,
such as US rummv n 1912> (from rum) and sodden ai 1599-1611+1841> (from OE seothan,
originally connected with heat and boiling, but shifting to mean ‘drunk’ before being
connected with lack of intelligence).
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fermenting malt, which is used to cause fermentation in other liquids and as 
yeast to leaven bread.
4.4.6 Miscellaneous
The remaining data in the DENSITY group has been classified as 
MISCELLANEOUS, because the entries within it do not fit neatly into any of 
the four main groups. Having said this, more than one of the eight entries have 
some possible relationship with either a single entry or one of the other groups 
in DENSITY, clav-brained ai 1596 could arguably be put into the EARTH 
category, since clay is a similar type of substance used for many of the same 
purposes, leather-headed ai al668 is only a step away from some of the entries 
connected with meat, since it is also an animal product, though not an edible 
one. This is unusual in that leather is a relatively high value substance, but 
given that it has a single supporting quotation this may account for its lack of 
success, knuckle-head n 1944> might also be similar to the MEAT entries in 
the respect that it is a substance found alongside animal flesh, but it could also 
be viewed alongside the two entries in this group that are compounds of bone,
bone-headed ai 1903> and bonehead n 1908>. ivorv dome n 1923> also 
belongs with these entries, which stand out as much harder substances; ivory 
is high value and, like leather, seems out of place in this group. The 
motivation for these items may be slightly different from the others in 
DENSITY, and may be more closely related to fact that outside of head is 
made of this substance - ie the implication may be that the head is bone all the 
way through, rather than containing a brain.
There are also two entries that are compounds of stone, stone n 1598 
and stunpoll n al794>. These are discussed in more detail below.
4.5 Semantic ‘‘pathways’
The fact that there are so many entries from such a small number of 
sources seems to be evidence of a principle similar to that discussed in section
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2.5 in relation to VISION vocabulary. When a link between two concepts has 
been made that is cognitively ‘cohesive’ for speakers, this seems to establish a 
pathway that attracts other mappings between the same general semantic fields 
(and, more narrowly, from the same lexical root). At least in part, this can 
account for the productiveness of particular source substances, and for the 
high number of items that are variant forms from a single root, that can be 
seen in the DENSITY groups, as well as in the rest of the INTELLIGENCE 
data.
Interestingly, this seems to have an effect even in cases where the 
mappings between fields have different motivations, or even mutually 
exclusive motivations. The variety of entries from edible substances seems to 
bear this out. Some of the relevant entries in FRUIT/VEGETABLES are 
complementary to those in DENSITY because close texture is one motivating 
factor in their mapping to STUPIDITY, so these sit easily beside the 
DENSITY-FOOD group. By contrast, the entries in the LIQUID/SEMI- 
LIQUID group have almost the opposite motivation - the substances discussed 
above have a completely different consistency, and are loose-textured and 
insubstantial. Despite this, the group is a further indication that generally, 
edible substances are subconsciously ‘available’ to be mapped to stupidity, 
and that this source field becomes increasingly available by association as it is 
exploited more and the link between concepts is strengthened. In fact, the 
remaining seven entries in the LIQUID/SEMI-LIQUID are also closely related 
to one of the subgroups in DENSITY : these are all simplexes or compounds of 
PDE sap, the watery fluid found in trees and plants. This means that all of the 
entries in this core category mirror those in either the WOOD or FOOD 
subgroups of DENSITY, suggesting strongly that these are particularly 
appropriate to be selected and linked with STUPIDITY.
The same principle seems to be evident in the ANIMAL group, within 
the sub-group SHEEP. As I discussed in section 3.4.1.2, the motivation for the 
SHEEP group is generally held to relate to female sheep, because of their 
status as flock members, but in the data this is not always the case and there 
are a number of entries from male sheep. The motivation for these cannot be
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the same, since rams exhibit entirely different behaviour; but it is credible that 
the general perceived connection between the species and stupidity 
strengthens both mappings, and further increases the availability of male sheep 
as sources for INTEUUIGENCE.
4.6 Specificity and lack of other substances
As I have pointed out, there would seem to be constraints on the type 
of entity that can be the source in a mapping (evident from the ANIMAU 
group as well), and the substances that appear in the group seems almost 
without exception to conform to these1—. One question that presents itself here 
is why certain other dense substances are less successful as sources. 
Obviously, some are excluded because of other properties they have, which 
‘override’ their potential to be used; an example would be a precious metal 
like gold. The high value and rarity of gold (and its generally positive 
associations) are more salient than its density, and because of these it would be 
extremely unusual for it to be associated with a negative characteristic like 
stupidity'—. However, this does not appear to be the case for all other possible 
sources, and there are a few that would seem to be equally as available and 
suitable as those that do appear in the data. Stone and low-value metals such 
as iron and steel seem ideal to be mapped to stupidity, given that they are also 
reasonably common, high density substances that are used by man in a variety 
of ways, and yet these do not emerge as established sources.
16 There are a very few exceptions, all categorised as MISCELLANEOUS, and more detail 
about these is given in section 4.4.6. The very fact that these tend not to be productive, or are
rare, or fall out of usage very quickly, seems to prove the point that substances conforming to
the ‘mles’ of appropriateness are generally much more cognitively ‘convincing’.
17 Chaucer plays with this and exploits it to comic effect in the General Prologue to the 
Canterbury Tales. In his description of the miller, he draws an unflattering portrait which
builds up to the line “And yet he hadde a thombe of gold, pardee” (Benson 1987:32 line 563).
By using “and yet”, Chaucer sets the reader up to expect to be told the miller’s redeeming
feature, but instead he twists the phrase a heart of gold, where gold has a positive association,
into a negative comment on the miller’s honesty. This inversion of the conventional results in
an extremely subtle and surprising irony.
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Stone does appear in the data, but only in two entries (listed within the 
MISC section): stone n 1598. which has a single supporting quotation, and 
stunpoll n 1794. which continues into current usage. The OED suggests 
uncertainly that stunpoll is derived from a variant of stone in compound with 
poll, head, but it should be noted that folk etymology would be likely to 
associate this with the verb stun. There are other items in the data connected to 
the idea of physical impact (classified as HIT/STUNNED) - for example, 
stupid itself can be traced back to Latin stupere ‘to hit, stun’ - so that this 
explanation for the etymology of stunpoll is intuitively satisfying. If someone 
has suffered physical impact to the head, it is likely that their mental faculties 
are affected negatively, so it is understandable that this can be used to imply a 
lack of intelligence. This must be a factor in the continued use of this word, 
and may be more significant than its actual origins. I would speculate that 
there may be various reasons for the lack of any other stone entries. It may be 
simply too hard - although substances like wood and lumps of earth are dense, 
they can be penetrated with effort, whereas stone is a completely different 
texture, and has no ‘give’ at all. The same is true of bone, which yields three 
very recent entries, bone-headed ai 1903> bonehead n 19Q8> and US ivorv 
dome n 1923>. and this is also a property of all metals. Correspondingly, there 
is a difference between being able to comprehend something with difficulty (ie 
get it ‘into one’s brain’) and being wholly incapable of this; it is perhaps quite 
different to imply that someone has limited and underused potential to learn 
compared to no ability at all.
4.7 Conceptual links and limits oil reference
Aside from this, and perhaps more convincingly, there may be an issue 
about other properties metaphorically associated with any entity. Little 
research appears to have been done on whether either lexical items or the 
source concepts they represent are limited in the number of referents they can 
support, but this may be a possibility; equally this may apply within a 
particular semantic field, albeit a very broad one.
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Assessing the precise range of reference of a particular linguistic item
- ie the number of discrete meanings it sustains, and the semantic ‘distance’ 
between these meanings - is an impossible task. The high level of variation in 
the number of entries assigned to individual lemmas by different dictionaries 
gives some idea of the problems involved in coming to any kind of consensus 
about reference, and how it should be divided. Allen (1999) discusses the way 
in which lexicographers vary in their approach to dividing the meanings of 
words by either ‘lumping’ or ‘splitting’, ie either giving general definitions 
and leaving the user to “extract the nuance of meaning that corresponds to a 
particular context”, or giving a greater number of definitions that “enumerate 
differences of meaning in more detail” (ibid:61). The approach that a 
lexicographer adopts tends to be affected by the functions of a particular 
dictionary edition - eg it is considered more helpful for a learner of English to 
be given a list of ‘focused’ meanings, where less central meanings are listed as 
associated subsenses, than to be given a list of several more demarcated senses
- but as Allen points out, this is only a very general guide. Two dictionaries 
with very similar aims can vary enormously, and similarly, even a particular 
dictionary can vary from edition to edition through time, and depending on the 
preferences of editors.
The Fowler brothers, editors of the first Concise Oxford Dictionary (1911), were
broadly speaking splitters, but they lumped as well, as they had to if they were going
to describe the verb set (for example) in one and half pages as against the 60-odd
columns of the OED. The Fowlers’ entry for make occupied a little over a column.
Their edition didn’t number the meanings...but counting the semicolons gives a sense
count of around 70... By the ninth edition, this had been reduced to 24...and in the
new edition, published this year, there are only 10 (ibid:62).
This sort of variation in approach means that little or no data has been 
compiled that gives any indication of the possible number of meanings that a 
lexical item can sustain, or any related information, such as the average, or the 
comparative multiplicity of meanings amongst different types of lexical 
items^.
18 ‘Different’ on all sorts of criteria, eg nouns v. verbs, concrete v. abstract nouns, adjectives 
relating to animate v. adjectives relating to inanimate entities, etc.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190
Added to this is the special difficulty posed by metaphorical extension 
of meaning, which tends only to be included when it is highly 
conventionalised in a particular lexical form, whether this be a single word or 
a fixed expression. Mappings between concepts, which may be represented 
linguistically in a variety of lexical items relating to the source concept, like 
those in the VISION, ANIMAL and DENSITY groups, are obviously much 
more difficult to identify and formalise, and therefore (from a cognitive 
linguistic point of view) these are handled less well. Lakoff & Johnson discuss 
the limitations of dictionaries in dealing with this sort of phenomenon:
...students of meaning and dictionary makers have not found it important to try to
give a general account of how people understand normal concepts in terms of
systematic metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS
MONEY, etc. For example, if you look in a dictionary under “love,” you find entries
that mention affection, fondness, devotion, infatuation, and even sexual desire, but
there is no mention of the way in which we comprehend love by means of metaphors
like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS MADNESS, LOVE IS WAR, etc. If we take
expressions like “Look how far we’ve come” or “Where are we now?” there would
be no way to tell from a standard dictionary or any other standard account of
meaning that these expressions are normal ways of talking about the experience of
love in our culture. Hints of the existence of such metaphors may be given in the
secondary or tertiary senses of other words. For instance, a hint of the LOVE IS
MADNESS metaphor may show up in a tertiary sense of the word “crazy” (=
“immoderately fond, infatuated”), but this hint shows up as a part of the definition of
“crazy” rather than as part of the definition of “love” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:115­
6).
Conventionalised metaphorical usages tend to be recognised within the 
definitions for the most central terms associated with particular source 
concepts. Amongst the terms found in DENSITY, it is standard for general 
terms like thick and dense to be defined as ‘stupid’ (or something similar) by 
lexicographers. Similarly, any other conventionalised metaphorical usages will 
also be listed - for example, thick as an adjective is also defined as “colloq.
intimate or very friendly (esp. thick as thieves)” in the Concise Oxford
Dictionary - and by identifying these it is possible to gain some very rough 
idea of the comparative level of variability in mappings between source 
concepts from larger dictionaries. However, this is obviously an extremely
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approximate method, any theories based on this kind of research can only be 
of the most impressionistic and general nature.
Despite this, it is generally accepted that there are constraints on 
reference, and specifically on the meanings that one lexical item can sustain, 
both in terms of quantity and semantic distance. Any language system must 
strike a balance in being both economical and unambiguous. Historically there 
are examples of oyer-lexjcahsation, where a language is flooded with words 
for one particular concept, and of the opposite phenomenon, where a single 
word has two related but different meanings and it becomes unclear which one 
is intended. Either situation can result from some extra-linguistic factor (like 
borrowing or influence from another language), and since language is a 
system, neither is sustainable. Consequently, mtralinguistic pressure will force 
change, and this is known as ‘systemic regulation’. Smith puts it like this: 
“...the systematic nature of language means that there are regulatory forces - 
the extra- and intralinguistic ‘blind watchmakers’ of linguistic evolution - 
which constrain the selection of variables” (Smith 1996:126). In his 1972 
work, Samuels details some of the specific processes of systemic regulation 
that have been observed in diachronic semantic change.
I. Ambiguity and limitation. If a form has two meanings - whether as the result of
polysemy or homonymy - so incompatible that they cause ambiguity, one of the
meanings dies out, or, more rarely, the form itself becomes obsolete.
II. Synonymity and differentiation... If, for extralinguistic reasons such as cultural
borrowing or foreign conquest, two exact synonyms exist for a time in the spoken
chain, either one of them will become less and less selected and eventually discarded,
or a difference of meaning, connotation, nuance or register will arise to distinguish
them (Samuels 1972:65).
These principles amount to two important points about the lexicon of a 
language. Firstly, there cannot be a huge number of words with the same 
meaning, so that true synonymy is rare or nonexistent, and secondly, it is 
unlikely for a word to have two disparate meanings that can be used in the 
same context and might be confusing for users. The example that Samuels 
uses to illustrate this second point is the adjective silly (from OE ges&lig), 
which has undergone various shifts in meaning since OE, and was highly 
polysemous between the 13l— and 16l— centuries.
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Pre-OE happy
OE -------L------------- ,
happy blessed
33th cent I 1.............1.....-T....
happy blessed pious
13 th cent.
innocent. helpless, deserving weak,
harmless defenceless of pity poor, feeble
ijdi cent.% -t- -L
i6th cent.
* 16th cent. 
r
simple, feeble-minded,
rustic, imbecile
ignorant
—1
foolish,
senseless,
stupid
19th cent.
20fii cent.
Dating of semantic changes of the word silly, OE ges&lig (Samuels 1972:66)
As the diagram illustrates, silly had both positive and negative meanings from 
the thirteenth century onwards, but all of the meanings with positive 
connotations gradually died out in the following six centuries. Samuels makes 
the point that “It seems reasonable to suppose that meanings as unlike as 
‘happy’ and ‘pitiful’, if their occurrences overlapped, would give rise to 
ambiguity, and that that is the main reason for the obsolescence of the 
meaning ‘happy’ in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and of the meaning 
‘harmless’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (ibid:67). What is 
notable about this example is that all of the polysemous meanings of silly were 
concentrated in the same semantic field, human characteristics. The reason 
that a number of these died out does not seem to be related to the number of 
meanings that the expression sustained at one time, although this might be a 
factor. Rather, the obsolescence of these polysemous meanings seems to be 
directly linked to the fact that they would have been used in the same context, 
ie to describe people. Because this could cause confusion, it could not be 
sustained.
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that there are similar 
constraints on metaphorical mapping, or at least on metaphors that are likely
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to become eonventional. Davidson eontends that “...there are no unsuccessful 
metaphors, just as there are no unfunny jokes. There are tasteless metaphors, 
but these are turns that nevertheless have brought something off, even if it 
were not worth bringing off, or could have been brought off better” (Davidson 
1996:415). This may well be the case for creative, novel metaphors, but it does 
not appear to be the case for at least the bulk of conventional metaphors; 
research carried out so far by Grady and others (as well as my own research) 
has indicated that a huge number of these have common primary metaphors as 
their basis19 20. Trying to make any assertions about whether there are limits on 
the number of concepts that can conventionally map to a target concept, or 
from a source concept, seems to be an unsupportable task. Lakoff & Johnson 
have successfully demonstrated that mappings to a target concept can be 
numerous , and the evidence they present for this, lists of mappings for 
particular target concepts, is in no way claimed to be comprehensive. 
However, I would contend that it is possible to make claims about constraints 
on the types of targets that source concepts are likely to be mapped to 
conventionally, and that these can be affected by intralinguistic constraints 
similar to those suggested by semantieists ineluding Samuels, described 
above.
Because the connection involved in the DENSITY mapping is not 
simply between a concept and a single linguistic form, or even several lexical 
items that share an etymology, it is much more difficult to examine the nature 
of this connection in light of this kind of semantic theory. As I have discussed 
in this thesis (and as is demonstrated by some of the many disagreements that 
pose challenges for metaphor study), deconstructing particular metaphors - 
ineluding sueh issues as whether or not metonymy is involved, and how to 
determine what motivates the mapping between source and target - frequently 
rests on subjective judgement. Even in cases where the basic mapping appears 
to be relatively straightforward and generally agreed, it is often unclear which
19 In fact, this also appears to be the case for many creative and literary metaphors; see for 
example comments made by Lakoff & Johnson (1999:66ff, 149-50).
20 See for example the lists of possible metaphors they supply for various target concepts 
including LOVE and LIFE (1980:46-51).
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lexical expressions can be assigned to this mapping. The DENSITY group 
exemplifies this difficulty. Not only do most of the items involved relate to 
specific substances like WOOD or EARTH rather than general terms meaning 
‘dense’, but as well as this many of these entries are associated with hyponyms 
of these categories, or with entities that seem intuitively to be closely related 
but do not slot neatly into any particular group. Examples of these entries, 
such as wattle-head n 1613. are given in the sections dealing with each of the 
subgroups in this chapter. It is for these reasons that any conclusions about 
constraints on these kinds of mappings must be based on conjecture and made 
tentatively.
Despite this, I believe that the observations made by Samuels about 
limits on word reference may offer clues to the reasons for the lack of certain 
substances in the DENSITY data. If a concept like WOOD becomes 
conventionally associated with the human characteristic stupidity, it may be 
that, with some qualifications— %, this precludes its mapping to other targets 
within the field of human characteristics. Conversely, other substances may 
not be mapped to stupidity if they are already have other conventionalised 
associations in the same area.
Stone is commonly and widely used as a source concept for other 
human characteristics besides stupidity. It can be connected with steadiness 
and eonstancy, as when someone is described as a rock or brick, and equally it 
can be used to connote cruelty and indifference, in phrases such as a heart of
stone or a stony expression. The more common base metals steel and iron, 
perhaps less familiar substances anyway, seem to have similar constraints. 
Steel has been used to express the idea of endurance, and this was used by the 
creators of Superman, whom they termed the man of steel' it is also the source, 
like stone, for cruelty or indifference, as in steely-faced. Iron tends to be 
associated with the ability to withstand physical or mental difficulty, as in an
21 There are terms that do seem to be able to sustain incongment meanings, but there may be 
certain reasons for this in each case. For example, the adjective wicked can be found in current
usage with the meaning ‘evil’, but it is also used as a term of approval. However, the latter
meaning tends to be restricted to a particular social group or particular contexts, and for this
reason it is unlikely that the two meanings could be confused.
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iron stomach or a will of iron. These well-established metaphorical 
connections appear to preclude the selection of these substances and others as 
sources for stupidity; in themselves, they fit the motivation that lies behind the 
DENSITY data, but because language is a system that is rooted in one 
particular cultural context, they are not available for the mapping.
To an extent, the characteristics that come to be associated earliest with 
particular entities, and inversely the initial selection of specific entities over 
others to connote these characteristics, must be arbitrary, even though the 
general mapping may be clearly motivated. It seems certain that not all 
mappings will be able to be accounted for precisely and in detail. However, in 
general this further demonstrates the way in which the shared associations of a 
community are crucially important, and must be taken into account in the 
analysis of any metaphorical mapping.
It may be that further research into the nature of metaphor, carried out 
with some attention to historical semantics as well as cognitive principles, will 
yield evidence that allows more insight to this kind of phenomenon. However, 
because conceptual relationships can be as complex as I hope to have shown, 
it seems unlikely that it will ever be possible to categorically prove theories of 
this kind. I believe that it is clear that this certainly cannot be attempted 
without recourse to corpus study, which seems to offer the most promising 
method of analysis of large bodies of real data that can be seen in context, 
either, or both, of individual texts and of similar data. In my opinion, this is a 
useful and significant area for further research, especially as, in general, a 
great deal more work has been done with target concepts than source concepts.
4.8 Conclusion
In general, what I hope to have shown in this chapter is the value of 
case studies in identifying mappings that have a significant input into the way 
particular target concepts are understood diachronically. DENSITY is not a
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source target that is generally recognised to be important in the way 
INTELLIGENCE is conceptualised, and it certainly is not one that has been 
discussed at any length. However, this is a source concept that has been 
productive over a long period and continues to generate new expressions, and 
as well as this it looks likely that it is not a metaphor that is confined to the 
vocabulary of INTELLIGENCE in English. Without a sizeable corpus that 
includes obsolete items, it is not possible to identify and fully analyse this kind 
of mapping, or to make any evaluation of its relative contribution to the 
language of the target concept. By using a corpus though, it is possible to 
identify groups of data that may not immediately seem significant or 
conceptually important, but which can shed light on other recognised 
mappings, as well as on the mechanics of metaphor in general.
As well as this, it is my contention that attempting case studies of this 
kind that focus on particular mappings, either with a source or target concept 
as a starting point, gives the opportunity to gain some sense of the 
complexities involved in metaphor. A diachronic approach can offer a fresh 
perspective on the background and influences of specific expressions and the 
general groups to which these relate; it is possible to identify linguistic 
‘failures’ as well as ‘successes’, and this may lead to a better understanding of 
what constrains and motivates individual metaphors, as well as of the 
metaphorical process itself. In terms of the DENSITY data, the explanation 
that I have posited about the source substances that do not appear in the 
mapping demonstrates the value and importance of bringing newer, cognitive 
theories of language together with older and more established theories from 
semantics and historical linguistics; this seems to me to have been lacking 
from much of the modem research in this area, and may be an important 
direction for semantics in the future. As well as this, and alongside the 
ANIMAL data, the DENSITY group is evidence of the way in which 
mappings are frequently motivated by a combination of factors. I hope to have 
illustrated a few of the ways these can combine, and especially the way in 
which cultural and intra-systemic influences can interact with cognitive 
processes to produce complex and yet cohesive mappings.
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5 Conclusion
En the introduction to this thesis, E argued that the term ‘metaphor’ is 
problematic within metaphor studies (and perhaps more widely within 
linguistics and cognitive science), because it has no generally agreed 
definition and is used differently by scholars in the field. En the light of the 
data E have studied, E would suggest that the simplest and most functional way 
to resolve this difficulty is not to impose limits on the meaning of the term that 
cannot be sustained in practice, but to take the opposite approach: it seems to 
me that ‘metaphor’ is most practically useful if employed as a broad, inclusive 
term. Steen argues that a conceptual definition of metaphor has implications 
for the way metaphors in discourse are regarded, asserting that “Conceptual 
metaphors may emerge as linguistic metaphors, similes, analogies, extended 
nonliteral comparisons and allegories, to name only the most obvious 
possibilities. Other divisions include personification, synaesthesia, and 
zeugma, while there are also the related categories of proverbs, sayings, 
idioms and symbols” (Steen 2002:2E). E believe that this approach has value, 
and E would argue that at its simplest level ‘metaphor’ can be used even more 
broadly, to cover metonymy and synecdoche and as well. This is not to say 
that metaphor is necessarily the most basic or conceptually important process, 
or that these other terms are not useful, but it is a fact that metaphorical 
mappings can result from quite varied mechanisms and can therefore be 
diverse in nature. Et is crucial to recognise that, if they are to be collected 
together, the term used to label the resulting group must be able to 
accommodate this diversity, and furthermore, it does not seem unreasonable to 
subsume other mappings that rely on similar mental processes under the same 
collective name, if only for the sake of economy. Et is my impression that this 
is the way that ‘metaphor’ is often used in practice, certainly by non-linguists 
(as represented by the dictionary definitions quoted in the opening paragraph 
of the introduction), but also by metaphorists themselves. This can result from 
difficulties in determining precisely which kind of mapping is involved in 
particular cases (see Feyaerts E999:3E9 for comments on the connection 
between SOOENG and KNOWENG), and from blending, frequently of
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metaphor and metonymy (cf. Goossens’ (E990) use of the term 
‘metaphtonomy’); even aside from these complications in classifying 
particular linguistic items, though, ‘metaphor’ tends to be used as the generic 
for a particular group of phenomena.
5.1 A corpus-based approach
Connected to this is the importance of using corpora. Et is essential that 
any view of metaphor is informed by real data rather than ad hoc examples 
only; though a theory-based approach can initially be useful because it lends 
itself to narrowly focused study on a single, specific feature of language, if it 
is to be practically useful it must be designed to take account of authentic 
examples of usage rather than discarding these as ‘deviant’. Until recently, 
metaphor studies have tended to focus more often on a theory-based approach, 
but with new techniques for data collection, and technology that allows larger 
corpora to be created and processed relatively easily, scholars are in an ideal 
position to explore metaphor from the opposite perspective and start with data. 
This has been an important part of my approach in this thesis; because E chose 
the three groups of data on which the research would focus after E had 
reviewed the whole corpus, E have examined three different kinds of 
mappings. En the SONSOS chapter, E examined a metaphor that has been 
studied extensively, which is a prototypical example for current theories in 
cognitive linguistics focusing on embodiment and the experiential basis of 
metaphor. By contrast, the DONSETY mapping has been all but overlooked, 
and has not been recognised to be central to ENTOCCEGONCO, but from the 
evidence of my corpus this has also been productive diachronically, and is an 
important element of the way ENTOCCEGONCO is conceptualised. ANEMAC 
metaphors perhaps lie somewhere between these two, in that these are widely 
recognised, but have received relatively little attention or analysis.
5.1.1 Incongruity in conceptualisations of INTELLIGENCE
By studying a corpus centred on a single target concept like 
ENTOCCEGONCO in this way, it is possible to gain an overview of the way in 
which a concept is understood, and the aspects of this that can be 
perspectivised differently. One interesting aspect of the corpus is that it seems
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to indicate that ENTOCCEGONCO is conceptualised in two alternative and 
somewhat incongruous ways, which frame the process of gaining knowledge 
(and condition of being intelligent, which enables the acquisition of further 
knowledge) quite differently1. For the CONTAENOR metaphor and other 
mappings consistent with this, including the DONSETY group, the mind is 
seen as an inanimate object that is passive in the way that it interacts with 
ideas, and the ideas themselves are the active agents involved in the process. 
This is more explicitly evident in related verb phrases, for example in 
describing the way that an idea can, or more often, cannot, penetrate or go into 
the head; this suggests that the mind has no control in the action. En some 
related phrases, it is not the ideas themselves that are active participants, but 
the individual involved in the thought process: this is the case in phrases like I
can 7 get that into my head or no matter what I do, the theory won ' go in.
Despite this change in agency, the mind is still a passive receptor, seen as an 
entity separate from the individual, and although the ideas/knowledge are not 
causing their own ‘motion’ into the mind, they are still ‘moving’, whereas the 
mind is ‘static’. En fact, this is consistent with one of the most historically 
influential theories of intelligence, the theory of EQ, which is based on the 
notion that a person’s mental ‘capacity’ is fixed and limited.
On the other hand, in the alternative conceptualisation of 
ENTOCUGONCO, the roles of the mind and ideas/knowledge are reversed, so 
that the mind has agency and ideas are without control. En relation to the 
SONSOS group, an intelligent mind is able to interact with an idea by using 
the senses to interact with it: depending on the physical sense involved in the 
metaphor, this means being able to perceive it visually, aurally, or by taste, or 
to control it with the hands by touch. Obviously the corollary of this is that the 
ideas are passive objects that are able to be apprehended or manipulated in
' A similar situation can be seen with regard to spaciotemporal metaphors. Boroditsky 
describes the way in which time can be conceptualised in terms of the “ego-moving metaphor,
in which the ‘ego’ or the observer’s context progressed along the time-line towards the future”
or alternatively in terms of the “time-moving metaphor, in which a time-line is conceived as a
river or conveyor belt on which events are moving from the future to the past” (Boroditsky
2000:5).
2 The LIGHT metaphors are an extension of this: if someone is bright, they are able to shed 
light on an idea, thereby making it easier to see.
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these ways. If the mind is SHARP, it is able to penetrate ideas or concepts 
(rather than the other way round), and get to the bottom of them, or get to the
core of problems3.
I would contend that this is an issue that could profitably be explored 
further, and which might benefit from an analysis of the verbs in this semantic 
field. In particular, it might be helpful to consider transitivity in different verb 
constructions. My own research has focused almost exclusively on nouns and 
adjectives, and I have given little attention to verbs except in occasional 
references to expressions that support the evidence within the 
INTELLIGENCE corpus and my interpretation of this (for example, in the 
SENSES chapter). However, a more comprehensive corpus-based study of 
verb expressions including phrases, carried out with attention to etymology, 
would undoubtedly be both valuable in itself and complementary to any 
consideration of other parts of speech in the same semantic field.
5.2 A diachronic approach
A diachronic approach is key to the research I have undertaken; from 
the evidence I have considered I believe that the importance of including 
historical data in metaphor research cannot be overestimated. From this thesis 
and evidence from other studies, there are a number of examples of the way in 
which historical data can offer insight into mappings that could not be 
uncovered by a purely synchronic approach. In many cases these show that the 
origins of an expression that might be assumed instinctively are not those that 
are evidenced etymologically. For example, sluggish meaning ‘slow’ (either 
literally or metaphorically) is generally assumed to come from the name of the 
gastropod, but in reality the opposite is true; the term slug is not recorded as a 
species name until nearly three centuries after it is used of people (the OED
lists the meaning “A slow, lazy fellow; a sluggard. fAlso personified, 
slothfulness” with supporting quotations from cl425, and the meaning “A
3 In general, the ANIMAL metaphors also seem to suggest that the mind has agency rather 
than ideas, since it is the animate participant in the process (with more or less ability), though
taken as a group, these display more complexity that other core concepts. The wide range of
factors involved in the mappings involving particular animals means that it is more difficult to
generalise with regard to this aspect of motivation.
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slow-moving slimy gasteropod or land-snail...in which the shell is rudimentary 
or entirely absent” with supporting quotations from 1704). En fact, the 
ENSOCT group as a whole clearly demonstrates the power of folk etymology, 
as discussed in section 3.4.3. Although few of the expressions in the group 
exhibit a straightforward semantic transfer from ENSOCT to STUPEDETY, and 
most of the entries are etymologically connected to roots that are not 
connected to ENSOCT terms, the link between the two concepts is sufficiently 
convincing to attract further expressions and to sustain those that already exist 
even if the forms from which they are descended are obsolete.
There are also cases in which historical evidence can solve linguistic 
puzzles about the origins of phrases, and this is exemplified by Hough’s work 
on understand (Hough forthcoming 2004), which draws from cognitive 
linguistic evidence, etymology and comparative evidence.
One point that has not been discussed at length in the main section of 
the thesis is the assumption that metaphorical sources tend to be concrete, and 
map onto abstract targets. As described in the introduction, my approach in 
analysing the ENTOCCEGONCO data was to look first at the etymology of each 
term, and to determine in this way if any mapping from one concept to another 
had occurred. This was important in avoiding preconceptions about terms 
assumed to be (or not to be) figurative, and in several cases turned up 
unexpected results. While cases of concrete to abstract metaphorical mapping 
are undoubtedly more common, an increasing number of semantic shifts in the 
opposite direction have been documented, and these present a strong argument 
in favour of diachronic language study. One of the most surprising groups in 
the ENTOCCEGONCO corpus is made up of seventeen entries that derive from 
dull. Folk etymology seems to attribute the meaning ‘stupid’ to a source 
meaning connected with SHARP/PEORCENG, but the evidence of the OED
suggests that in fact the opposite transfer of meaning has occurred. The 
earliest meaning for dull is defined as “Not quick in intelligence or mental 
perception; slow of understanding; not sharp of wit; obtuse, stupid, 
inapprehensive. En early use, sometimes: Wanting wit, fatuous, foolish”. This 
is supported by quotations as early as the tenth century, and has a cognate in 
Germanic. The concrete meaning of the term, “Not sharp or keen; blunt (in lit.
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sense)”, seems to be much later, and the earliest supporting quotation for this 
dates to cl440 (one earlier quotation dating to cl400 is also listed in the OED,
but this is marked as dubious^. Keen appears to develop in a similar way, with 
the abstract sense evidenced earlier than the concrete; this is also observed by 
Shindo in a discussion of the semantic development of this item alongside that 
of eager and clear. She concludes that “There exist some semantic changes 
running in the opposite direction to the widely recognized tendency from 
concrete to abstract meanings” (Shindo 2003).
Another alternative to the traditionally assumed concrete to abstract 
mapping seems to exist in cases where the concepts held to be the source and 
target of a mapping do not appear to have been separate historically. In chapter 
2, where the SENSES data is discussed, I have shown that some of the most 
central VISION-PERCEPTION vocabulary in English may not result from 
semantic transfer from an earlier physical sense to a later mental one. 
Instances of this kind of linguistic item, which has a conflated meaning that 
subsequently splits into two senses (or is at least regarded as having a ‘literal’ 
and a ‘figurative’ denotation), challenge traditional ideas about metaphorical 
mappings, and as I suggest in the conclusion to chapter 2, these must be 
accommodated in any theory of metaphor. Again, I would argue that this 
supports the case for a more flexible view of metaphor, in which diversity of 
this kind does not appear ‘anomalous’.
5.3 An approach
I have tried to approach the data by using material from a range of 
disciplines, depending on what seemed most appropriate to a particular group 
of entries; this has resulted in a study that draws from reconstructive 
etymology, psychology, archaeology, comparative linguistics, history and 
semantics. I thus hope to have shown the variety of influences that can be 
involved in the coining and conventionalisation of mappings, and potential
4 Interestingly, the definitions for this item supplied in the OED use the same metaphor, and 
perhaps show how deep rooted the connection between the two concepts has become. Part of
one earlier definition uses the word “obtuse”; another, also with earlier supporting quotations
than the concrete sense, is “Having the natural vivacity or cheerfulness blunted”.
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reasons for the success of some mappings and the failures of others that are 
outwardly very similar. An interdisciplinary approach can also be useful in 
evaluating theories of metaphor that have been posited at various times. For 
example, one relatively recent theory, which is appealing in its simplicity, is 
based on prototype theory:
...the basic mechanism behind metaphor is straightforward. It is simply the use of a
word with one or more of the ‘typicality conditions’ attached to it broken. As we
noted in Chapter 5, words have fuzzy edges, in that for the majority of words it is
impossible to specify a hard-core meaning at all. Humans understand words by
referring to a prototypical usage, and they match a new example against the
characteristics of the prototype. A tiger can still be a tiger even though it might have
three legs and no stripes: it just wouldn’t be a prototypical tiger (Aitchison 1987:144­
5).
Aitchison’s suggestion is basically that metaphor involves the recategorisation 
of any referent as a marginal member of a new group. She goes on to say that 
in the same way that a tiger missing one leg and stripes is still a member of the 
category, describing a person as a tiger involves the same kind of 
recategorisation. The same idea was proposed by Morse Peckham in 1970, in 
his statement that “We perceive a metaphor as metaphoric...when we 
encounter words...which conventionally do not belong to the same category. 
A metaphor...is an assertion that they do” (Peckham 1970:405). However, 
whilst this may offer a different perspective on the metaphor, it seems not only 
inadequate but also misleading. As E have shown, ANEMAC metaphors arise 
out of a tradition of human-animal thought, and this appears to be one part of 
what makes them ‘successful’ as a group. Saying that metaphor simply 
amounts to recategorisation implies that all mappings are equally likely, and 
does not take account of the many other factors that can be involved. The 
complexity of this process, and the variety of possible factors, makes the 
process of mapping from humans to animals quite different from the process 
of including an entity in a category even though it does not possess all the 
necessary characteristics to be a prototypical example. For this reason, E 
believe this theory is inadequate. More generally, E would argue that 
conducting interdisciplinary case studies of individual mappings can be 
invaluable in assessing the usefulness and merit of particular theories.
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5.4 Future
The principal aim of this thesis has been to give some impression of 
the diversity that metaphor can entail, and the range of phenomena by which 
the metaphorical process can be influenced. I hope to have made some wider 
contribution to metaphor as a discipline, and highlighted some of the key areas 
that might be explored in the future.
There are several other research projects that I would suggest as a 
worthwhile follow-up to this thesis. One of the more practical concerns the 
way in which the data might be used; in my opinion, there is potential for an 
online or CD-Rom based resource that could be used by undergraduates and 
other metaphor scholars, which would set out information about each group, 
including etymological history, possible motivations and related source 
concepts, through a series of html-style links. The front end of this resource 
could be one or more semantic maps, structured in a similar way to the 
Wordnet-based Visual Thesaurus5; this would enable users to access groups of 
data with explanatory notes, and, from these, etymologies of individual terms. 
From my own experiences, teaching aids of this kind can provide useful tools 
for student research; as well as this, the online metaphor sites that are available 
currently are a helpful reference, but most of these are far from comprehensive 
and may be unfinished.
As well as this, I believe that there is room for a great deal more 
comparative linguistic research into the INTELLIGENCE mappings. My work 
on the SENSES data, for which I used data from Austronesian and Afroasiatic, 
evinced the difficulties involved in this kind of investigation, but resources 
like Ehret (199D) and Tryon (199D) are an important starting point for this 
kind of work and provide far more comprehensive evidence than has been 
hitherto available. Comparative work into metaphor seems to me to be a 
necessary direction for future study, especially in the context of questions 
about linguistic universals and the extent of the role of embodiment in 
cognition.
5 http://www.visualthesaurus.com7onlme/index.htnil
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6 Postscript: Sapir-Whorf, PC language and the
influence of metaphor
I would suggest that the approach I have taken could valuably be 
widened further, and it would be interesting to link up my own analysis of 
INTELLIGENCE with work on related topics. One issue in which I am 
particularly interested is the question of linguistic relativism, and I would 
contend that empirical work of this kind could provide valuable new material 
for the further consideration of the connection between thought and language.
The question of whether language can influence thought is one that has 
been discussed within linguistics for decades, and which has remained wholly 
unresolved. In its strongest form, what has come to be termed the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis - the idea that thought is conditioned and even constrained by 
language - has been generally discredited, but the weaker form of the theory, 
linguistic relativism, continues to be taken seriously by many linguists. This 
holds that language can influence thought to some degree, but is not the only 
factor in the way speakers of different language construct varying world 
views. The comments of Sweetser represent one of the more moderate views 
of this kind, and one which accepts the possibility of, if not the evidence for, 
relativism.
Perhaps, however, the issue of language shaping cognition is a little less thorny than
we thought. For example, few linguists or anthropologists would be upset by the
hypothesis that learning a word for a culturally important category could
linguistically reinforce the learning of a category itself. There seem to be areas, at
least, of interdependency between cognition and language. Likewise, it would be
hard to deny that much of the basic cognitive apparatus of humans is not dependent
on language, and that humans therefore share a great deal of prelinguistic and
extralinguistic experience which is likely to shape language rather than to be shaped
by it (Sweetser 1990:7).
In recent years, the possible influence of language on thought has been 
an important issue amongst non-linguists too, and in the media particularly 
there is an implicit belief that the way in which an idea is framed linguistically
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is crucially important. This has fed into the idea of ‘political correctness’ that 
has been contentious in the last two decades, which is specifically concerned 
with the way social groups of various kinds are labelled, and the way in which 
labels can perpetuate particular attitudes. Et has become unacceptable (and 
potentially a crime) to use outdated terminology that might cause offence in 
official matters, and generally even those who do not subscribe to the use of 
politically correct (PC) language would judge certain expressions to be 
inappropriate.
En my opinion, it is important to view the ENTOCCEGONCO data in the 
context of these issues, since they provide a background and justification for 
considering the various metaphors involved in the way intelligence is 
conceptualised. Oven before PC language became a fashionable topic of 
debate, the terminology used to indicate the level of an individual’s mental 
capacities was much discussed within educational theory and was subject to 
frequent changes in practice. The table below lists some of these, and gives 
dates of official usage for each; this clearly illustrates the speed with which 
terms can fall out of acceptability within one register and even become taboo 
items.
1886
Idioi
lmbecile
IH99
Statutory categories
/970 1981
Suited
dnrriptive
categories/973 !94" 1962
Id ioi Idiot Severely Severely Educationally Child with
siib-iiormal sub-normal subnormal 1 learning
Jinbccile Imbecile (SSN) (SSN) (severe) s'. difficulties
Moral ini bctile Psycho pat hit 1 (seveie)
Blind Blind Blind Blind iS Blind
Partially sighted Partially sighted Partially sighted
Deal Deaf Deaf Deaf 5 Deaf
Partially deaf Partial hearing Partial hearing ■2 Partial hearing
Rpiieptrc
Dcfdt.live
Epiieptic Epileptk:
M erital dc fee live Ed n ca tio nail y
Epileptic
Educationally 1 EpilepticChild with
(feehle-minded) subnormal subnormal zr. learning
(mild 01 • difficulty
modcrate) (mild or
moderate)
Maladjusted Maladjusted Maladjusted
disruptive
Pbysieal Physically Physically Physically
defective handicapped handicapped handicapped
Speccli Speech Speech
defect defect defect
Delicate
Diabetic:
Delicate Delicate Delicate
Dyslexic?
Autistic?
Xutr C.ilcgoi ii.-s suggested hul never iidupted include: ihc neuropathic i hild, the inconsequential child, the psychiatrically crippled child, the aphasic
<hild and otheis. Aulisni and dyslexia were recognised undo the 1970 Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act.
From Tomlinson 1982:61
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It is impossible to assess conclusively whether or not significance 
should be attached significance to terminology, and to evaluate the practice of 
changing labels in response to more progressive attitudes in order to minimise 
stigma. However, the impressions of those working in education - even those 
who are initially skeptical - seem to support the idea that terminology can 
have an effect on people's perceptions, and can be more or less helpful in the 
way in which it presents those of varying mental capabilities. In an informal 
interview I conducted with a group of around twenty student teachers in the 
final stage of a Post-Graduate Certificate of Education (PGCE), most of the 
group admitted that although they considered some terms like stupid, slow,
and thick to be inappropriate in describing pupils, they did find themselves 
using these occasionally outside the classroom. There were mixed feelings 
about whether or not using ‘unofficial’ terms related to intelligence had any 
effect, but several of those taking part in the discussion felt strongly that the 
way in which another teacher described pupils in a class - for example, 
terming them thick rather than referring to their ability level - did influence 
the attitude that other teachers had towards them. One member of the group 
described her experience of a school in which one teacher refused to teach a 
class because of the way the students had been described, and the way he had 
come to talk about them, and she felt very strongly that this was a direct result 
of pejorative terminology. Though this kind of anecdotal evidence cannot be 
accepted as proof of the effect of language, it does seem to be mirrored in 
educational policies, and reflects the general feeling that labels can create 
stigma and must be monitored carefully.
If it is true that presentation can affect perception in this area, then it 
must equally be advisable to consider the possible implications of particular 
metaphors. In turn, it is critical to be aware of what motivates these metaphors. 
In order to gain some sense of what might be involved in the creation and 
‘survival’ of any metaphorical mapping, its source and development must be 
explored.
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7 Appendix: Additional data tables
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7.9.1 CONTAINER-EMPTY/FULL OF NOTHING................................................................. 227
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7.18 HUMBLE/ORDINARY........................................................................................................ 242
7.19 INTELLIGENCE................................................................................................................... 243
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1043 clever-smart aleck derog smart-arsed/-assed aj 1960
1045 clever-smart aleck derog smart-arse/-ass n 1962
1046 clever-smart aleck derog smarty-boots/smarti-boots aj 1962
1047 clever-smart aleck derog smarty-boots/smarti-boots n 1962
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